LORD CARDWELL AT THE WAR OFFICE

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

Edward Sandford

LORD CARDWELL AT THE WAR OFFICE

A HISTORY OF HIS ADMINISTRATION 1868-1874

BY GENERAL SIR ROBERT BIDDULPH
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107712

WITH A PORTRAIT

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PREFACE

THE object of this book is to place on record the history of Lord Cardwell's administration of the War Office from December 1868 to February 1874.

It will probably come as a surprise to the reader to learn that before he received the Seals of office, Lord Cardwell had made a careful study of the military problems that had been occupying public attention since the Crimean War, and had written a paper in which he reviewed the principal questions of army reform which would inevitably present themselves. The paper was prepared, in December 1868, to bring his general view before Mr Gladstone and other colleagues, but it shows that the subject had been thought out before there was any prospect of the writer becoming responsible for the War Department.

During the Crimean War he had been pressed by Lord Palmerston to undertake (but had declined), the duties of the Exchequer, and in 1858-59 he had taken a leading part on the Commission for manning the Navy. Thus, his attention had been called perforce to the gravity of the question of War Finance, and to the arduous problem of providing in peace for recruits on any outbreak of war. But these were only two aspects of the more general question of reorganizing national defence.

In the very forefront of Army Reform stood the question of War Office administration. By the crude and

hasty reconstruction of 1855, the various administrative departments of the army were amalgamated, without first defining the principles upon which that amalgamation ought to be effected. The Board of Ordnance, which had been declared to be "the model department of the Government,"[1] and which had existed since the reign of Henry VIII., was abolished, and with the disappearance of the Master General, whose office had existed without interruption from the time of Richard III., a soldier of rank and experience ceased to be included among the responsible ministers of the Crown.

When the War Office was reconstructed it was formed by what in geology is called a "catastrophe." It consisted of part of the old Colonial Office, part of the old Ordnance Office, all of the Secretary at War's office, part of the Treasury, and a little bit of the Home Office; all these were suddenly thrown together without having been properly combined. When the Select Committee of 1860 had completed its enquiry into the result, the chairman (Sir James Graham) remarked to Mr Cardwell, "There is only one word that can describe it, and that word is '*Chaos.*'"

For thirteen years the efforts of every Secretary of State for War had been directed to the building up of an efficient military department on this confused substratum; but Lord Cardwell perceived that the confusion would never be remedied until a reconstruction had been made upon some sound principle. In 1855, the command and discipline of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers

[1] Select Committee, 1855, evidence of Lord Hardinge. Royal Commission on Civil Administration of the Army, 1836. Select Committee on Public Income and Expenditure, 1828.

had been transferred to the Commander-in-Chief, and four years later the control of the armaments and warlike material for fortresses and artillery was similarly transferred; but the Auxiliary Forces and the Army Reserves were under the direction of a general officer directly responsible to the Secretary of State. While the functions of the Commander-in-Chief had thus been enlarged at home, they had been further extended by placing under his command the whole of the troops abroad, except those serving in the territories of the East India Company. Though in theory the Commander-in-Chief's department was subordinate to the War Minister, yet communication between the Horse Guards and the War Office was by letter, and the discipline of the army, as also the first appointment and the promotion of the officers, were excluded by a formal document from the department of the Secretary of State for War.

It appeared to Lord Cardwell that the War Department should be organized somewhat on the model of the Admiralty, but with a difference, approximating more to the constitution of the old Board of Ordnance.

In the Board of Admiralty, the first Lord, as a Cabinet Minister, had the chief power, but the responsibility of the Board was a joint one. In the Board of Ordnance each member of the Board had a definite department over which he presided, and for which he was responsible to the Master-General who was supreme and had the power of deciding any controverted point. It is practically impossible for a Secretary of State to hold any other position than that. He is the Sovereign's mouthpiece, and the Sovereign acts upon his advice. This then was the form of administration adopted by Parliament on

Lord Cardwell's recommendation.[1] The War Office was divided into three departments dealing with—1. *Personnel;* 2. *Matériel;* 3. *Finance.* These were subdivided into branches, each under a responsible head. One of the most important of these branches was the Intelligence Department, which, as will be found in the pages of this history, owed its inception to the initiative of Lord Cardwell.

Another great question of primary importance was the provision of an adequate military force. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 had shown the rapidity with which modern peace armies can be expanded to war establishments, and had demonstrated how needful it was that Great Britain should be able, on the outbreak of war, to place on foot a far larger number of men than had ever been thought necessary before. This end could only be attained by creating an Army Reserve to consist of men still in the prime of life who, after being trained for a few years in the army, had passed into the ranks of the civil population, and were receiving a small retaining fee with the liability of recall to the colours on a national emergency. For this purpose the Short Service Act of 1870 was introduced, providing for the creation of a Reserve which would increase automatically without adding to the number of troops with the Colours during peace. Short service necessitated a greatly increased

[1] This organization is inferior to that of the Admiralty, in that the Naval Lords have a distinct position under the Patent, so that the First Lord is obliged to consult them. The Secretary of State for War is under no such obligation. Hence at the Admiralty, although one First Lord succeeds another, the policy usually remains steady, while at the War Office each successive Secretary of State, as he need only consult the soldiers at the War Office when he pleases, seems to think it his duty to have a policy of his own.

number of recruits, and one great obstacle to recruiting lay in the undue proportion of foreign service to which the troops were exposed. It was therefore determined to withdraw troops from the self-governing colonies, so as to concentrate a larger force in the United Kingdom, to disband local regiments borne on Imperial Estimates, and to encourage the formation of Colonial military forces for their own defence.

The new Enlistment Act was accompanied by two measures which were opposed to the old traditions of the army, viz.: abolition of recruiting bounty, and discharge of men of bad character. By the first measure such men were deprived of the chief inducement for enlisting, and the temptation to desert and fraudulently re-enlist was greatly lessened. By the second measure the army was purged from those whose presence in the ranks deterred many respectable men from enlisting, and this, coupled with the abolition of corporal punishment, tended to open the ranks to a better and more educated class than had usually offered themselves to the recruiting officer. While these measures were yet in progress the outbreak of the Franco-German War occurred, and emphasized the importance of the measures that had been adopted for increasing the number of battalions in the United Kingdom, and the formation of a reserve to fill their ranks.

The year 1871 was mainly devoted to the abolition of the purchase system which stood in the way of every attempt to organize the forces of the Crown for the best interests of the public. The mode in which the abolition was carried out is told in this history. It has never been written before, and an endeavour has been made to

narrate it fully, at the risk of being tedious, because it relates to a very important episode in the history of the British army. The tact, the patience, and the courage which Lord Cardwell displayed under very difficult circumstances during that year, stamped him as a sagacious and capable administrator.

The abolition of purchase was followed by the localization of the forces and the affiliation of the Auxiliary troops to the Regular army. By this system a fixed territorial area was assigned to each regiment of infantry, and upon that area its recruiting was based. Regiments were no longer to consist of "a fortuitous concourse of atoms," but each was to have a permanent connection with some county. At the same time the infantry was definitely organized on a double battalion system, by which means the battalions abroad could be maintained constantly efficient, and the waste and extravagance of a single battalion system were avoided.

The localization of the army had another incidental advantage which Lord Cardwell had in view. Like all institutions controlled by a popular assembly, the army was subject to the constant fluctuations caused by hot and cold fits of the British public, alternating between panic and parsimony. By taking the lowest number of battalions by which the service of the Empire could be carried out in time of peace and allotting them in double battalion regiments to fixed territorial areas in the United Kingdom, he placed the infantry on a settled basis (as regards number of battalions) below which it could not be reduced, but which could be expanded indefinitely by adding battalions to existing regiments. He was thus enabled successfully to resist demands for reduction made on the sole ground of

saving money. Similar demands have indeed since been made the excuse for reducing the number of men in the home battalions to an extent which has seriously interfered with the working of the system, but it has effectually prevented the reduction of the "cadres" of regiments, weak in peace time but possessing a large reserve capable of raising them to full strength in time of war.

It remains for me to offer an apology for writing this book. My first acquaintance with Lord Cardwell was in the early part of 1870, when he visited the district in which I was a staff officer, in order to make himself acquainted with certain local conditions that surrounded a question of some magnitude. A few months later I met him at the War Office, at a conference which I had been asked to attend, in order to assist in formulating a scheme for placing the Artillery Militia and the Artillery Volunteers on a more efficient basis. In the autumn of 1871, after the abolition of the purchase system, he offered me the post of Private Secretary, which he wished to be held by an officer of the army. I was at that time, in common with most officers in the army, dissatisfied with what was supposed to be Lord Cardwell's administrative policy. The "dual" government of the army was known to exist at Head Quarters, and the introduction of the control system into the military districts was looked upon as an attempt to introduce a dual system of administration throughout the army. Few understood that Lord Cardwell was really working for unification, for it was not his custom to announce his views beforehand, but rather to work quietly and silently until the work was so far advanced as to exhibit itself.

I thought it right to tell him of my objections, in

order that he might judge of the propriety of making some other choice. He assured me, however, that he was satisfied that I should serve him to the best of my ability. With that understanding I accepted the office which he offered to me, and I held it from October 1871 to June 1873. During that period I had ample opportunity of observing the skill and sagacity with which he administered the affairs of the army. I also learned how little is known by officers generally of the principles of army administration, and how much less is known by the British public and most of their guides.

Some years afterwards, I was asked to give the necessary information for a paper to be written on Lord Cardwell's administration of the War Office. I felt that it would be impossible to do this in a satisfactory way without having access to papers and correspondence which were not at my disposal, besides devoting to the work an amount of care and time which my public duties would not allow.

A year ago, shortly after my retirement from the active list, the question incidentally came forward again, and I was urged by some brother-officers to undertake the work. Lord Cardwell's representatives placed his papers and correspondence at my disposal, and Lord Northbrook, to whom I applied for certain information, allowed me to examine any of his papers bearing on the same period. In this way I found an abundance of material which, together with the Reports of Royal Commissions and Select Committees, the pages of Hansard and the columns of *The Times*, gave me, if anything, too much to work upon. I can only regret that a task of such importance has not fallen into abler hands.

My object has been to give an accurate history of the events connected with Lord Cardwell's administration. I have not hesitated, therefore, to quote largely from official documents in order to try to do justice to my subject; and if I have occasionally used the language of others, either from official reports, from *The Times*, or from the *Annual Register*, it is because I felt that I could not express myself better, and therefore I would not spoil it by altering the phrases. For any such obligations not acknowledged in the text, I beg to offer my acknowledgments now, and to express my special thanks to Mr Evelyn Fanshawe and to Lord Northbrook for the papers lent to me by them; and also to Mr Charles Parker, whose connection with Lord Cardwell enabled him to give me useful information which he has ungrudgingly afforded to me. A paper written in 1871 by Captain Evelyn Baring, R.A. (now Earl of Cromer), on the organization of Infantry, afforded me much useful information, and papers written by the late Sir Douglas Galton[1] and Sir Ralph Thompson,[2] on the administration of the army prior to 1868, have been of great service to me. I have to thank many of my old army and War Office friends for assistance in discussing and criticizing some portions of my proof sheets: Sir George Ramsay, Sir Ralph Knox, General Sir Frederick Stephenson, General Sir Edward Bulwer, Major-General Sir Charles Wilson, Sir James O'Dowd (who died after this book had gone to press), Colonel Lonsdale Hale, and also Mr A. D. L. Cary, in charge of the Parliamentary library of the War Office, who, with

[1] Assistant Under-Secretary of State 1862-69.

[2] Under-Secretary of State 1878-95.

the permission of the Secretary of State, has afforded me much assistance in searching the official records. Lastly, I am indebted to Lord Selborne for allowing me to publish his father's letters on the Royal Warrant abolishing the sale of Commissions, and to the Trustees of Mr Gladstone's papers for permission to publish his letter on the successes in Egypt in 1882.

ROBERT BIDDULPH.

January 1904.

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LORD CARDWELL AT THE WAR OFFICE

CHAPTER I

ARMY ADMINISTRATION, 1854-1868

THE result of the general election of 1868 showed that the Conservative party no longer enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the electors. Without waiting for the meeting of Parliament, Mr Disraeli's government resigned office; and in the morning papers of the 4th December 1868 it was announced that Mr Gladstone had been summoned to Windsor on the previous day, that he had had an interview of some duration with the Queen, and had undertaken the formation of the new Cabinet.

While this announcement was being read by the public at breakfast, Mr Cardwell was calling on Mr Gladstone in obedience to a summons from him, and on his entrance was thus greeted by the new Premier: "Clarendon is Foreign Secretary, and you are Secretary of State for War."

Such was the beginning of Mr Gladstone's first ministry, which was formed so expeditiously that an announcement of the principal appointments was made on the 7th December. The distribution of offices was generally approved, though it was observed that Mr Cardwell, who had been invited by Lord Derby to become

his Finance Minister[1] in 1852, and had received the same offer from Lord Palmerston in 1855, would have had a more congenial office as Chancellor of Exchequer, while Mr Lowe, who was designated for that office, would have been better able to meet the demand for efficient Army Reform. Mr Lowe's abilities will not be questioned, but the tact and patience which Mr Cardwell possessed in an eminent degree, were qualities without which it would have been impossible to carry out the important changes which took place under his administration of the War Department.

The immediate question of Army Reform which was occupying Sir John Pakington when he relinquished the seals of the War Office, was the proper organization of the various Departments which administered the army. In order to appreciate the difficulties which presented themselves, it is necessary to glance for a moment at the organization of the army at the time of the outbreak of the Crimean War, and pass in review the principal changes that had taken place since 1854.

The several departments, which at that time had the management of the business of the army, were represented by—

1. The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.[2]
2. The Commander-in-Chief.[3]
3. The Secretary at War.[2]
4. The Treasury.
5. The Master-General of the Ordnance.

[1] This statement is taken from *The Times* of the 7th December 1868. Lord Cardwell's papers do not afford any information on the subject.

[2] The reader's attention is invited to the distinction between the "Secretary of State for War," and the "Secretary at War," who exercised perfectly distinct functions, and should not be confused in the following pages. The two offices were merged in 1855.

[3] After the death of the Duke of Wellington, the designation of this office was "General Commanding-in-Chief," and so remained until H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge was appointed Commander-in-Chief by Patent in 1887.

6. The Home Secretary, who with the Secretary at War controlled the Militia.

7. The Board of General Officers for the Inspection of Clothing.

These seven Departments were independent of each other, and communicated with each other by letter.

1. The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was responsible for the amount of force to be maintained, and when this was approved by the Cabinet, he communicated it to the Commander-in-Chief. He also allotted garrisons to Colonial possessions. In time of war he was responsible for the selection of officers to command in chief, and to a considerable extent for the selection of officers to important commands under them. He had entire control over operations bearing on the war.

2. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the discipline and efficiency of the infantry and cavalry. He made the arrangements for the enlistment of the soldiers, and for the commissioning and promotion of officers. He recommended to the Crown the officers who were to be entrusted with commands, subject, in the case of commands at home, to the previous approval of the Home Secretary, and in the case of Colonial or Foreign commands, to the approval of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. As the Sovereign's Deputy he exercised the active command of the forces at home. but he had no control over the supply of their arms, accoutrements, stores, or ammunition; nor over the fortifications, armaments, and magazines. He could not of his own power increase or diminish any garrison; nor could he move a single man without the previous sanction of the Secretary at War, by whom the "route" was signed upon a requisition made by the Quartermaster-General on the War Office.

The Commander-in-Chief exercised no command over the troops outside the United Kingdom,[1] but stood to them in much the same position as he now does to the British troops in India. For the general exercise of their command, general officers abroad reported to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.

3. The Secretary at War[2] was a Minister of the Crown, holding a seat in Parliament, and sometimes in the Cabinet. His sanction and authority were required in everything relating to the finance of the army, and to those matters which brought soldiers into contact with the inhabitants of the country, such as the quartering, billeting, and marching of troops. He brought in the annual Mutiny Act in the House of Commons, and to that extent had a certain amount of control over the discipline of the army. He controlled financially the pay and allowances of the Staff, the Infantry, and the Cavalry. He fixed the rates of pay, food, and clothing to be given to the army (exclusive of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers). He issued pay and allowances

[1] The Duke of Wellington held the office of Commander-in-Chief by Patent. In that instrument his authority was limited to "all and singular our Land Forces employed or to be employed in our service within our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland."

H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge was appointed a General on the Staff, to "obey such orders as you shall receive from Her Majesty, the Commander-in-Chief, or any other Your Royal Highness' Superior Officer." The Queen's pleasure, as above, was conveyed by a "letter of service" from the Secretary of State for War in the usual form in which general officers receive their appointments to serve on the staff of the army.

[2] In the event of a vacancy in the office of Commander-in-Chief the charge of that office devolved on the Secretary at War. On the death of the Duke of York in 1827, it became the duty of the Secretary at War to promulgate the orders of the Crown to the army. The King wrote, "He is now responsible for those duties attached to the Commander-in-Chief."

When the Duke of Wellington resigned in April 1827, Lord Palmerston, who was Secretary at War, assumed the duties of the Commander-in-Chief's office and acted therein till the Duke resumed the command of the army four months later. *Clode's Military Forces of the Crown.*

at home, dealt with questions relating to recruiting, savings banks, issues of routes, and the grant of passages, and had the executive control over schools, chaplains, and military prisons. He dealt with all questions of half-pay, pensions to officers and their families, the payment of pensions to soldiers, and the control of the enrolled pensioners. He had no control over the Artillery and Engineers, nor over the material of the army. The Secretary at War held direct communication with the Crown; but should any regulation introduced by him be objected to by the Commander-in-Chief, he had to communicate his views, together with the objections of the Commander-in-Chief, to the first Lord of the Treasury, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or to all of them, for them to obtain the Sovereign's pleasure thereon.[1]

4. The Treasury, besides its general control over the finances of the army, had the direct management of the Commissariat department, and through its Commissariat officers provided provisions, fuel, and light for the troops employed abroad and in Ireland.[2] At foreign stations the Commissariat officer made all important contracts, and if the General Officer Commanding gave orders for expenditure not provided in the estimates, or not in accordance with the Regulations, it was the duty of the Commissariat officer to point it out to him, and to report the matter to the Treasury. He was also expected to write to the Treasury in detail upon the various proceedings at the station, and to call attention to what he considered to be unnecessary expenditure.

5. The Master-General of the Ordnance had charge of

[1] Royal Warrant, 29th May 1812.

[2] Supplies of bread, meat, and forage in Great Britain were provided by the Board of Ordnance, the cost being repaid to the Ordnance by the War Office, and recovered by that Office from the troops by means of the stoppage for rations.

the discipline, pay, and allowances of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers; he was also charged with the construction and armament of fortifications, the construction and care of barracks, and the supply of fuel and light at home. He provided and regulated the issue of artillery, arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and other stores both for the Army and the Navy, camp equipage, barrack furniture, great-coats for the Army, and clothing for the Artillery and Sappers, in fact everything for the Army except the regimental clothing of the Infantry and Cavalry, which was supplied by the Colonels of Regiments. The Master-General, like the Secretary at War, was under the general financial control of the Treasury. He was a member of the Government and sometimes in the Cabinet. He was always a military officer of high rank. The Master-General had supreme control over the whole business of the Ordnance, both civil and military. In his civil duties he was assisted by the Board of Ordnance, which consisted of the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, the Clerk of the Ordnance,[1] and the principal Storekeeper, who each had distinct duties and were termed the Principal Officers of Ordnance. The two former were members of the Government, and generally had seats in the House of Commons.

For his Artillery duties the Master-General had under him (1) the Deputy Adjutant-General of Artillery, who managed the discipline of the Royal Artillery, and (2) the Director-General of Artillery, who had charge of the armaments and ammunition in the hands of the Artillery. This officer was the adviser of the Master-General on scientific questions, and dealt with experiments and new patterns of arms.

[1] The Clerk of the Ordnance was sometimes a military officer and sometimes a civilian.

In his charge of the Royal Engineers the Master-General was assisted by the Inspector-General of Fortifications, who advised on all questions of works and buildings in charge of officers of Royal Engineers. The Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Engineers assisted the Master-General in administering the discipline of the Corps.

6. The Home Secretary was the responsible Secretary of State for general military questions relating to Great Britain.[1] When the Duke of Wellington died, in September 1852, the Secretary of State for the Home Department took the pleasure of the Crown on the circular to be issued to the Army, and the same was communicated by the Secretary at War to the Adjutant-General and promulgated by that officer. So long as the Militia and Yeomanry were disembodied they were under the control of the Home Secretary; a Committee of the House of Commons prepared the Militia Estimates, and the Secretary at War dealt with all questions of finance and internal arrangements of the regiments.

7. The Board of General Officers was formally established by a Royal Warrant of George I., dated 29th November 1714. At that time there was no Commander-in-Chief, nor any Headquarter administration of the Army in the sense in which it is understood at the present time. Such matters as could not be dealt with by the Colonels of Regiments were disposed of by the King's order conveyed through the Secretary at War or the Adjutant-General. The Colonels clothed and equipped their Regiments, and matters of general importance to the Army were referred to the Board of General Officers by the King's command. These commands were signified

[1] This practice still survives with regard to the Channel Islands. The appointment of the officers proposed for the command of the troops in Jersey and Guernsey (where they also act as Lieutenant-Governors), requires the concurrence of the Home Secretary.

by the Secretary at War. When the Board was assembled five formed a *quorum.* After the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief in 1793, the functions of the Board gradually diminished, and in 1854 they were practically limited to matters relating to the clothing of the Cavalry and Infantry of the army.

The general features of the arrangements were, therefore, that the departments which supplied the Army with either food, stores, or accommodation, were independent of the troops and were managed by members of the Government directly responsible to Parliament, who exercised a detailed supervision over the expenditure.

Although the control by Parliament over the army and the financial checks over the expenditure were very complete, there was this serious defect, viz., that when the Sovereign was no longer the active head to govern the whole machine, there was no one head who could authoritatively co-ordinate the proceedings of the departments.

The Artillery and Engineers formed indeed a remarkable exception to the general arrangement for the rest of the army. In the Master-General of the Ordnance they possessed a head to whom all questions of service and discipline converged. He united in his own person the administrative functions now exercised by the Secretary of State for War and by the Commander-in-Chief, so that as regards these two corps there was complete unity of administration.

As regards the Infantry and Cavalry of the army it was very different. The Commander-in-Chief had to look to three separate departments for their payment and supplies, viz., the Secretary at War, the Treasury, and the Board of Ordnance, all under Parliamentary control.

The want of unity of arrangement was so much felt at the breaking out of the Crimean War, that a scheme for the amalgamation of the departments was somewhat hastily adopted, without any general plan being laid down for effecting this amalgamation upon defined principles.

Accordingly in June 1854, the Department of War was separated from the Colonial Office and placed under a fourth[1] Secretary of State, who assumed control over all the military departments. In December 1854, the Commissariat Department was transferred from the Treasury to the War Department. In February 1855, the office of Secretary at War was combined with that of Secretary of State for War, the Deputy Secretary at War becoming an Under Secretary of State.

In March 1855, the general control of the Militia and Yeomanry was transferred from the Home Office, and after the Militia was disembodied at the end of the war, an Inspector of Militia was appointed who acted under the Secretary of State for War.

In May 1855, the Letters Patent for the Board of Ordnance were revoked, and its duties were vested thenceforth in the Secretary of State for War; at the same time by Her Majesty's command the Secretary of State transferred the command and discipline of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers to the Commander-in-Chief, who was thus charged with the administration of all the combatant branches of the army.

The clothing of the Infantry and Cavalry was now undertaken directly by the War Department, which also absorbed the Army Medical Department. At the same time a definite distribution was made of

[1] The three Principal Secretaries of State before this were (1) Home; (2) Foreign; (3) War and the Colonies.

the duties of the several classes of clerks, and they were rendered available for any branch of the War Department.

The Consolidated Department thus included the duties of the Secretary of State, the Militia business of the Home Office, the War Office (Secretary at War), the Ordnance Office, the Commissariat and Medical Departments, the duties of the Board of General Officers relating to clothing, also the examination of cash and store accounts and of the payments made for non-effective services.

The Commander-in-Chief's office alone maintained its separate existence; the military command and discipline of the army, as likewise the appointments to and promotions in the same, being vested in the General Commanding-in-Chief, subject to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, and subject to any powers formerly exercised by the Secretary at War. Although under the supreme control of the Secretary of State, it was a perfectly distinct department, communicating by letter with the War Department.

The Clerk of the Ordnance was continued as the executive officer of the Secretary of State, directing all the business of the Supply Departments, viz:—

1. Inspector-General of Fortifications.
2. Director-General of Artillery.
3. Naval Director-General of Artillery.
4. Director-General of Stores.
5. Director-General of Contracts.
6. Director-General of Army Clothing.
7. The Accountant-General charged with the financial duties and with the control and audit of all expenditure on account of supply services and works.

In 1857 the offices of Clerk of the Ordnance and

Deputy-Secretary at War were abolished, and the following offices were created, viz., an Assistant Under Secretary and a Secretary for Military Correspondence. By the abolition of the Clerk of the Ordnance the Secretary of State lost the services of a Parliamentary Executive Officer who controlled the Supply Departments and relieved the Minister of the detailed work.

The Naval Director-General of Artillery was appointed Director of Stores, continuing to perform the duties of the former office. The office of Director-General of Clothing was abolished, the duties being performed by an Assistant Director under the Director of Stores. The Topographical Department, which had been formed in January 1855 for the purpose of supplying maps to the army in the Crimea, and the Ordnance Survey hitherto a branch of the office of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, were placed under a Director immediately responsible to the Secretary of State. A Council of Military Education was established, and placed under the General Commanding-in-Chief.

In May 1859, the following alterations were decided upon :—

1. Transfer to the General Commanding-in-Chief of the purely military duties of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, who was relieved of his military duties as Commandant of the Corps of Royal Engineers, but retained the position of official adviser to the Secretary of State on all questions relating to fortifications and other works, and was charged with the execution of those works.

2. Abolition of the office of Director-General of Artillery, whose military duties, including the control of the armaments and warlike material for fortresses and artillery, were transferred to the General Commanding-in-Chief. That portion of his duties which still remained

in the War Office were placed in charge of the President Ordnance Select Committee.

3. Formation of a permanent Defence Committee.

4. Reconstruction of the Ordnance Select Committee.

5. The management of Regimental Schools and Libraries was transferred to the Council of Military Education.

The Volunteer Force having so largely increased in 1859,[1] and a Military Officer being required to superintend the organization and discipline of the Force, an Inspector-General with a Deputy was appointed in January 1860 and placed in charge of a Branch under the Secretary of State.

In May 1861, the Secretary for Military Correspondence was appointed Under Secretary of State, and the former appointment was abolished, a military officer being appointed to assist the Under Secretary of State.

In July 1861, a Director of Ordnance was appointed who relieved the President Ordnance Select Committee of his duties as adviser to the Secretary of State on artillery and armaments, and was also placed in charge of the whole of the Manufacturing Departments.

In 1862, the designation of Inspector-General of Fortifications was altered to Inspector-General of Engineers and Director of Works. In the former capacity he was reinstated in the command of the Corps of Royal Engineers and placed in immediate communication with the Commander-in-Chief; in the latter capacity he was under the direct control of the Secretary of State.

In 1863, the Clothing business was transferred from the Stores Department, and was made into a separate branch under a Director of Clothing.

[1] Prior to 1859, the Volunteer Force consisted only of the Hon. Artillery Company and the Yeomanry.

In August 1866, it was decided, in consequence of the great and important changes in Naval Ordnance, to appoint an officer of the rank of Rear-Admiral to be attached to the Admiralty as Director-General of Naval Ordnance to perform the duties hitherto performed by the Naval officer who was Naval Director-General of Artillery at the War Office.

In the same year, a Committee, presided over by Lord Strathnairn, was appointed to consider the question of Army Transport; but a change of government having occurred a few weeks later, the new Secretary of State for War (General Peel) directed the Committee to extend its enquiries into the administration of the Supply Departments of the army. The Committee made its report in March 1867, recommending that a Controller-in-Chief should be appointed at the War Office to have control of the Executive Departments of Supply, viz., the Commissariat, Military Store, and Purveyor's Department, which were to be fused together, the upper ranks to be termed Controllers, and Deputy and Assistant Controllers.

The Secretary of State adopted this recommendation, and appointed, in 1868, a second Military Under Secretary of State (Major-General Sir Henry Storks) with the title of Controller-in-Chief, and placed under this officer the Commissariat, Purveyors, Barrack, Military Store, Clothing, and Contract Departments. The Treasury, in concurring in this appointment, laid down, as a guiding principle, that "the functions of the Controller-in-Chief, as head of the Supply Department of the War Office, should be kept entirely distinct from those of the Financial Department of the Office."

The Treasury further stated that there should be, in addition to the Secretary of State and the Parliamentary Under Secretary,—

1. An Under Secretary of State competent to advise

the Secretary of State on military matters and who should be generally, if not always, a military man.

2. A Controller-in-Chief without the rank of Under Secretary of State, to be either a military man or a civilian, as might be most convenient at the time of his appointment.

3. A principal financial officer, to be a gentleman of acknowledged financial reputation and experience in accounts, always a civilian, and of equal official rank with the Controller-in-Chief.

Sir John Pakington, who had become Secretary of State for War in March 1867, did not, however, limit his action to the points recommended in the Report of Lord Strathnairn's Committee, for he also placed the munitions of war, the Tower,[1] and the manufacturing establishments at Woolwich under the management and oversight of Sir Henry Storks.

In January 1868, the separate office of Inspector-General of Militia was abolished, and the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Army Reserves were placed under the Inspector-General of Volunteers, who was thenceforth styled Inspector-General of Reserve Forces.

If the administration of the army in 1868 be compared with what it was in 1854, it will be seen that the power of the Commander-in-Chief had been widely extended by assigning to him the general command of the army abroad as well as at home, and by the transfer to him of the Corps of Artillery and Engineers, and also the armaments of fortresses. On the other hand, the concentration of all the Departments of Supply and of Finance under the single administration of the Secretary of State of War, while it greatly simplified the general administration of the Military Forces of the Crown, tended to lessen the

[1] The Tower of London was at that time one of the chief storehouses for the reception of small arms and ammunition.

independent power of the Commander-in-Chief by reason of there being a single Minister who controlled the services without which the army could not exist. The closer his relations became with the Secretary of State of War, the more clearly did the superior position of the latter appear, and on the other hand, the more real power and influence was exercised by the Commander-in-Chief over the military policy of the Government.

Such was the general position of army administration in December 1868, when the Queen, on the advice of Mr Gladstone, entrusted the Seals of the War Department to Mr Cardwell, whose previous career and antecedents it may be convenient here to notice.

Edward Cardwell was educated at Winchester, and thence proceeded to Oxford, where he had a distinguished career, which began with an open scholarship at Balliol, and ended with the rare distinction of a double First-Class in classics and mathematics. Robert Lowe[1] and Roundell Palmer,[2] his schoolfellows at Winchester and cotemporaries at Oxford, were his intimate friends, and were politically associated with him during his public life. While an undergraduate at Oxford he filled the office of president of the "Union," in which office he showed promise of those qualities which would have placed him in later years in the Speaker's chair, had he been so minded. Called to the bar in 1838, he commenced practice on the Northern circuit, where he soon acquired a prominent position; but his private circumstances being such as rendered him independent of a profession, he decided to devote himself to a political career. Having entered Parliament in 1842, he was appointed Secretary to the Treasury in 1845, and there he acquired the friendship and esteem of Sir Robert Peel,

[1] Afterwards Viscount Sherbrooke.

[2] Afterwards Earl of Selborne, Lord Chancellor.

then Prime Minister, whose confidence in him was shown when, on his death in 1850, it appeared that he had appointed Mr Cardwell to be his literary executor in conjunction with Lord Mahon.

He subsequently joined Lord Aberdeen's ministry in 1852, as President of the Board of Trade. When Lord Aberdeen gave place to Lord Palmerston in February 1855, Mr Cardwell remained at the Board of Trade; but on finding that Lord Palmerston intended to give way to the demand for an enquiry into the conduct of the war, the Peelites declined to continue in office. Lord Palmerston strongly pressed Mr Cardwell to become Chancellor of the Exchequer in the place vacated by Gladstone, but he was not willing to separate himself from those with whom he had been accustomed to act, nor was he prepared to advise the Queen to consent to the appointment of Mr Roebuck's committee. He therefore quitted the ministry in company with Sir James Graham, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Sidney Herbert. In 1859 he joined Lord Palmerston's second Ministry, and held successively the posts of Chief Secretary for Ireland, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Secretary of State for the Colonies, retaining the last-named office after Lord Palmerston's death in 1865 until the resignation of his successor, Lord Russell, in the following year.

Mr Cardwell was fifty-five years of age when he became Secretary of State for War in succession to Sir John Pakington, in December 1868.

CHAPTER II

ARMY REFORM

ALTHOUGH Mr Cardwell had had no previous connection with the War Office, the administration of the army and navy had already occupied his thoughts. On the very day that Mr Gladstone received the Queen's commands to form a Ministry, Mr Cardwell was preparing a paper in which he pointed out that the most important administrative question for the new Government would be a review of the army and the navy with a view to increased efficiency and diminished expenditure. Dealing with the army, he adverted to the confusion that had existed since the reconstruction of 1855, the absence of any principle for the guidance of the Department, the contradiction of various ministerial statements on the subject, and the duality of the arrangements by which the army was governed. This rendered it necessary that an intelligible foundation should be laid for the government of the army, and that the superstructure should be built up in conformity with it. The proper task for the head of the naval or military department is simply that of raising the navy or the army to the highest possible state of efficiency of which the means placed at his disposal will admit. He considered that the Board of Admiralty should be the model adopted for the future government of the army. He observed that in case of war our safety would depend not on the efficiency of either branch of the service separately, but on the com-

bined efficiency and united action of them both. The orders which the Sovereign would give, through a Secretary of State, ought to come from one single authority to the head of the navy and the head of the army, and neither of these officers ought to be superior to his colleague who presides over the sister service.

As regards the army itself, he thought that extensive changes would be imperatively demanded. Eight years ago, Lord Palmerston's Cabinet had resolved that the principle of selection should be applied to the Lieutenant-Colonelcy of a regiment, in lieu of the principle of purchase. That step had not been taken, and he agreed with Lord Grey's opinion that—"if you touch the system of purchase at all, it would be wiser to abolish it altogether."

Although the House of Commons might not expect a complete exposition of policy with regard to the army during the session about to open, yet the Government must be prepared to consider the following subjects:—

1. Appointment and promotion of officers; involving purchase, seniority, selection, military education, and the relation of highly educated officers to those who might be promoted from the ranks.

2. Recruiting: involving the question whether service should be for a long or a short period; whether there should not be a very considerable change in the proportionate numbers of men serving at home and in the colonies; whether after a short service in the first army the soldier should not pass into a second army, with gradations to the Militia, and interconnection of all services.

3. What inducements should be held out to the army in the way of (*a*) Civil employment, (*b*) Retirement, etc., for officers and men.

4. Whether the distinction between the Guards and the Line should be preserved.

This was a formidable array of questions, and Mr Cardwell raised them, not from any fancy of his own, but because he was convinced that they would raise themselves, and that it was impossible for any Liberal Government to decline the thorough investigation of them.

A perusal of this paper[1] cannot fail to strike the reader with the fact that Mr Cardwell had correctly gauged the conditions of the British army, and had made an accurate forecast of those problems of military reform which recent events in Europe had already brought into the foreground, and the necessity for which was soon to be emphasized by the Franco-German War. The most thoughtful of our military reformers had but touched the fringe of the subjects which Mr Cardwell, with the eye of an experienced statesman, had already discerned as being of imperious necessity. The mode in which he carried out these necessary reforms it is the object of this history to relate.

When Mr Cardwell accepted the seals of the War Department, he stipulated that he should be allowed to appoint Lord Northbrook to be his Under Secretary of State. If a peer has some advantage in entering political life, it is equally true that a peer who has worked his way to the front sometimes finds himself at a disadvantage in consequence of his being a member of the Upper House. Lord Northbrook had sat for nearly ten years in the House of Commons, and had been a Lord of the Admiralty, Under Secretary of State for War, for India, and for the Home Department, also Secretary to the Admiralty. His abilities and experience might have obtained for him a place in the new Cabinet, had not his father's death recently removed him to the House of Lords. There was

[1] See the First Appendix for this Memorandum in full.

no room for another peer in Mr Gladstone's Cabinet, and Lord Northbrook readily agreed to become Under Secretary of State for War a second time, to assist Mr Cardwell in the heavy duties which were about to devolve upon him.

Nor was Mr Cardwell slow to avail himself of this assistance, for, having in the first place turned his attention to the state of the relations which subsisted between the financial and the other branches of the War Department, he appointed a small committee under Lord Northbrook to enquire into the arrangements in force for the conduct of business in the Army departments. This committee first considered the constitution of the War Office, with especial reference to the subject of financial supervision. Their report on this subject was made on the 11th March 1869, and was accepted in its general principles by Mr Cardwell. They drew attention to the old traditionary theory, which was that administrative departments were to be distrusted, watched, and checked, whilst the function of finance was to watch, criticize, and check their expenditure. Two rival antagonistic powers were thus created, one seeking to spend, and the other to check expenditure. Efficiency and economy were thus at war, the expenditure which should be directed to secure efficiency tending to degenerate into extravagance, and economy which should check waste resulting in incomplete efficiency. It was necessary that this theory, with the narrow and perfunctory duties which it assigned to finance, should be no longer accepted, since there existed in the person of the Secretary of State for War a Minister responsible alike for the efficiency of the service and for its economical administration, and able to harmonize the two.

A more perfect theory of administrative organization lay in the union of finance and administration, so that

financial considerations might attend on administrative policy from its inception, as well as control it during its progress, and review it in anticipation of each financial year. This theory, instead of making finance a mere critical division of War Office administration, would attribute to it the higher function of governing, as far as necessary, the whole policy of administration, and of forming part of the primary responsibility of the Minister, and of the Cabinet of which he is a member.

In order to assist the Secretary of State in dealing with financial questions, it was proposed by the committee to give him, as a subordinate, a Parliamentary officer to be termed Financial Secretary, who would control on behalf of the Secretary of State, and in accordance with his instructions, the two branches of Audit and Account. This arrangement would tend to put on a proper footing the relations of finance to administration. Those relations may be classed under two heads:—

1. Financial initiative and review.
2. Concurrent financial criticism and control.

The first of these constitutes the higher function of finance. The only possible great permanent administrative economies are the product of policy in administration; and of all methods of exercising financial control, the most profitable is that which deals with the policy of future administration, and determines the construction of estimates from the first.

The committee showed that there are two ways in which estimates may be constructed:—

1. They may be allowed to grow up out of the requirements of the spending departments, put forward without any sufficient sense of responsibility for financial results, ultimately to be cut down to suit the financial exigencies of the time.

2. They may be constructed, *ab initio*, under the

guidance of clear ideas of the financial and administrative policy of the Minister, and with complete responsibility for financial results.

Since estimates must originate with the departments which have to administer and spend, it is upon the heads of those departments that must be imposed the duty and responsibility of constructing their estimates from the first, in accordance with the financial and administrative policy of the Government. This latter method was adopted by Mr Cardwell as being that by which alone great permanent administrative economies could be secured.

After presenting their first Report on the 11th March 1869, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Lugard was added to Lord Northbrook's committee, which then proceeded to consider some points connected with the establishment of the Control system that pressed for settlement.

The chief points were :—

1. The separation of munitions of war from other military stores, placing them under the charge of a department to be administered by the Director-General of Ordnance, and independent of the chief of the Control department.

2. The relation in which the manufacturing departments should stand to the Controller-in-Chief, and the proposal to appoint an officer as head of the Woolwich Arsenal.

As regards the first of these questions, Lord Strathnairn's committee had proposed the creation of a department, distinct from the Control Department, to be called the Ordnance Department, to take charge of "Munitions of War," under which head were classed :—

1. Gun and small arm ammunition.
2. Field artillery.
3. Field equipment Royal Engineers.
4. Pontoon trains.

5. Spare arms, accoutrements, harness and saddlery for Artillery.

This department was to be responsible to the Secretary of State for War through the Director-General of Ordnance, but locally was to be under the general officers in command in garrison and in the field.

While carrying out the main recommendation of Lord Strathnairn's committee by appointing a Controller-in-Chief, Sir John Pakington left for further consideration the proposal as to the Ordnance Department, which he placed meanwhile under the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. The question was one on which there was a considerable difference of opinion among the very experienced and competent officers who were examined by Lord Northbrook's committee, whose second Report, dated 7th May 1869, recommended that the provision, custody, and issue of munitions of war should form part of the duties of the Control Department, both in the War Office, and in the field up to the 3rd reserve or field arsenal.

As regards the second question, viz., the control of the manufacturing departments, just before Sir John Pakington quitted office he had appointed the Director-General of Ordnance as head of the Arsenal, but no instructions had been issued as to the nature and extent of the authority which he was to exercise. The arrangement was strongly objected to by the heads of departments in the Arsenal, who argued that it was not desirable to diminish their individual responsibility, and the subject came before Mr Cardwell within a few days of his entering into office. He suspended his decision pending the enquiry of Lord Northbrook's committee. Their report, largely influenced by the weighty opinion of Lord Dalhousie,[1] was adverse to the appointment

[1] Better known as Lord Panmure, Secretary of State for War 1855 to 1858.

of a head of the Arsenal. They recommended, however, that, as questions of manufacture and supply are so intimately connected, and the one is so dependent on the other, these departments, and all others for the manufacture and repair of stores, should be placed under the administrative direction of the Controller-in-Chief, leaving the responsibility of the heads of the departments intact as regards manufacture.

The labours of Lord Northbrook's committee did not end here, and they immediately proceeded to their third task, which was to overlook the whole establishment of the War Office, and their enquiry, with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief, was extended to the Horse Guards. In pursuit of this enquiry they took a considerable amount of evidence, but as their third Report, which led to very important results, was not presented till the 12th February 1870, it will be noticed later on when the measures which were adopted in that year come under review.

CHAPTER III

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1869-70

BESIDE the necessity of continuing the process of War Office organization which had been begun in 1855, another question demanded the immediate attention of the new Secretary of State for War.

In his election address on the 9th October 1868, Mr Gladstone had condemned as unnecessary the late addition of £3,000,000 to the national expenditure; and on taking charge of the War Department, Mr Cardwell informed the Commander-in-Chief that a considerable retrenchment of army expenditure would be expected by the Cabinet and by the House of Commons, and that it was his earnest desire to make that retrenchment in the way most conducive to the interests of the service. In making that retrenchment, he did not propose to weaken in the least degree our home defences, or to withdraw forces from the Colonies to such an extent as would expose either the Colonies or the forces left in them to any hazard.

The task that lay before Mr Cardwell was no easy one.

1. He had to continue the unification of the War Department begun in 1855.

2. He had to effect a proper division of administrative duties in the War Department.

3. He had to lay the foundation of an arrangement whereby the whole of the forces, regular and auxiliary,

should be combined in an effective system of national defence.

In carrying out these improvements he was expected to effect a diminution in the annual expenditure, without decreasing the effective strength of the army, both in men and material, for offensive and defensive war.

The new Parliament was about to meet, and it was necessary that the Army Estimates should be got ready for submission to the House of Commons as soon as possible. Mr Cardwell did not let the grass grow under his feet, for on the 9th January 1869 he propounded in a letter to Mr Gladstone the principles of an arrangement which would give an efficient defensive force at a greatly reduced cost. These were:—

1. As regards the Army; to reduce the total force in the Colonies from 50,000 to 26,000.

2. As regards the Militia; to officer it with half-pay officers of the Army in great measure; to put the discipline of it (but not the patronage) under the War Office, and to train it with the Army.

3. As regards the Volunteers; gradually, but steadily and rapidly, to weed out the inefficient Corps, and to combine their training more frequently with that of the Militia and Regulars.

To the first and most important of these changes he did not anticipate much opposition, as the principle of colonial self-reliance was very generally assented to. Indeed the withdrawal of troops from distant stations lay at the root of the whole question of Army Reform. As long as the period of foreign service bore so large a proportion to that of service at home, the discouragement to enlisting was great, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reduce the period of enlistment. Moreover, short enlistment was essential to a healthy organization of the army and to economy. Of the non-

effective vote nearly £1,500,000 was for pensions. The true policy was to enlist young men only, and not to keep older men, except those who had risen to be non-commissioned officers. He pointed out that by this means the active army would always be filled with soldiers in the prime of life, and the civil population would be filled with men who had gone through five or seven years of military training. Thus the active army would be the training school of the whole population. The idle plan of offering pensions to induce worn-out men to continue in the service would be discontinued, and a great relief afforded to the non-effective vote. The withdrawal of troops from distant places would enable us to do with a smaller proportion of everything which troops require, and so effect a large saving in the vote for stores.

It was the duty of the Cabinet to decide what is the proper amount of force to be kept up each year, a decision which Mr Cardwell did not propose to anticipate; but he showed the results of his proposals in the following table.

	Regulars.	Militia.	Volunteers.	Total.
Existing force . .	137,500	65,000	170,000	372,500
Proposed force . .	126,000	100,000	200,000	426,000

Deducting the 26,000 men to be stationed in the Colonies, this would give:—

The Army at home	100,000
The Militia	100,000
The Volunteers	200,000
TOTAL at home	400,000

In effecting the reduction of the regular army he proposed to retain all the present cadres, reducing those at home to a little above the level of the French army in time of peace.

The proposed force would work out to a very

considerable reduction in cost, and would also have the effect of giving to the soldier the inestimable boon of an equal time of service at home and abroad. Including India the numbers would be :—

At home	100,000
India, 65,000 Colonies, 26,000	91,000

The Volunteer force was constantly increasing, and the estimates for 1869-70 showed an obligatory increase in the capitation rate of £26,000, over which the Government could exercise no control. It was worthy of consideration whether a maximum of 200,000 men should not be fixed for the capitation rate, and after that number had been reached, the least efficient companies be deprived of the capitation so as to keep the vote down to 200,000 until all became effective.

Mr Gladstone entirely approved of the general principles propounded, and it may be interesting here to give the proposed distribution of the 26,000 men to be kept in the Colonies.

Imperial Stations :—

Malta and Gibraltar	10,000	
West Indies and West Africa	3,500	
Bermuda	2,000	
China	1,500	
Simon's Bay and St. Helena	1,000	
Halifax and Newfoundland	1,000	
		19,000

Contributing Colonies :—

Canada	2,000	
Ceylon	2,000	
Mauritius	1,100	
Straits Settlements and Hong-kong	1,000	
Australia	900	
		7,000
		26,000

On the 11th March 1869, Mr Cardwell moved the Army Estimates for the coming year, and in noticing the proposed reductions in the Colonies, he drew a distinction between the Colonies which are occupied for the purpose of colonization, and those maritime ports which are occupied for Imperial objects as stations for our fleet. Excluding the latter from his calculations, he dealt with the former only, on which he anticipated a saving of one-third of their existing cost.

In 1861, a select committee of the House of Commons had been appointed to consider the general question of our colonial military expenditure. That committee reported that a great change was necessary in the policy of the country in that respect, in order that the burdens of the people at home might be diminished, and a spirit of self-reliance generated in our colonial possessions, so that the result might be mutually advantageous to the colonies and to the mother country. The Resolution of the committee was adopted by the House of Commons and became the settled policy of the country. This policy was first carried into effect by the Duke of Newcastle[1] with regard to the Australian colonies. Afterwards, when Mr Cardwell was at the Colonial Office, there was withdrawn from New Zealand a force of 10,000 men, which for some years had been waging war with the insurgent Maoris, a war which might have lasted for some years longer had not the withdrawal of the troops led to its cessation. A little later the same policy was carried into effect in the Crown Colonies of Hong-kong, the Mauritius, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements, not indeed by withdrawing the troops, but by requiring the colonists to contribute towards their support.

In 1866, notice was given to the Governor of the

[1] Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 1852-1854.

Cape that the policy adopted by the House of Commons in 1861 must at no distant time be applied to the Cape Colony. That policy was carried into effect by the Earl of Carnarvon.[1] Canada was the sole exception, and that for the remarkable and exceptional reasons caused by the civil war in the United States, and subsequently by the threatened Fenian invasion. So far back as 1851, Earl Grey, then Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, addressed to the Governor-General of Canada a despatch in which he pointed out that Canada, enjoying as she did the blessings of responsible government, must be prepared to encounter all the sacrifices which freedom and a responsible government demanded of her. His successor, the Duke of Newcastle, made use of the same argument in 1853 when reducing the force in Canada to a little over 6000 men.

The threatening of hostilities in connection with the *Trent*[2] affair in 1861 led to a large augmentation of the forces in Canada, raising the total in British North America to 17,000 men. In 1865,[3] one of the strongest arguments for the confederation of the Canadian Provinces was the necessity which lay upon them of looking forward to providing for their own defence. Exceptional circumstances prevented the application of the policy to Canada until 1867, when Sir John Pakington withdrew 3500 men out of the 16,000 who were then stationed there; and just before he quitted office, the

[1] Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1866-1867.

[2] The *Trent*, a British mail steamer on a voyage from a neutral port to England, was stopped on the high seas by an American vessel of war, and four passengers, envoys from the Confederate States to Europe, were forcibly taken out. A demand for their restoration was immediately made and military preparations were commenced for enforcing the demand. War was avoided by the Government of the United States complying with the British demand.

[3] Mr Cardwell was then Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Duke of Buckingham, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, recommended to the War Office a further reduction of 3500 men, which reduction had already been embodied in the estimates for the coming year, before Sir John Pakington quitted office. This recommendation Mr Gladstone's government now proposed to carry out, and indeed to go still further, leaving only 6250 men in British North America.

In making these reductions the British government was not actuated by mere sordid considerations of economy, nor did they consider that the diminution of force was really any weakening of the Colonies. The distribution of a small force of regular troops rather weakened than strengthened the colonists if it tended to prevent them from exerting themselves to rely on their own resources. Canada, with 30,000 or 40,000 armed men of her own, occupied a stronger and more independent position than she ever did before. The true defence of our Colonies is that they live under the *ægis* of the name of England, and that war with them is war with England. The modern policy of the Imperial Government was to strengthen and defend the Colonies, as well as increase the power of England, by generating in every one of the settlements where the British name is known a spirit of British energy and self-reliance; and at the same time to consolidate and concentrate the strength of the mother country for their defence in time of need.

Acting on this policy the Estimates for 1869-70 were framed so as to give a reduction of 15,173 men in the forces stationed in the Colonies. Part of this reduction was effected by disbanding colonial corps, on the principle that it is not desirable to maintain, at the expense of the mother country, forces which, owing either to the conditions under which they are recruited, or other

circumstances, are not available for general service in any part of the world.

As the number of troops at home would be largely increased by the withdrawals from the Colonies, part of this increase was applied to a reduction in the strength of the battalions at home; but the total force at home was not reduced, for whereas the number of regular troops at home in 1868 was 87,500, the number provided by the Estimates of 1869-70 was 92,058. Mr Cardwell attached much importance to the principle of maintaining intact the cadres of the battalions, arguing that, with a peace establishment of 50,000 men, 100 battalions of 500 men each is a much stronger organization than 50 battalions of 1000 men each. For, if it be desired to bring the infantry to a war strength, all that is needed in the former case is to place the required number of men from the Reserve with each battalion, which will at once give 100 battalions at war strength. In the alternative case, the required increase can only be made by organizing 50 new battalions with officers and staff complete. When reducing the army, the reduction of battalions affords the greatest pecuniary saving, but three very undesirable results are incurred. (1) A hardship is inflicted on a great number of officers. (2) A considerable expense is incurred in half-pay for services for which no return is obtained. (3) The strength and elasticity of the army is diminished, and the defensive power of the country is lessened. Mr Cardwell had already in contemplation the formation of reserves on the continental system, by which the cadres could be rapidly expanded to a war establishment of 1000 rank and file.

At this time, the term "Reserve Forces" included indiscriminately: the Militia, which would be embodied in time of war; the Volunteers, who would be called out in case of invasion; and the two classes of Army Reserve, of

which the First Class could be sent abroad with the regular forces, and the Second Class was only available for service at home. The First Class Army Reserve, including the Militia Reserve,[1] numbered only 3545 men, and this was the only force which could be used for the first line for foreign service.

Mr Cardwell proceeded then to lay down the following propositions: viz., that the army of a country circumstanced as this is, ought to be, as regards both men and *matériel* in time of peace, comparatively small; that its efficiency should be the highest possible; that it should be in a form capable of easy expansion; that, as regards its *matériel*, this should be of the highest quality and the greatest efficiency, and with this object it should not be allowed to accumulate in proportions so large as to be likely to become obsolete, to wear out, or to be the worse for keeping.

It was in accordance with these principles that, while thirteen battalions were brought home from the Colonies, their cadres were kept intact; but it was evidently necessary that some plan should be adopted by which the battalions at home could be filled up when the emergency might arise.

The First Class Army Reserve consisted of 1000 men only, and although the strength of the Militia Reserve was fixed by statute at 20,000, only 2700 had been enrolled. Mr Cardwell fully recognized the objections to the Militia Reserve, whereby the Militia would lose some of their best men just at the time when they might most require their services, but pending the consideration of a better system he determined upon the

[1] The Militia Reserve consisted of a certain number of trained militiamen who had engaged to serve in the regular army in case of war. They engaged for five years and received a payment of £1 a year so long as they were in the Reserve.

enrolment of their full number, so that the ranks of the army might be completed if required.

But besides filling up the battalions, there was the question of maintaining a force efficient in itself and able to second and support the army. For this purpose there was evidently the old constitutional force of England—the Militia, and it was to the improvement of this force that Mr Cardwell turned his attention.

Sir John Pakington, when Secretary of State for War, had drawn attention in the House of Commons to the fact that while the General Officer Commanding the Northern District had 7000 regulars under his command, there were 86,000 men of the reserve forces located in his district with whom he had nothing whatever to do. Mr Cardwell, commenting on this statement, insisted that there ought to be a relation between the regular army and the reserve forces, in such a manner that the country might feel that the whole strength of its force is welded and consolidated together, and could be applied with the greatest advantage to resist and repel invasion. The best method of effecting this would need careful consideration and special legislation. Meanwhile it was decided to raise the number of the Militia in Great Britain to its statutory maximum, 90,000 men, and to make arrangements for brigading them, when possible, with the regular forces. The position of the officers was also improved by raising their pay and allowances, during the period of training, to the rates given in the army.

As regards the Volunteers, considerable pressure had been used to raise the capitation grant. Mr Cardwell felt that merely to scatter broadcast an increase of the capitation grant would not be satisfactory, having regard to the great difference in the requirements of the different corps. While prepared, therefore, to increase the Parliamentary

grant, he judged it absolutely necessary to require a much more efficient organization of the body, and to lay down these rules :—

1. There should not be in any locality more separate corps of Volunteers than could be kept up at a proper strength.

2. A greater proportion of those who receive the grant should attain to the highest standard of efficiency.

3. Officers and non-commissioned officers should always be selected for their efficiency.

4. If Parliament were to be asked for an increased contribution for the Volunteers, it must be made, not by a blind increase of the capitation grant, but by adopting measures the direct tendency and necessary consequence of which should be to contribute to increased efficiency.

As regards the Yeomanry, there were some competent authorities who did not attach a great value to that force, but at a period when Her Majesty's Government were most desirous to encourage the reserve forces and to endeavour to make them more efficient, and enable them to act in complete harmony with the regular forces, Mr Cardwell was very unwilling to discourage any branch of the reserves. He expressed his opinion in the House of Commons, in reply to criticisms on the usefulness of the yeomanry, that, considering the exceeding smallness of our regular cavalry force, they would be most useful for escort and outpost duties, to relieve the regular cavalry from the drain which those duties would entail upon them, duties which the local knowledge of the yeomanry would enable them to perform very efficiently. He stated his intention of arming them without delay with breech-loading carbines, and expressed his opinion that they would be more useful as mounted riflemen than as cavalry, and that as such they would prove a very efficient force. The yeomanry were the only surviving

portions of the old volunteer force, and he hoped that they might be made efficient both as mounted riflemen, and as cavalry for outpost duties, scouting, and escorts.

For the reserve forces generally a breech-loading rifle was to be immediately adopted, and their general arming with the breech-loader was commenced in 1869.

The reduction of colonial garrisons allowed a corresponding reduction in staff and establishments, and some diminution was made in the staff at home; but every reduction was carefully dealt with on its own merits. The net reduction effected in the estimates of 1869-1870 amounted to £1,138,250, equal to 10 per cent. on the whole of the net effective estimate. Part of this saving would not be permanent, as it was due to the necessity for suspending the manufacture of the reserve of Snider rifles.

The overwhelming effect of the breech-loader in the hands of the Prussian infantry in the war with Austria in 1866 had enforced on all other armies the necessity of immediately adopting a similar arm. As a temporary expedient the "Snider" rifle had been adopted in the British army. It was undoubtedly superior to the Needle gun, though possibly not to the Chassepôt with which the French infantry were being armed, but it had this advantage, that the Enfield rifles of the British army could be quickly converted into breech-loaders on the Snider system. A more perfect weapon had, however, been designed in the Martini-Henry rifle, but before being adopted it was necessary to try it in different climates and under varying conditions. Some of these rifles were therefore issued for trial at home, in India, and in Canada, and some were supplied to be tested by experienced riflemen at the next Wimbledon Meeting. Meanwhile the conversion of the Enfield rifle was pushed on, with a view to arming the whole of the reserve forces as soon as

possible with a breech-loader, and keeping up a sufficient supply for present use with a small reserve; the manufacture of proper reserves being postponed till the new pattern rifle could be finally approved.

The following table shows the net total *effective* of the estimate of 1869-70 compared with the votes of former years, and also the force available at home.

		At Home	
		Number of men.	Battalions.
1865-66	£10,786,407	83,242	46
1866-67	11,005,300	91,703	46
1867-68	11,785,300	91,048	53
1868-69	11,988,000	87,505	53
1869-70	10,834,600	92,015	66

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY STATE OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1815-70

IN order to understand the responsibility for home defence as it presented itself to the Ministers of the Crown, it is necessary to give a short sketch of the defensive state of Great Britain at different intervals subsequent to the close of the Napoleonic wars.

When the fall of Napoleon in 1815, followed by his exile to St Helena, gave peace to Europe, no time was lost in reducing all military establishments, so as to afford the utmost possible relief to the heavily burdened Exchequer. All the nations of Europe were exhausted by a long and costly war, and no apprehension of a fresh outbreak existed, so that popular attention was exclusively directed to the palpable advantages of the reduction of public expenditure and of taxation.

The number of regular troops in the United Kingdom—

In 1820 was 64,426, with 22 field-guns.
In 1830 was 50,856, with 30 field-guns.
In 1840 was 53,379, with 30 field-guns.

In 1844, Sir James Graham, then Home Secretary, wrote a secret and confidential memorandum, in which he pointed out that it was necessary for our safety to be able to command, at any moment, a very considerable force at home, and that our existing means of defence were so inadequate as to cause great danger.

A change of ministry took place in 1846, and Earl

Grey, who then became Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, wrote a paper[1] on the state of the army, which in his opinion required the early and very serious attention of the Government from two points of view: first, as regards the force habitually kept at home; and second, as regards the necessity of improving the efficiency of the army. He advocated a large reduction of our colonial garrisons, which at that time swallowed up about four-sevenths of the whole of the infantry of the line,[2] pointing out that the policy upon which we ought to act, now that steam allowed of easy communication between the different parts of the Empire, was not to scatter our force more than could possibly be avoided, but to keep a large reserve in this country ready to be sent at short notice wherever danger might threaten. He recommended a further increase to the Artillery,[3] and the enrolment of 100,000 Pensioners at home.

A few days after the date of Lord Grey's memorandum, Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, Inspector-General of Fortifications, submitted to the Master-General of the Ordnance some *Observations on the possible Results of a War with France, under our present system of Military Preparation*, in which[4] he stated that there might be in Great Britain and Ireland perhaps 30,000 regular troops, including infantry and cavalry; of which 20,000 to 25,000 must remain for the protection of Ireland and of garrisons, etc., leaving not more than 5000 to 10,000 men available to oppose the efforts of more than ten times their number. He believed that there was not in the whole British Islands

[1] Dated 17th October 1846.

[2] In 1840, four-fifths of the Infantry were abroad; viz., 59 battalions in Colonies; 22 battalions in India and China; 22 battalions at home.

[3] The Artillery had been increased on 1st April 1846 by a battalion of eight companies (48 officers and 1200 men).

[4] *Military Opinions of Sir John Burgoyne.* Published in 1859.

a sufficiency of field artillery for the equipment of an army of 20,000 men, without admitting of any reserve whatever. The amount of small arms was quite unequal to a state of war, and of minor stores there was a total deficiency. The Master-General laid this paper before his colleagues, and Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, prepared a Report on the Defence of the Country,[1] which he submitted to the Cabinet on the 17th December 1846, in which he stated that this Empire was existing only by sufferance and by the forbearance of other Powers. He urged that the Militia should be increased and the dockyards fortified as a security against a *coup-de-main.*

Sir John Burgoyne sent a copy of his *Observations* to the Duke of Wellington, who wrote to him in reply on the 9th January 1847. In this letter the Duke stated that he had in vain endeavoured to awaken the attention of different Administrations to the alteration made in maritime warfare and operations by the application of steam power to ships; that with our naval arsenals and dockyards not half garrisoned, 5000 men of all arms could not be put under arms, if required, for any service whatever. The whole force employed at home would not afford a sufficient number of men for the mere occupation and defence of the works constructed for the protection of the dockyards and naval arsenals, and would not leave a single man disposable. He had earnestly entreated different Administrations to raise, embody, organize, and discipline the militia, which would give an organized force of about 150,000 men. This, with an augmentation of the regular army at a cost of under £400,000 a year, would suffice. He concurred in Sir John Burgoyne's views of the danger of

[1] Lord Palmerston's Report is worth perusal. It will be found in the *Life and Correspondence of Sir John Burgoyne.*

our position and of the magnitude of the stake at issue, and said he was especially sensible of the certainty of failure if we did not attend to the measures necessary to be taken for our defence, and of the indelible disgrace of such failure.[1]

This letter was shown to the members of the Cabinet, and (confidentially) to a few other persons, by one of whom it was communicated a year later to the *Morning Chronicle*, in the columns of which newspaper it appeared on the 4th January 1848. The publication of the Duke of Wellington's views of the defenceless state of the country excited much interest, but so far from having the result that might have been anticipated, the leaders of public opinion asserted that the addition of 25,000 or 30,000 men to the army was absolutely impossible, as the country could not bear the cost. Mr Cobden, speaking at Manchester, intimated that the Duke of Wellington was in his dotage, saying that his Grace had passed the extremest probable duration of human existence, and was tottering on the verge of the grave.

In the following month, the Revolution broke out in Paris, and Louis Philippe immediately abdicated and took refuge in England. The revolutionary wave passed rapidly through Europe, overthrowing some and shaking to their centre others of the thrones of the European Powers. In England, the skilful measures adopted by the Duke of Wellington completely parried the threatened outbreak in London on the 10th April, while the insurrection in Ireland was quelled after an insignificant skirmish with forty-six constables in the widow M'Cormack's cabbage garden.

Some augmentation of the regular forces now took place, but when Parliament was opened on the 2nd

[1] This letter is given in the *Life and Correspondence of Sir John Burgoyne.*

February 1849, the Queen's speech stated that—"the present aspect of affairs has enabled me to make large reductions in the estimates of last year." This statement was challenged in both Houses in the debate on the Address. The Government narrowly escaped defeat in the House of Lords, but in the Commons Lord John Russell pointed out that his Government had increased the navy by 3000 men and the Artillery by 5000 men,[1] and a hostile amendment was defeated by a large majority, though little attempt was made to justify the statement that had been challenged.

The number of regular troops in the United Kingdom in 1850 was 68,538, with 70 field-guns.

Public opinion was not, however, prepared for any adequate expenditure, and in May 1850 Sir John Burgoyne again wrote a forcible memorandum[2] on the inadequacy of the military condition and establishments of this country even for self-protection. He stated that the slight improvements commenced in 1846 had since been gradually checked, and the pressure for reduction of expenditure and of taxation had not only led to a low standard of military organization, but had induced the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary at War to hold out an expectation that it would be still further lowered. This course, if persevered in, must lead to consequences with which no financial views could be placed in competition. He argued that our extreme weakness at home and the neglected state of some of our valuable foreign possessions invited attack. The French had several hundreds of thousands of regular troops available for taking the field at once, and could with ease place 200,000 men on their coast

[1] Two more battalions of Artillery were raised in 1848, and 40 guns were added to the Horse and Field Artillery.

[2] *Remarks on the Military Condition of Great Britain.* It is not given in the *Life of Sir John Burgoyne*, but is mentioned in it. A copy of the memorandum is in the hands of the writer.

in a few days. If we assembled every available man from Great Britain and Ireland, we could not get more than 50,000 to 60,000 men of every description, and these most imperfectly provided with artillery and with the essential requisites for a campaign. In 1803, when Buonaparte threatened an invasion, we had in the United Kingdom 100,000 regulars, 80,000 militia, and 300,000 volunteers enrolled, armed, and organized. Now, we had not got arms or equipments for any levy *en masse* nor any organization for such a levy, neither was there any determination to be prepared for the maintenance of a decided superiority at sea; on the contrary, a reduction of the naval service had become a popular topic. It was even probable that, if war broke out, France would have an absolute naval superiority. The whole question was met by a determination to avoid expense, and a blind hope of perpetual peace. What was needed was the power to bring 100,000 troops and 100 pieces of cannon into the field, without completely abandoning posts that ought to be guarded. This would need an addition of 80,000 men to the present strength.[1] So shocking was the military condition of Great Britain that if serious differences were to arise with France it would be necessary to avoid war "by all means and at any sacrifice."

Sir John Burgoyne asserted that the very object of armed forces was being gradually lost sight of. Judging from the debates on the army estimates, the troops seemed to be looked upon merely as a reserved police for the preservation of internal tranquillity at home and abroad. The scale for their maintenance was measured solely by peace requirements.

The ease with which Great Britain withstood the revolutionary wave that passed over Europe in 1848

[1] These 80,000 men would be militia. The 100,000 men for the field army would be one-third regulars and two-thirds militia.

seemed to confirm the popular view of the military requirements, and the Cabinet were unable to put forward the measures which most of the Ministers deemed to be essential for the safety of the country.

A consideration of the position in which England was placed during this period will serve to show that the apprehensions of public men were not without foundation. On more than one occasion war with France seemed imminent. In 1840, when England intervened in Syria on behalf of the Sultan, the operations against Beyrout and St Jean d'Acre were carried out by a squadron which contained only nine English ships of the line and one Turkish, whilst the French who were clamouring for war with England could command a combined fleet of twenty French and Egyptian ships of the line.[1]

In 1844, the Pritchard affair at Tahiti caused an outburst of indignation which was only appeased by the French Government disavowing the act of Admiral Dupetit Thouars.[2]

In 1846, the Spanish marriages led to a breaking up of the cordial understanding between England and France which had been revived after the differences of 1840.[3]

But a still greater danger threatened England in 1848, a danger that seems to have been even greater than could have been anticipated. Since the passing of the Reform Bill, the encouragement given by the British Government to the revolutionary party on the continent had awakened the serious apprehensions of *all* the great continental Powers. It subsequently came to light that a coalition against Great Britain was set on foot by the Cabinets of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and France,

[1] *History of Europe*, ch. xxxii.

[2] *Annual Register*, 1844.

[3] Fyffe's *Modern Europe*, vol. ii. ch. vii.

which is described as follows in Alison's *History of Europe*:[1]—

"The English agents at Vienna, Berlin, and Berne, warned the British Government repeatedly, in the course of the winter of 1847-8, that something underhand was in agitation; but they were far from being aware of the extent and imminence of the danger which threatened. It is now known, from the revelations of the Ministers of Louis Philippe, that the overtures of the Northern Powers had been accepted by the French Government, and the 15th March fixed for the conclusion of definite arrangements against Great Britain! The Revolution of 1848, by setting the continental Powers against each other, probably saved Great Britain from a contest, singled-handed, with a confederacy as powerful as that which overthrew France on the field of Leipsic."

In 1851, the Great Exhibition took place, and was hailed as the inauguration of an era of perpetual peace; but this vision was quickly dissipated by the events of the 2nd December in Paris, which gave rise to serious apprehensions as to the maintenance of peace. In January 1852, Lord Grey submitted another memorandum to his colleagues, in which he drew their attention to his former paper of the 17th October 1846 "in consequence of the great and not unnatural anxiety which was felt by the public as to our means of repelling a foreign invasion." Parliament met immediately after this, and the Queen's speech indicated an increase in the naval and military estimates. The Government also introduced a Militia Bill in the House of Commons, but being defeated on a proposed amendment to the title of the Bill, they resigned.

The new Government under Lord Derby lost no time in presenting a new Militia Bill, which provided for the levying of 80,000 militiamen. This was carried by a very large majority in the House of Commons. The

[1] *History of Europe*, ch. xlvi.

second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords was signalised by an emphatic speech in its favour by the Duke of Wellington, the last occasion on which he addressed the House of Lords, when he spoke in weighty terms of the services which the militia had rendered to him in the great struggle for our country's liberties.

But apart from the danger of invasion, there were some who discerned on the horizon the symptoms of storms that threatened to disturb the deceitful calm to which the public were giving a blind confidence. One of the most prominent of the younger soldiers who made their mark during the great war was Sir Henry Hardinge. Entering the army at a very early age, he served through the whole of the Peninsular War with great distinction, returning to England before he was thirty, a Lieutenant-Colonel and a K.C.B. During the Waterloo campaign, he was British Military Commissioner with the Prussian army, and was wounded at Blücher's side at Ligny, where he lost his left hand. Promotion was not so lavishly bestowed in those days as it is now, and Hardinge remained a Lieutenant-Colonel till 1821. In 1823 he was appointed Clerk of the Ordnance, and soon afterwards entered Parliament. He twice held the office of Secretary at War, and twice that of Chief Secretary for Ireland. In 1844 he was appointed Governor-General of India, where his rule was signalised by great military achievements, as well as by administrative success, for which he was created a Viscount and received the substantial acknowledgments of Parliament and of the East India Company. His varied administrative career, combined with his recent war experience in India, appears to have led him to entertain more advanced ideas than most soldiers of his generation. To him Burgoyne addressed a letter on the

12th May 1851, lamenting that we were falling into imbecility and decay, whilst the French had just allotted £275,000 for sea defences for Cherbourg, avowedly for the chance of collision with England. Lord Hardinge replied that we were incurring very serious risk by the defenceless state of our naval and military preparations, especially naval, and stated that we had not 20,000 infantry available to oppose a landing.[1]

Indeed we were, in his opinion, in a feeble state whether for offence or defence. Walking one day in the Great Exhibition, he met Mr Cardwell, and taking him by the arm he invited him to walk with him. He said:—

"I have been this morning with the Duke of Wellington, trying to persuade him to have the infantry armed with the Minié rifle; but he will not consent. Now, I foresee that in the course of the next three or four years there will be a general war in Europe; we shall be involved in it, and we shall be beaten unless we have a rifle."

A few months after this conversation, there was a change of ministry, and Lord Hardinge became Master-General of the Ordnance. His first act was to prepare 300 field-guns, with 600 wagons, to be got ready in the arsenal. He also obtained the Duke of Wellington's consent to the infantry being armed with the Minié rifle. In September 1852 the Duke died, and Lord Hardinge was made Commander-in-Chief. The re-arming of the infantry was pushed on as rapidly as possible, but we did not then possess the means of rapid manufacture of rifles, and the Eastern Expedition of 1854 sailed from England with the old smooth-bore musket. The Minié rifle was issued to some of the infantry at Malta; others

[1] These letters are given in the *Life and Correspondence of Sir John Burgoyne.*

received it after they got to Turkey, but the fourth Division did not get their arms exchanged until after the battle of Inkermann. The victory of the allies in that hard-fought battle was largely due to the British infantry[1] being armed with the Minié rifle, and it was entirely due to Lord Hardinge's foresight and energy that their new weapons had been provided before they landed in the Crimea.

In 1852 the number of field-guns at home had been raised to 120, and this enabled the Government in 1854 to send 60 guns to the Crimea, a number which was raised to 92 in 1855, while the number left in the United Kingdom was increased to 114.

The Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny roused the British nation from their dreams of perpetual peace, and at a threat of invasion from France in 1859 a force of 150,000 volunteers sprang into existence which, with 100,000 regulars and 180 field-guns, placed the country in a state of security against the dangers that had appeared so threatening both to statesmen and soldiers for the previous fifteen years.

The public mind was now awakened to the total want of preparedness for war. The Indian Mutiny had necessitated a permanent increase to the European force in that country, and the sudden outbursts of war on the continent of Europe in 1859, in 1864, and in 1866, showed not only how precarious was a state of peace, but also the rapidity with which continental nations were able in a few days to expand their peace establishments into armies prepared for war.

The foregoing historical sketch will explain why the Government in 1869 held it to be of great importance that any reduction in the army should not diminish the numbers serving in the United Kingdom, for although the creation

[1] Four out of the five Divisions then in the Crimea had the Minié rifle.

of the volunteer force had added 150,000 men to the defensive forces of the kingdom, these were only available in case of invasion, whilst the need of a sufficient force capable of serving in any part of the world became daily more apparent.

Taking every decade from the battle of Waterloo to 1870, the following was the strength of the forces in the United Kingdom.

	Regulars.	Auxiliaries.	Total.	Field-Guns.
1820 . . .	64,426	60,740	125,166	22
1830 . . .	50,856	34,614	85,470	30
1840 . . .	53,379	20,791	74,170	30
1850 . . .	68,538	29,868	98,406	70
1860 . . .	100,701	229,501	330,202	180
1870 . . .	89,051[1]	281,692	370,743	180

[1] This does not include the 20,000 additional men voted for the army in August 1870.

CHAPTER V

REORGANIZATION OF WAR OFFICE

THE third Report of Lord Northbrook's committee was completed in February 1870, and, as already stated, it dealt with the whole establishment of the War Office and Horse Guards. The number of persons (civilian and military) engaged in the administration of the army was 82 superior officers and 673 clerks, at an annual cost of £249,079. This staff was excessive when compared with other European Powers, the cause being that the whole military administration of Great Britain had been organized on a system of want of trust, which had created double establishments for the transaction of the same business.

Although by the Order in Council of 11th August 1854 all the different offices which were concerned in the administration of the army had been placed under one responsible Minister, yet the tradition still remained of a system of unnecessary check, double labour, and divided responsibility. This led to unsatisfactory results. The committee therefore enunciated two cardinal principles:—

1st. That the Secretary of State is the Minister responsible both for the efficiency of the army and for its economical administration, and that all departments of army administration are subordinate and responsible to him.

2nd. That confidence should be placed in, and responsibility fixed upon, the chiefs of the principal departments.

As regards the first, notwithstanding the former limitation in the Secretary of State's patent, his supremacy, even if necessary in matters of discipline, had been asserted by Lord Panmure, by General Peel, and by Mr Sidney Herbert in the evidence given by them before the Select Committee on Military Organization in 1860, whose report stated that "notwithstanding the reservations in the patent, His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief admits the supreme control of the Secretary of State over the army." That committee had pointed out that the separation of the Horse Guards and War Office engendered the belief that they are two distinct departments. This error was confirmed by public opinion, and led to divided action and even to antagonism.

A preliminary step, therefore, for any efficient organization must be that the whole administration of the army should be conducted under one roof. Taking this as a basis, the business of the army naturally divided itself into three principal departments: (1) Military; (2) Supply; (3) Financial. These departments were, however, represented in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State alone, whereas the navy had four officials in Parliament, and the House of Commons was open to all the members of the Board of Admiralty. Formerly, the departments now under the Secretary of State for War were represented in the House of Commons by no less than seven members.[1]

Further assistance was absolutely necessary for the Secretary of State, and it was therefore proposed that the chiefs of the Control and Financial departments should be eligible for election as Members of Parliament. The Controller-in-Chief's department was responsible for

[1] Clerk of the Ordnance; Surveyor-General of the Ordnance; Secretary to the Master-General; Secretary to the Treasury; Secretary at War; Home Secretary; Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.

an expenditure of nearly five millions of money, and his duties were analogous to those formerly performed by the Clerk of the Ordnance, whose office Mr Cardwell proposed to revive. This title was subsequently changed to "Surveyor-General of the Ordnance," and the War Office Act of 1870 provided that both this office and that of "Financial Secretary of the War Department," should be tenable by persons having seats in the House of Commons.

Lord Northbrook's committee made, however, one important reservation, as to which it is desirable to quote their exact words.

"Looking to the magnitude of the expenditure and the importance of the business connected with the supplies of the army, it cannot fail to be a great advantage that the Control Department should be represented in Parliament; but it must not be forgotten that the duty of administering the supplies of the army requires special qualifications, and the first object should be to appoint to the office a person possessing those qualifications. It would, therefore, we think, be unfortunate if the appointment came to be considered as one which must, as a matter of course, be conferred upon a Member of Parliament. It would be sufficient, in our opinion, that the office should be classed with those of the Naval members of the Board of Admiralty, who form part of the political administration of the day, are eligible to sit in the House of Commons, but need not necessarily always be Members of Parliament. This was the position formerly occupied by the Master-General of the Ordnance."

It is allowable to digress here just to see how this was acted upon.

The first Surveyor-General of the Ordnance appointed under the new Act was Sir Henry Storks, a general officer of great and varied experience, who obtained a seat in the House of Commons a year later. When Mr Gladstone's Government quitted office in 1874, a

retired officer was appointed who was a Member of Parliament, but whose sole military qualification had been the command of a company. When the next change of Government took place, in 1880, a general officer of experience (Sir John Adye)[1] was appointed who had not got a seat in Parliament, but on his quitting the office in 1883 on appointment as Governor of Gibraltar, no further attempt was made to carry out the recommendations of Lord Northbrook's committee; but the "unfortunate" contingency which they had alluded to came to pass, and "the appointment came to be considered as one which must, as a matter of course, be conferred upon a Member of Parliament." The result of this was that during the next five years the appointment was held successively by four civilian Members of Parliament, when it was, not unnaturally, found to be a useless appointment, and was suppressed. A well considered administrative scheme was thus wrecked in order to add another salaried appointment to those given to political partizans.

This matter came under review in 1887, when it was reported on by a Royal Commission appointed to enquire into the Civil Establishments of the different Offices of State. The Commissioners said that the intentions of Lord Northbrook's committee of 1870, on whose recommendation this office was created, had not been carried out, and that the idea of securing the highest professional acquirements for the position had been entirely abandoned. Lord Northbrook, in his evidence before this Commission, stated his agreement with the report of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's Commission that it had been most unfortunate that, with the exception of two men, Sir Henry Storks and Sir John Adye, the

[1] Lieutenant-General Sir John Adye had been at the War Office during Mr Cardwell's tenure of office, and had consistently supported his policy. He was a man of great ability, and had an extensive knowledge of staff duties.

gentlemen who had filled the office of Surveyor-General of Ordnance had no professional qualifications, and it was to this cause that he attributed the defective organization of the War Office in respect to the supply of stores. Having regard to what had happened, he thought his committee in 1870 had been wrong in recommending that the Surveyor-General should form part of the political administration of the day, as the temptation to fill up the office by a supporter of the Government was too great, and it would be better that he should be a permanent officer appointed for five or seven years. This opinion was adopted by the Royal Commission, but instead of carrying out their recommendation, the Government of the day abolished the office.

The recommendations of Lord Northbrook's committee formed the basis of the War Office Act of 1870, which divided the actual army administration between three great officers, any of whom might be in Parliament.

1. The *Officer Commanding-in-Chief*, whose department was much enlarged by placing under him the Reserve Forces, the Military Education department, the Chaplain's department, and the newly created Topographical department which ultimately became the Intelligence department.

2. The *Surveyor-General of Ordnance*, who maintained all supplies, transport, clothing, and munitions of war, with entire responsibility for the purchase, construction, and charge of *matériel*.

3. The *Financial Secretary*, who was responsible to the Secretary of State for the estimates submitted to Parliament, and was charged with the appropriation, accounting, and audit of all funds voted thereon. He also controlled the Army Pay department.

The Bill was introduced in the House of Commons

on the 15th February 1870, when Mr Cardwell, in explaining its provisions, submitted that complete unity of administration could never be attained till all the offices were in one building. Meanwhile he had arranged that all the correspondence between the War Office and Horse Guards should cease, and that there should be a common registry for the letters of both. The daily number of letters thus registered was 1500, but during the year 1869 there had been a reduction of 30,000 letters in the War Office correspondence.

The army estimates for 1870-71 were brought in a few days later. They showed a reduction of over £1,000,000 sterling on the effective vote, part of which was obtained by a further withdrawal of troops from the Colonies. Mr Cardwell, in commenting on this, quoted a letter written to *The Times* by Sir Charles Adderley,[1] which said:—

"Every soldier withdrawn from Canada has been replaced by ten Canadian soldiers, which, in an imperial view, means decupling the British strength for the defence of the whole Empire, and not, as these gentlemen view it, starving out the connection and announcing surrender."

Several colonial corps were to be disbanded, and further British regiments brought home, raising the number of infantry battalions in the United Kingdom to sixty-eight.[2]

In October 1869, the Government of India, having fallen into financial difficulties, requested the Home Government to remove four cavalry and seven infantry regiments from India, in order to relieve the Indian exchequer. The problem thus thrust upon Mr Cardwell

[1] Sir Charles Adderley had been Under Secretary of State for the Colonies in Mr Disraeli's Government. The truth of his prediction was amply proved in the Boer War in 1900.

[2] Exclusive of the Guards.

was very difficult to solve. A large number of extra battalions had only recently been raised in order to provide for an increased garrison for India, and Mr Cardwell was strongly of opinion that if they wanted to make reductions, they should reduce the local European regiments which had only been raised in recent times. Any reduction of British battalions raised difficult purchase questions, and seriously affected the pecuniary interests of a number of individuals. A conference was held at the India Office to consider this matter, when the India Office was represented by the Duke of Argyll as Secretary of State, and Sir Thomas Pears the Military Secretary of the India Office, while the representatives of the War Office were Mr Cardwell, the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Northbrook, and Sir Edward Lugard.

After much discussion, the conclusion was arrived at, that some battalions of infantry and some cavalry regiments must be disbanded altogether, viz., some of the new second battalions of the British army, and some of the more recently raised European regiments of the Indian army, and also the recently raised cavalry regiments. Mr Cardwell had brought with him to the conference the Estimate clerk of the War Office, Mr Ralph Knox,[1] who was well versed in all details relating to the army establishments. Lord Northbrook had previously discussed with Mr Knox the difficult problem that lay before them, and before a final decision was taken, he requested the conference to listen to a scheme which Mr Knox desired to suggest. Briefly, that scheme was that the infantry battalions in India should be reduced from 12 companies to the home establishment of 10 companies, and that the depôt companies should be attached to a regiment at home. The depôt

[1] Now Right Hon. Sir Ralph Knox. He became Under-Secretary of State for War in 1897.

battalions which had been maintained for regiments in India, would then be unnecessary.

This scheme appeared suitable for solving the difficulty without disbanding the cadres of regiments. It was accordingly adopted, and by equalizing the number of companies in the home and Indian battalions, it had the incidental advantage of putting an end to the hardship which was inflicted on every regiment when brought home from India by reducing its establishment from 12 to 10 companies, a measure which, under the operation of the purchase system, inflicted a pecuniary loss on the officers concerned.

Two battalions were brought home from India,[1] reducing the number in that country from 52 to 50, and the depôt battalions were broken up. The depôt companies brought home were attached to a battalion at home, moving with it and forming a portion of it. In the case of the double battalion regiments with one battalion abroad and one at home, there was at home a homogeneous battalion of 12 companies to supply drafts to the foreign battalion of 8 companies. With the other battalions where the depôt was attached to another regiment, the method was devised of holding recruits in solution, as it were, for fifteen months; that is, a recruit was enlisted for general service for the first fifteen months of his service, and during that time could be posted either to the home or the foreign regiment as was found convenient.

Similar arrangements were made for the cavalry, one troop being struck off every cavalry regiment, which would thus consist of seven troops. If the regiment went to India it would take six troops[2] and leave one

[1] These two battalions were restored to India in 1885.

[2] In 1885 a fourth squadron was added to the cavalry regiments in India.

as a depôt. This depôt troop was to be attached to a regiment at home. The required reductions were thus obtained without disbanding regiments.[1]

The reduction of troops and companies involved, however, a large number of officers, and a reduction was also made in the subalterns of garrison artillery, so that altogether 1239 officers were reduced, of whom 754 were on the British establishment. This reduction was necessarily not immediate; the lower ranks absorbing one out of every three vacancies, while the process was accelerated by the bestowal of twenty-five unattached lieutenant-colonelcies, fifty unattached majorities, and 100 unattached companies. As regards the rank and file, the battalions were reduced to a very low establishment.

At the same time the Army Enlistment Act of 1870 was introduced, the first term of engagement being fixed at twelve years, only a part of which was to be passed with the colours and the residue in the reserve, the relative periods being laid down from time to time by the Secretary of State. This period was now fixed for the infantry at six years for each, and it was calculated that a reserve of 60,000 men would be thereby created which would be available for service in any part of the world. The Act also gave greater facilities for calling out the reserve in case of imminent national danger or of great emergency, instead of waiting for an actual invasion or a state of war. It was obvious that it would take some years before the reserve would reach substantial numbers under its normal operation. Meanwhile there was only the First Class Army Reserve, under the Reserve Force Act 1867 and the Militia Reserve Act 1867, who were

[1] It was decided to disband one cavalry regiment, the 21st Hussars, but before it could be brought home for that purpose, the war of 1870 broke out, and the augmentation of 20,000 men to the army allowed of its retention.

available for general service in case of war. The number of these for 1870 was estimated at 23,000 men.

As regards recruiting, bounty had been abolished, and from 1st January 1869, recruits, after attestation, were sent by themselves without escort to join their regiments. Out of 8192 recruits thus sent in 1869, only seven failed to reach their destination.

For the militia and volunteers, officers' training schools were established, and Great Britain was divided into districts to which Inspectors of Reserve Forces were appointed.

The net results of the Session of 1870 were:—

1st. A further reduction of the army estimates by over £1,000,000, or £2,330,000 below the estimates of 1868-69.

2nd. A further concentration of troops at home by withdrawing them from the self-governing Colonies.

3rd. The introduction of a system of short service, for the formation of a reserve.

4th. The unification of the War Office and Horse Guards was commenced, and the distribution of administrative duties placed on a sound basis.

5th. A consolidation of the regular and reserve forces was begun.

The total numbers at home stood as follows:—

Regulars	89,051
Auxiliaries	281,692
TOTAL	370,743

The number of field-guns in the United Kingdom was 180.

Of the foregoing measures, by far the most important, and destined to have the most far-reaching consequences, was the Army Enlistment Act 1870, by which for the first time in English history a measure was adopted for the

creation of a large reserve force, not always employed but always in readiness to be called out at the shortest notice; so that an army small in peace might be at once converted into a large and effective army for the purposes of war. Before the Act had received the royal assent, war broke out between France and Germany.


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CHAPTER VI

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

EVER since the defeat of the Austrians in 1866, the French army had considered that a shadow had been cast over their military reputation by the Prussian victory at Sadowa. That event happened when a French corps was assembled at the camp at Chalons for the summer manœuvres. The troops present that year consisted of the Imperial Guard, whose ranks included the most distinguished officers of all branches in the French army, and loud and outspoken were their assertions that it would be necessary to give the Prussians a beating. They must just wait till they had got a breech-loader, which was only a matter of time for a rifle had been chosen, the Chassepôt, a pattern of which was exhibited by Marshal Regnault de St Jean d'Angely, who commanded the Imperial Guard.

There was, however, one voice raised among them, which expressed the opinion that the beating of the Prussians might not prove so easy as they thought.[1] The gallant but ill-fated Bourbaki, who had commanded a regiment of Zouaves with much distinction in the Crimea, was now commanding a brigade of the Imperial Guard. He had been one of the military deputation which had been sent to Königsberg to assist at the coronation of King William of Prussia, and stood almost alone in the opinion that it might be a difficult task to beat the Prussian army. Of a similar opinion was Colonel Stoffel, the French military *attaché* at Berlin, whose able and clear reports,

[1] This opinion was uttered in the hearing of the present writer.

(which were published in 1871), met with the same reception as the predictions of Cassandra.[1]

The Emperor himself was credited with a desire to maintain peace. The state of his health and of the finances of the Empire combined to make him desirous of avoiding war, and the *plébiscite* of May 1870, which gave him a majority of five and a quarter millions of votes against a million and a half, appeared to assure the stability of his throne and dynasty. Fifty thousand soldiers had, however, voted in the minority, and this was supposed to indicate some dissatisfaction in the army at the rising prestige of Prussia, while their own prestige had been dimmed by the abortive campaign in Mexico. In an evil hour, the Emperor Napoleon listened to these suggestions, little thinking that he was playing into the hands of Bismarck and Moltke.

On the 18th July[2] 1870, the French Chargé d'affaires at Berlin delivered an official declaration of war; but while Europe was awaiting in breathless expectation the first shock in this encounter of giants, the world was startled by the publication, in *The Times* on the 25th July, of the draft of a treaty by which, in consideration of the assent of France to the extension of the North German Confederation, the King of Prussia was to permit and aid a French conquest of Belgium. This information had been given to the British Government a few days

[1] On the 14th and 17th July, Stoffel reported that the mobilization would be complete on 25th July, and that by the 3rd August Prussia would have on the French frontier several armies, each of 100,000 to 120,000 men. This prediction was exact. On the 4th August the 3rd German army crossed the frontier, and overwhelmed General Douay's division at Weissemburg; and on the 6th August defeated the army of Marshal MacMahon at Wörth. On the same day, portions of the 1st and 2nd German armies defeated the 2nd French army corps under Frossard at Spicheren.

[2] The date of this event is given by some public writers as 19th July. Colonel Stoffel, however, who was at Berlin, states it was 18th July; he was ordered by Count Bismarck to leave Berlin the same day.

before by Count Bernstoff, the Prussian ambassador, who communicated it personally to Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville[1] on the 19th July. Count Bismarck's object in making this communication appears to have been to cause the British Government to become the instrument of the publication of the proposed treaty, which he knew would cause indignation to the English nation, combined with apprehensions as to the possibility of Antwerp falling into the hands of the French, and would thus, he hoped, detach British sympathy from France in the approaching war. But while puzzled at the strangeness of the communication, Mr Gladstone saw that it was of importance to avoid the responsibility of publishing it. His reticence obliged the Prussians themselves to give the secret to the world, if they were to reap the advantages which they anticipated from its publication, and this accordingly took place on the 25th July, as already stated.

Napoleon used to speak of Antwerp as a loaded pistol held at England's head (*un pistolet chargé que je tiens sur la gorge de l'Angleterre*). His experience in 1803-4 when he was preparing for an invasion of England from Boulogne had shown him the necessity for his flotilla being able to lie in a sheltered anchorage and yet put to sea at once if a favourable opportunity offered. At Boulogne, if the vessels remained in the basins they could not get out in less than five or six days, and if they lay outside to be ready for an opportunity of crossing, they suffered serious mishaps from bad weather. The Scheldt offers just the shelter that is needed for such a flotilla, which would be protected from maritime attack by Antwerp, a first-class fortress fortified on the most modern system. "It is the point," says Alison,

[1] Lord Granville had become Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a few days before this, in consequence of the death of the Earl of Clarendon on 27th June 1870.

"from which in every age the independence of these kingdoms has been seriously menaced." It has accordingly been "the fixed policy of Great Britain for centuries to prevent this formidable outwork from falling into the hands of her enemies."

Acting on this policy, and before war had actually been declared, the contingency of England having to defend the neutrality of Belgium had been considered at the War Office, and a scheme was in hand for the despatch of a force of 10,000 men to Antwerp.

With the army on a peace establishment, the difficulty was now apparent of organizing the infantry of the force, owing to the reduced strength of the battalions. There was indeed, including the First Class Army Reserve, a larger force at home than there had been at any time during the previous fifty years, with the single exception of the year 1856, but the Army Reserve was not available, for the "Army Enlistment Act" was still passing through Parliament, and even after it had become law, which was not till the 9th August, the change in the conditions under which the reserve might be called out did not affect any one already in the reserve, without his own consent. Although the number of regulars at home had not been diminished, that number was divided among a larger number of battalions, there being sixty-eight battalions of the line at home in 1870 as compared with forty-six in 1868. There were indeed the battalions preparing for colonial and Indian reliefs, which were five at 650 rank and file, and five at 800 rank and file, but it was not desired to interfere with the Indian reliefs, and the remaining battalions had only 500 rank and file each, a strength quite unsuitable for foreign service. To provide nine battalions of 850 men each, it was proposed to select three battalions of Guards and six battalions of line regiments which had a second battalion at home,

and raise them at once to a strength of 850 by transfers. For the Artillery and Engineers there was no difficulty, owing to their organization, and thus a force of 10,000 men could be sent immediately.

If it were desired to double the force, it could only be done by taking the ten battalions which were preparing for India and the Colonies and making up the force as follows:—

5 Battalions at 800=		4,000	
5 „ at 650=		3,250	
3 „ Guards at 1000=		3,000	
9 „ Line at 500=		4,500	
Total Infantry			14,750
Artillery			4,500
Engineers			750
GRAND TOTAL			20,000

There would still be left for home defence 65,592, without counting the reserve. Nineteen battalions of the line would go abroad, leaving forty-eight at home.[1] A similar effort in 1868 would have taken fifteen line battalions, leaving only thirty-one battalions at home.

It was, however, obviously necessary that if such an effort were required, the army should be put on a war footing; and Mr Cardwell expressed himself clearly to Mr Gladstone that he was not prepared to be responsible for sending an expedition abroad, unless measures were taken to increase the strength of the army. Her Majesty's Government consequently obtained from Parliament, on 2nd August, a vote of 20,000 additional men for the army, and a vote of credit for £2,000,000, of which £1,400,000[2] was assigned to the army.

[1] This would make sixty-seven battalions of the line at home. The number in the estimates for 1870-71 was sixty-eight (see Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd March 1870). It is probable that one battalion had not yet returned home when this memorandum was prepared.

[2] Of this sum, only £904,882 was spent.

By this action the Government exposed themselves to the criticism that they had been obliged to recant their economies of the last two years, owing to their having reduced their establishments before the reserves had been provided. The public, who had pocketed the profits with great satisfaction, now turned round and found fault with the results. Especially it was said, as regards the men, that 20,000 trained men had been discharged, and 20,000 recruits had now to be got in their place. It is, however, only fair to observe that the reduction had been chiefly effected in colonial corps, West India regiments, etc. Of the rest of the army hardly any effective soldiers had been reduced, for the discharges were mainly confined to men over twenty-one years' service, those who had less than one year to complete their limited engagement and who were not willing to re-engage, and men of bad character whom it was not desired to retain in the army. Of this latter class upwards of 3000 were discharged between 1st April 1869 and 1st October 1870. By these means a large number of inefficient men were got rid of. Thus, while the total numbers at home had been increased, they contained fewer inefficients than had been the case two years before.

That this was no mere random assertion may be seen from the following figures:—

Taking the gross strength of all ranks—

In 1868 there were serving at home	87,505
In 1870	89,051

Of the First Class Army Reserve there were—

In 1868	3,545
In 1870	21,900

Adding these to the regular army, there were—

In 1868	91,050
In 1870	110,951

If the rank and file of the infantry alone be taken, there were at home—

In 1868	35,580
In 1870	40,550

If to the infantry be added the reserves available to complete their ranks, there were—

In 1868	39,125
In 1870	62,450

It was not only in numbers, however, that the superiority appeared, but still more so in organization. It had always been urged by military men that we ought to possess at home a large number of "cadres" in time of peace, which might be filled up with recruits or reserves, instead of raising fresh battalions.

Trying the two years by this standard, there were as follows:—

	1868.	1870.
Regiments of Cavalry . . .	19	22
Batteries of Artillery . . .	69	83
Companies of Engineers . . .	25	30
Battalions of Infantry . . .	53[1]	75[1]

But it was said that the strength of men in the cadres was too low. In 1868, the strength of the battalions of infantry of the line was 600 rank and file. In 1870, it was 500 rank and file. But the reserve in 1868, which consisted of 3545 men, would have only sufficed to raise 9 battalions to 1000 each; whereas the reserve in 1870, consisting of 21,900 men, would raise 43 battalions to 1000 men each.

The Government was therefore fully justified in claiming that the organization of the army in 1870 was far more powerful than when they had taken office two years previously. The strength of the militia, of the yeomanry, of the volunteers, and of the Second Class

[1] Includes seven battalions of Guards.

Army Reserve had each been increased, the total of these forces having been raised from 253,428 to 278,411.

The Reserve Acts of 1867 had failed to supply the reserves which were needed, so low a rate of pay having been offered for the First Class Army Reserve that very few joined it. This was rectified by Mr Cardwell, and the short service Enlistment Act was passed which gave a good prospect of securing a real army reserve, that upon the existing establishment[1] was calculated to rise to a normal number of 83,000 men. The militia reserve had not come forward as had been hoped for under the Act of 1867. Alterations recently made in the regulations had had the effect of filling up their numbers to the regulated strength.

The opposition press was constantly asserting that the volunteers had been neglected by the present Government. The former Government had, however, given a bald refusal to their request for an increased contribution from the State. After a careful enquiry, the present Government had considerably increased that contribution, and that in a manner which, although it might not be so popular with some officers of the force as a simple increase of the capitation rate would have been, was far more for their true interests and for those of the public. Under the new rules, an officer or a sergeant, who proved that he was capable of properly performing his duty, could gain for his corps a capitation rate of £2, 10s. a year. To enable them to learn those duties, schools of instruction were established at Aldershot, Manchester, Glasgow, and Woolwich. Considerable aid was also given to volunteers who assembled in camps of instruction, and additional assistance was given to the

[1] As increased in August 1870.

National Rifle Association and to the National Artillery Association at their annual camps.

Lastly, the want of cohesion between the regular and the reserve forces which had formerly existed had been remedied to a considerable extent. In 1869 an Act was passed to enable the militia when out for training to be placed under the command of general officers of the army, and in 1870 the country was divided into new districts co-terminous with the military districts, and the whole of the reserve forces when called out for training were put under the general officers commanding those districts.

Mr Cardwell was therefore justified in asserting that although the army estimates had been reduced by £2,000,000, that reduction had been accompanied by a substantial augmentation of the military strength of Great Britain. Special efforts were made to increase the First Class Army Reserve. With this object their pay was doubled, subject to their accepting the new conditions of service contained in the Army Enlistment Act of 1870. These terms were considered liberal, and were freely accepted by the men already in the reserve, and by others who were eligible for the force and who now offered themselves for enlistment in it.

In 1869, the gradual arming of the auxiliary forces with the breech-loader had been commenced, and when the war broke out in 1870, sixty-five regiments of militia and fifteen of yeomanry had been so armed. Immediate steps were taken to complete all corps, and in October 1870 the issue was commenced, and it continued at the rate of 1000 a day for five months, and was finally completed in May 1871, when over 250,000 had been issued.

Recruiting went on vigorously, and in the six months following the outbreak of the war, 24,555 recruits were

raised, notwithstanding that bounty had been abolished. The 20,000 men added to the army were distributed as follows:—

Cavalry	1,831
Artillery	5,317
Infantry	12,100
Royal Engineers	294
Army Service Corps	470

But what was of the most importance was the increase given to the field artillery. The number of field-guns at home on the outbreak of the war was 180, being 10 batteries of horse artillery and 20 batteries of field artillery, with 5110 men. The militia and volunteer artillery were available to assist in the defence of fortresses and arsenals, but a sufficient force of field batteries was needed for a manœuvring army for home defence of 100,000 to 150,000 men.

Accordingly the horse artillery was raised from 10 batteries to 16, with 96 guns; and 20 batteries of garrison artillery were converted into field batteries,[1] making 40 altogether, with 240 guns, and giving a total of 336 guns horsed and equipped, with a peace establishment of 8012 rank and file. The Royal Artillery was also augmented by 5000 men. After making up the 336 field-guns to a war establishment of 8816 men, there remained 7566 artillery-men available for garrison duty, besides 14,457 artillery militia and 33,600 artillery volunteers—total garrison artillery 55,623. Besides this, the guns and wagons for twelve more batteries were got ready and kept in reserve. All the wants of the navy as to armaments and artillery stores were,

[1] The ease with which these batteries were raised, with trained gunners, may be contrasted with the difficulty experienced in 1900, owing to the change that had been made in the organization of the Royal Artillery in 1899.

according to the practice then in force, provided from the army vote.

On the whole, it may be said that the action of the War Department, when surprised by the sudden outbreak of the war between France and Prussia, was energetic and judicious.

CHAPTER VII

ARMY PURCHASE

ALTHOUGH the British Government had twice, during 1870, to consider the question of sending a force to Antwerp, the necessity for such an expedition fortunately did not arise. The danger of Belgium being drawn into the strife was averted by the prompt negotiation of treaties[1] with Prussia and France. By this arrangement, England made a separate but identical treaty with each of the belligerents, by which they undertook to maintain the neutrality and independence of Belgium. In the event of either belligerent violating that neutrality, England was to co-operate with the other for the defence of Belgium.

The military events, however, which were taking place in France were of so striking and marvellous a character that they excited in the minds of the English people an anxious interest, and a settled purpose to review their military institutions for the purpose of placing them on a basis of permanent security.

Allusion has already been made to two lessons which were enforced by the wars of 1864 and 1866. First, that modern infantry must be armed with breech-loaders. Second, that modern armies must be so organized as to be capable of immediate expansion in case of war, so as to be able within a few days to muster a force at

[1] These treaties were signed on the 9th and 11th August respectively.

least twice as large as their peace establishment. The war of 1870 brought prominently to notice a third point in which the Prussian army excelled, and to which excellence its astounding victories were largely due. That was the admirable training and instruction of the officers, both staff and regimental.

In his memorandum of 1846, Lord Grey had stated that it was indispensable that means should be taken to improve the education of the officers of the army, which was far from what it should be. He observed that it could not well be otherwise, for—

"Their promotion depends exclusively upon seniority or upon interest, and their having money to purchase their successive steps. There is not even a pretence of making it depend upon their showing themselves to be fit for it. In the navy, before an officer can obtain his commission as lieutenant, he is obliged to pass through a strict examination, and to show that he has acquired all the knowledge necessary for the effective performance of his duty. But in the army there is nothing of the kind. A young officer may get his company, and subsequently rise to the highest rank upon the mere statement of his commanding officer that he is acquainted with what may be termed the mechanical parts of his professional duty; and even the assurance that he knows this is too often given as a mere matter of form, and without being at all deserved. Under such a system, can we be surprised that the regimental officers of our army should as a body be so inferior to those of the artillery and engineers, and of the navy?"

Lord Grey then proceeded to advocate the necessity for introducing a system of examination for officers of the army. (1) That no young man should be allowed to receive a first commission without undergoing an examination to ascertain that he had received the education of a gentleman, to include military drawing and one European language in addition to his own. (2) That before being eligible for the rank of captain, an officer

should pass a second examination to prove that he had at least a moderate knowledge of the theory and science of his profession, as well as its practical duties. (3) That a certain number of promotions should be given every year to officers who should have most distinguished themselves in their examinations. The first of these recommendations was introduced shortly afterwards; the second some ten or twelve years later. To the third, however, the purchase system offered an insuperable obstacle, and no attempt was made to carry it out.

But it was not only to promotion by merit that the purchase system was an obstacle. Every question of army reform or of military organization had to be considered in the light of the pecuniary interests involved thereby. An officer could not be transferred from a regiment to the half-pay list without causing him to accept a commission much inferior in value to that which he had purchased. For this reason it was almost impossible to reduce an entire battalion on the termination of a war, or to reduce the cadres of existing battalions; and thus a great obstacle existed to the reduction of the army to a peace establishment.

The difficulty was greatly enhanced through the practice which had grown up of making payments in excess of the regulation prices, a practice which, though illegal, was tacitly and universally recognized. An officer transferred to the half-pay list would therefore lose not only the regulation difference in value between full and half pay, but also the over-regulation value of his commission. If the commanding officer of a regiment wished to retire, he could not do so without heavy loss, unless the step were permitted to "go in the regiment." No selection could be made of his successor; the next senior who could afford to purchase must necessarily succeed to the command, and thus, in time of war, the lives of hundreds of men

the fate of a battle, or the crisis of a campaign, might be thrown into the hands of a man who was altogether incompetent.

That this was not an imaginary or overstrained statement of the situation created by the purchase system may be judged from the following letter, written during the campaign in the Low Countries in 1794, by Major-General Craig, who was Adjutant-General to the forces under the Duke of York.

Major-General Craig to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

NIMEGUEN, 12*th October* 1794.

I will conceal none of our faults from you—indeed they are too obvious, too glaring, to admit of the attempt. That we have plundered the whole country is unquestionable. That we are the most undisciplined, the most ignorant, the worst provided army that ever took the field is equally certain; but we are not to blame for it. If your Ministry at home in their great wisdom will totally destroy that chain of dependence by which alone discipline can be preserved in an army, the consequence is inevitable. There is not a young man in the army that cares one farthing whether his commanding officer, his Brigadier, or the Commander-in-Chief himself approves his conduct or not. His promotion depends not on their smiles or frowns—his friends can give him a thousand pounds with which he goes to the auction room in Charles Street and in a fortnight he becomes a captain. Out of the fifteen regiments of cavalry and twenty-six of infantry which we have here, twenty-one are literally commanded by boys or idiots—I have had the curiosity to count them over. To keep the latter in any sort of order during the best part of the campaign, we have had Major-General Stuart, and now he has but two colleagues. Consider all this, and you will hardly be surprised when I repeat that we have no discipline —that we are naked and unprovided of everything that depends upon the regiments themselves—that we do not know how to post a picquet or instruct a sentinel in his duty; and as to moving, God forbid we

should attempt it within three miles of an enemy! This is no exaggerated picture. Judge, then, if I can be surprised at anything that can well be reported of us. I beg, however, to know what it is. As to plundering, it is beyond everything that I believe ever disgraced an army; and yet I think we do all we can to prevent it, that is, with the little assistance which the ignorant boys or idiots above alluded to can give us. It is not in nature to prevent it but by the exertion of the officers, and every mode that we can devise has been tried to excite them to it, but without success.

The apprehensions of Major-General Craig as to the probable results of any attempt to move in the presence of an enemy were soon justified. Notwithstanding the successes that had been gained in the previous year, the campaign of 1794 ended disastrously for the British forces. They were attacked seven days after the date of General Craig's letter. Nimeguen was captured by the French, and the English were compelled to retire from Holland.

There were greater faults than the purchase system which contributed to the disasters that overtook the British army in 1794, but General Craig's letter shows that the sale and purchase of commissions were wholly unrestricted, and that the colonels of regiments lacked either the power or the will to prevent men who were quite unfit for the position, from acquiring the superior ranks in the army.

But the system was more at fault than the colonels, for sixty years later a Royal Commission which had been appointed to enquire into the Sale and Purchase of Commissions in the Army, when enumerating the objections urged against the purchase system, reported as follows:—

"Under such regulations there is little inducement for officers to acquire proficiency in the science of war, or to study the military progress of other nations. An officer who performs his routine duties, and who keeps a sum of money available to purchase his promotion, as opportunities offer, may look forward with confidence to the attainment

of high military rank. While the subaltern who has not the means to buy advancement may serve during all the best years of his life in distant stations and in deadly climates, yet he must be prepared to see his juniors pass over him, for he will find that knowledge of military science and attention to regimental duties do not avail him, unless he is able to buy the rank to which his qualifications entitle him."

The system by which junior officers passed over the heads of their seniors led to great incongruities. In the same regiment might be seen lieutenants with double the service of some of the captains. The length of service of the officers of the same rank was most uneven. A few examples taken in the year that purchase was abolished will serve to illustrate the incongruities to which the system gave rise.

In the 15th Foot the senior lieutenant had longer service than ten of the captains. The same was the case in the 16th Foot. In the 41st Foot one of the lieutenants was senior to every officer above him from the lieut.-colonel downwards. In the 87th Foot there were two captains of six years' service, and two lieutenants of thirteen and fifteen years' service respectively; the lieut.-colonel of the regiment had entered the army two years after the senior subaltern, who was also senior by length of service to one of the majors and ten of the captains, all of whom had entered the regiment when he was already a lieutenant, and had passed over his head. In the 37th Foot there were three captains of nine years' service who were senior to one of thirty-two years' service.

A few years before this, there was, in a regiment serving in India, a captain of forty-seven years' service who had been at the battle of Waterloo, at which time not one of the other officers of the regiment, except the lieutenant-colonel, was born. The length of service of the other

captains in the regiment varied from twenty-three to seven years.

A lieutenant often passed over the heads of several officers; thus in 1870, the ninth lieutenant in the 91st Regiment became a captain by purchase, passing over the heads of eight subalterns senior to him.

An extraordinary case occurred in the year 1846, when there were two captains, a father and son, serving in the 24th Regiment. A majority was for sale, and the father, who had nearly forty years' service, declined to purchase, thinking it better to let his son have the opportunity of advancement; so the son purchased the majority over his father's head. The story has a tragic sequel. Two years after this, the regiment went on active service, and the son was killed, when the father became a major without purchase.

The system was naturally prejudicial to discipline. An old officer could hardly be expected to show deference to a young man many years his junior, who had been promoted over his head not for merit, but simply because he had got a sum of money which he himself lacked.

The possession of money was a *sine quâ non* for promotion, so much so that when the lieutenant-colonel of a regiment wished to retire, and neither of the majors was able to purchase, a major was brought in from another regiment to be lieutenant-colonel.[1]

It is not surprising, then, that the system had been frequently the subject of public discussion, and the difficulties which it seemed to place in the way of necessary improvements in the army led gradually to the conclusion that the time had arrived when it was absolutely necessary to deal with the question.

A whole generation has passed away since the abolition of the purchase system. There is not an officer serving

[1] Royal Commission of 1856, Q. 2278.

with any battalion of infantry or regiment of cavalry who entered the army under that system, and the echoes of the strife which accompanied its abolition have long died away and are forgotten. Before entering, therefore, on the history of the abolition of purchase, it seems necessary to give some description of the system in order to make it intelligible to a modern reader.

CHAPTER VIII

SALE AND PURCHASE OF COMMISSIONS

THE sale and purchase of commissions appear to have come into existence with the creation of a standing army.

In 1856, a Royal Commission, of which the Duke of Somerset was chairman, was appointed for the purpose of enquiring into the practice. Their Report, made in 1857, states that from the earliest period of which there are any records of a standing army in this country, the sale and purchase of commissions in the army appear to have been authorized. The purchase of civil offices under the Government was openly recognized in those times; as an illustration, they state that the situation of Secretary of State was not obtained by an eminent statesman without payment of £5000. The adoption of such a system in the army was therefore in unison with the custom of the public service, and in 1681, Charles II. bought the command of the regiment of Guards from Colonel Russell, and bestowed it on his son the Duke of Grafton, who had not, it is stated, been in the army before he received this appointment.

The first official recognition of the practice of advancement in the army by purchase is found in a Warrant of Charles II., dated 7th March 1683-4, directing that when any commissioned officer of the land forces should obtain leave to surrender his commission, and that at his request it should be granted to any other, the person so surrendering the commission and the person

obtaining it should each pay one shilling in the pound of the sum received and paid to the Paymaster-General for the benefit of Chelsea Hospital, then just established. This was a mere recognition of a pre-existing practice, but it is the first recorded sanction that was given to the system.

The system probably originated in the following manner. When a new regiment was required, it was raised by the person who was to be appointed Colonel, and upon him devolved the trouble and expense of recruiting the required number of men.[1] In return he had the privilege of nominating some[2] or all of the officers. In order to recoup himself of part of the expense he had been put to, the Colonel required the officers to contribute; in other words, he practically sold the commissions to them. These officers in their turn claimed to recoup themselves by selling their commissions to their successors.

The sale of commissions was prohibited by William III., but was re-established in 1701 as a provision on retirement. A Royal Warrant issued by Queen Anne on 1st May 1711 enacted that no commission might be sold except by permission under the Royal Sign Manual; and that no officer should have leave to sell who had not served *twenty* years, or been disabled in the service;

[1] Only a few years before the abolition of purchase, gentlemen were given commissions in return for raising men; thus, on 25th November 1857, R. W. Macleod Fraser (who had sold out of the army as a major in 1856) was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel 6th Foot, without purchase, "for having raised a new battalion of 1000 rank and file."

On 2nd February 1858, Poulett H. Somerset (formerly Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel Coldstream Guards, who had sold out in December 1855) was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel 7th Foot, without purchase, "for having raised a new battalion of 1000 rank and file."

Commissions as ensign without purchase were also given at this time to gentlemen who raised 100 rank and file.

[2] There are some still living who can testify to the existence of this practice when new regiments were raised in 1858.

unless it were allowed by the Sovereign on some extraordinary occasion.

The prohibition to sell under twenty years' service was soon disregarded. On it was built the converse proposition, that is, that anybody who had served twenty years might sell under any circumstances, whether he had purchased or not.

George I. was very averse to the sale of commissions. He issued a Royal Warrant in February 1719-20 by which a tariff of prices was established; and it was ordered that:—

1. A commission might not be sold to any person more than one grade lower in rank to the seller, *i.e.* a lieutenant-colonel could only sell to a major; a major to a captain.

2. No officer above a lieutenant could purchase higher rank unless he had served ten years as a commissioned officer.

3. Regulation price only to be taken.

4. Persons purchasing had no title thereby to sell again thereafter.

The Crown exercised absolute control over the purchase money, sometimes appropriating the amount in part to payment of debts, and the residue to the benefit of the wife of the officer if deserted by him. The Royal Warrant of Charles II., enacting that every officer selling his commission was to surrender twelve pence in the pound for the use of Chelsea Hospital, has already been noticed.

On the other hand, the bestowal of a commission without purchase was regarded as so great a favour that the recipient was sometimes made to pay for it in an indirect manner. For instance, by a Royal Warrant, dated 10th March 1761, Captain Robert Rayner of Griffin's Regiment of Foot, retired on account of ill-health, was ordered to receive ten shillings a day for the rest of his life. The sum was to be made up by deduction

from the pay of non-purchase officers of Griffin's Regiment as follows: The youngest captain without purchase was to pay 5s. 4d. a day; the youngest lieutenant without purchase 1s. a day; the youngest ensign without purchase 3s. 8d. a day, "the same being the whole of his pay." By Royal Warrant of 15th July 1779, Captain Stephen Prion of the 1st Horse Grenadier Guards was granted 19s. a day for life, the sum being made up by similar deductions.[1]

In 1765, Lord Barrington, Secretary at War, was directed by King George III. to summon the Board of General Officers to draw up a tariff of prices for every regimental commission in the cavalry and infantry of the army. He carried out the King's command by writing the following letter:—

Lord Barrington to the Judge Advocate General.

WAR OFFICE, *3rd October* 1765.

Certain commissions in the army are sometimes allowed to be sold, although the King is in general very much averse to a practice so injurious to officers of merit who have no money; but it is highly proper, when any commissions are sold, that their price should be fixed, determined, and known. Without some regulation of that kind, a practice exceptionable at best may be rendered very hurtful to the army.

Before the King declares his pleasure on this subject, he wishes to know the opinion of his general officers, what sum is proper to be given for each of the following commissions:—

(*Here follow lists of the several commissioned ranks in the cavalry and infantry*).

It is therefore His Majesty's pleasure that you do summon the Board of General Officers, who are to consider the matter aforesaid; and you will transmit to me their opinion thereon, to be laid before His Majesty. And it is His Majesty's further pleasure that they also

[1] See War Office Miscellaneous Letter Books at the Record Office.

take into consideration whether any difference should be made between the price of commissions of regiments serving in and out of Europe, and, if any, to specify what difference.

On the 31st January 1766, the Board of General Officers made their report to the King, and submitted a list of prices to be "uniformly observed in the respective corps, whether serving in or out of Europe, whenever your Majesty shall in your good pleasure permit such commissions to be sold." The Board further state their opinion "that if any deficiency should arise by the commissions of cornet, ensign, or second lieutenant not producing the price allowed by the said estimate, the loss should be sustained by the officer who obtains leave to sell."

FIRST AND SECOND TROOPS OF HORSE GUARDS

Commissions.	Prices.	Difference in value.
First Lieutenant-Colonel	£5500	£400
Second Lieutenant-Colonel	5100	800
Cornet and Major	4300	200
Guidon and Major	4100	1400
Exempt and Captain	2700	1200
Brigadier and Lieutenant or Adjutant and Lieutenant	1500	300
Sub-Brigadier and Cornet	1200	1200
TOTAL		£5500

FIRST AND SECOND TROOP OF HORSE GRENADIER GUARDS

Commissions.	Prices.	Difference in value.
Lieutenant-Colonel	£5400	£1200
Major	4200	1100
Lieutenant and Captain	3100	100
Guidon and Captain	3000	1300
Sub-Lieutenant	1700	300
Adjutant	1400	1400
TOTAL		£5400

HORSE

Commissions	Prices.	Difference in value.
Lieutenant-Colonel	£5200	£950
Major	4250	1150
Captain	3100	1100
Captain-Lieutenant	2000	250
Lieutenant	1750	150
Cornet	1600	1600
TOTAL		£5200

DRAGOON GUARDS AND DRAGOONS

Commissions.	Prices.	Difference in value.
Lieutenant-Colonel	£4700	£1100
Major	3600	1100
Captain	2500	1100
Captain-Lieutenant	1400	250
Lieutenant	1150	150
Cornet	1000	1000
TOTAL		£4700

FOOT GUARDS

Commissions.	Prices.	Difference in value.
Lieutenant-Colonel	£6700	£400
Second Major, Third Major, First Major } with rank of Colonel	6300	2800
Captain	3500	900
Captain-Lieutenant, with rank of Lieutenant-Colonel	2600	1100
Lieutenant, with rank of Captain	1500	600
Ensign	900	900
TOTAL		£6700

MARCHING REGIMENTS OF FOOT

Commissions.	Prices.	Difference in value.
Lieutenant-Colonel	£3500	£900
Major	2600	1100
Captain	1500	700
Captain-Lieutenant	800	250
Lieutenant[1]	550	150
Ensign	400	400
TOTAL		£3500

(Report signed by thirty General Officers.)

[1] In the regiment of Fusiliers, which have First and Second Lieutenants . . First Lieut. £550 £100; Second Lieut. 450 450

The grounds upon which the Board of General Officers proceeded in fixing the prices of the several commissions were also stated as follows:—

"The Board considered the value of the pay and of the rank distinctly; and after fixing what appeared to them a reasonable price for the commissions of cornet and ensign in the respective corps, and which they might probably be sold for in time of war as well as peace, proceeded to estimate every increase of pay, after the rate of £100 for each shilling *per diem*, in a general view, not attending minutely to fractional sums; and in the next place endeavoured to fix a certain proportionate value upon each advancement in rank, such as might, if possible, be extended to all the different corps."

On the 8th February 1766, Lord Barrington signified the King's entire approval of the report, and that His Majesty would order what they recommend, to be invariably observed for the future, under pain of his highest displeasure.

Accordingly on the 10th February 1766, a Royal Warrant was issued stating that the report of the Board, which was annexed, had been approved by the King, and—

"Our will and pleasure is, that in all cases where we shall permit any of the commissions specified therein to be sold, the sum to be paid for the same shall not exceed the prices set down in the said report; and all colonels, agents, and other our military officers are hereby required and directed to conform strictly and carefully to the regulations hereby laid down and established, upon pain of our highest displeasure."

But although a tariff of regulation prices was thus established, it did not follow that an officer had an unqualified right to sell his commission, for the Secretary at War, after signifying the King's approval in his

letter of the 8th February 1766, proceeded to comment on the system at considerable length.

Having regard to Lord Barrington's official position, and to the fact that, so far as the present writer is aware, this is the only instance on record where the sale of commissions is discussed by a responsible minister of the Crown giving official instructions thereon, this letter deserves particular attention; but as it is of considerable length, it is given in the Appendix,[1] merely noting here that Lord Barrington pointed out the impropriety of allowing officers to "sell commissions which they did not buy"; and he laid down as an established rule "that officers should sell what they bought, and no more," and that this rule must be absolutely adhered to without exception.

It will be observed that while the regulation of the 1st May 1711 limited the right to sell to those only who had served twenty years, whether they had purchased or not, Lord Barrington's letter asserts that it had long been a rule that officers should not sell any commissions which they had not bought.

A strict adherence to these rules, especially to Lord Barrington's instructions, would have probably led to the gradual extinction of the purchase system, but it is very certain that the instructions were ignored; and indeed they were hardly compatible with the giving of a legal value to every commission by means of an official tariff of authorized prices.

The tariff was slightly altered in 1783 as regards cavalry regiments, but no alteration whatever was made for the Foot Guards and Infantry of the line until 1821. In that year a Royal Warrant was issued by which the regulation prices were considerably increased in the higher ranks, especially in the rank of lieutenant-colonel,

[1] See Second Appendix.

the price of which was largely raised throughout the service, viz.:—

		Increase from 1766.
Household Cavalry . . .	£7250	£1750
Cavalry of the line . . .	6175	1475
Foot Guards	9000	2300
Infantry of the line . . .	4500	1000

The Board of General Officers, by whom the new prices were drawn up, stated in their report that "commissions in the army are of a higher value than that fixed for them by the regulations of 1766."

The Royal Warrants which laid down the regulation prices forbade any sum to be paid in excess of them. Nevertheless it is certain that these regulations were evaded, and sums very considerably in excess of the regulation were habitually paid. It would be a natural deduction that the several ranks had increased in value and that an increase in the regulation prices, which would raise them to the ordinary market value, would tend to prevent a breach of the law which forbade any such excess to be paid.

In a debate in the House of Commons on over-regulation payments on the 15th March 1824, Lord Palmerston, who had been Secretary at War since 1809, stated that "the existing inconveniences had been for some time felt, and an attempt had been made to remedy them by increasing the price of commissions." It seems therefore clear that it was the practice of making over-regulation payments that led to the increase of regulation prices in 1821.

The increase did not, however, have the effect of reducing the over-regulation payments, and when a converse operation took place in 1860, when the prices of cavalry commissions were reduced to the regulation rates for infantry, no change was effected in the over-

regulation cavalry payments, but they remained exactly the same. Nothing seemed to affect the over-regulation payments except a time of war, when they usually ceased altogether in the regiments which were on active service.

CHAPTER IX

OVER-REGULATION PAYMENTS

THE question next arises, How did over-regulation payments come into existence in face of the strict prohibitions against them?

The report of the Royal Commissioners of 1870 states that they had been unable to ascertain by any direct proof when the practice began, but they had no reason to doubt that it prevailed from the time when the prices of commissions were first fixed in the year 1719-20.

This opinion was doubtless correct, and a consideration of the circumstances which attended the sale and purchase of commissions by fixed regulation will show how excess payments probably arose.

Under the purchase system an officer could only realize the money which he had sunk in the purchase of his rank by retiring altogether from the service, in which case he could sell his commission for its regulated value. If, however, he was desirous of remaining in the army to rise to the rank of a general officer, he was necessarily obliged to forfeit what he had paid, because on becoming a major-general his lieutenant-colonel's commission passed without purchase to the next senior officer in his regiment, while his new commission as major-general was not a saleable one. In order to save part of the loss, in such cases, it became the practice for a lieutenant-colonel to go on half-pay some time before he was likely to become a

major-general. This he effected by exchanging with a lieutenant-colonel on the half-pay list; and for such an exchange a fixed sum was laid down by regulation.

If the half-pay lieutenant-colonel came into the regiment to serve, it would give no promotion in the regiment, and the transaction would only affect the two lieutenant-colonels concerned. But if the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment could bring in a half-pay lieutenant-colonel who wanted to realize the value of his commission—and a half-pay officer could only sell by first exchanging to full pay—then it would be worth while for the senior of each rank who would obtain promotion, to make some payment to the lieutenant-colonel in consideration of his bringing in an officer from the half-pay list to sell and give a step of promotion throughout the regiment. By these means an officer could afford to sacrifice the regulation value of his commission, as he received a bonus from each of the officers of his regiment who gained a step by his going to half-pay.

This will be best illustrated by an example. Lieutenant-Colonel A., commanding a regiment of foot under the regulations of 1783, wishes to save the value of his commission, £3500, without retiring from the service. He finds Lieutenant-Colonel B. on the half-pay list, who wishes to exchange in order to sell his commission. B. pays to A. the regulation difference between half-pay and full pay; that is, £1948, 10s., as fixed by regulation. B. would then sell in the regiment for the regulation price, receiving £3500. A. will have received £1948, 10s., from B. and will need £1551, 10s. to make up the regulation value of his commission. There would not be much difficulty in getting this made up by the Major, Captain, Lieutenant, and Ensign, who respectively get promotion by B.'s retirement. A. has thus saved himself from all loss.

It is obvious that this would not hold good if A. himself had given much over-regulation money; but it is suggested that this is what *originally* gave rise to the practice; and it seems to be borne out by the fact that over-regulation payments gradually increased in amount till they became nearly equal to the regulation prices, and in some cases largely exceeded them.

In 1856 a Royal Commission was appointed to report on the Purchase of Commissions, and received in evidence from Mr C. Hammersley, of the firm of Cox and Co. the army agents, that while the regulation price of a lieutenant-colonelcy of a cavalry regiment was £6175, the usual price was £14,000; that he had known £16,000 to be given, and on one occasion £18,000. In other corps it was as follows:—

A company in the Foot Guards,	regulation	£4,800,	usual price	£9,000
Lieut.-Colonel	„	„	9,000,	„	13,200
A company in a line regiment		„	1,300,	„	2,400
Lieut.-Colonel	„	„	4,500,	„	7,000

Mr Hammersley also stated that the relatives of an officer sometimes impoverished themselves for the purpose of raising the money for an officer's promotion.

With reference to this, the Commissioners observed that when an officer got money from his friends for the purchase of his commissions, and subsequently sold out, he obtained money which he would not have acquired but for the purchase system.

The Royal Commission of 1856 reported:—

That the practice of paying sums exceeding the regulation price must be considered to be an accompaniment of the purchase system which it appeared impossible to prevent. That the regulations, though stringently worded, were habitually neglected.

That the regulation price was a fiction, and the large

sums which officers were compelled to pay aggravated the evil effects of the system.

That the command of a regiment was an important trust; yet it was admitted by high authority that several officers had attained the position of lieutenant-colonel who were unequal to the command of the regiments which they held.

That it was difficult to remove an inefficient lieutenant-colonel. That it must indirectly affect all the higher ranks of the army, since commanders in the field must be selected from officers the great majority of whom had obtained promotion by purchase and not from any acknowledged fitness.

That it restricted the number of those from whom officers could in the first instance be obtained; it deadened the feelings of emulation and the eagerness to acquire military knowledge, and it rendered men eligible for the highest command without taking any security that they were fitted for such a position.

They also reported the advantages of the system, that it facilitated retirement, and therefore accelerated promotion which would otherwise stagnate in time of peace. It also offered security against favouritism.

They stated that if purchase were abolished, it would be found indispensable to introduce the two principles which gave vigour to the French service, viz., promotion by selection and compulsory retirement. Finally they recommended that the rank of lieutenant-colonel should not be purchasable.

It must be added that the public reaped an advantage from the purchase system which cannot be ignored. So long as it existed, there was no necessity for any large non-effective vote. A few officers were allowed to retire on full pay after thirty years' service, but the number was limited by the very moderate fixed sum allowed for the

purpose. The sale of his commission was therefore the ordinary provision for an officer who wished to retire, and this cost the public nothing.

It was also not without profit sometimes to the officer, for many officers sold out who had not bought any step, thus receiving £4500 in the case of a lieutenant-colonel. Such instances were by no means exceptional, for a return of officers on full pay on 1st May 1856, showing the regulation amount which each had actually paid for his commissions,[1] and the sum to which each would be entitled under the existing system on retiring from the service, states that the total sums paid amounted to £4,742,280, whereas the officers were entitled to receive £7,126,030. The difference between these two sums represented the value of steps which had been obtained without purchase, and had, doubtless, been much enhanced by the casualties of the Crimean War, then drawing to a close. These had caused very rapid promotion. In one regiment[2] there were three officers who had become captains in two years' service. Another[3] had a captain of fifteen months' service, and another[4] had one of thirteen months' service.

The report of the Royal Commission of 1856 had the effect of bringing the purchase system prominently before the public mind, but no steps were taken to carry out their recommendation that, at least with regard to the command of a battalion, the system should be abolished. In 1860 it was taken into consideration by Lord Palmerston's Government, who determined to adopt it; but nothing was done, for the abolition of purchase in the case of the lieutenant-colonel affected the interests of every officer in the regiment.

In 1860 the prices of commissions in the cavalry of the line were reduced to the same as infantry of the line, the

[1] An officer received a fresh commission for each step of promotion.
[2] 41st Regiment. [3] 77th Regiment. [4] 88th Regiment.

difference to existing holders being made up to them out of the "reserve" fund when they sold out.

In 1868 Sir John Pakington submitted to the Queen that it was advisable to do away with the rank of cornet and ensign in the army, and he obtained Her Majesty's approval to that measure. He left office before he could prepare a scheme for submission to Parliament, and the task devolved on his successor. Mr Cardwell accordingly proposed in 1870 that every candidate for a first commission should be made a lieutenant at once, and that the difference between the value of an ensign's and a lieutenant's commission should be paid by the public. The total cost of this would ultimately be £509,500. This proposal was made after taking the advice of some of the most experienced officers in the army with respect to it; but it met with a most dismal reception in the House of Commons, and was universally rejected. The cause of this rejection was that no provision was made for over-regulation prices. This made it necessary to have an enquiry, for although everybody knew what over-regulation prices were, except those who were responsible, yet every one who was responsible was obliged to be entirely ignorant.

Accordingly the Royal Commission of 1870 was appointed to enquire into over-regulation payments on promotion in the army. They reported unanimously that while the existence and general prevalence of the practice was notorious, there had been no attempt to put a stop to it by enforcing the provisions of the statute prohibiting it; and that there had been a tacit acquiescence in the practice, amounting to a virtual recognition of it by civil and military departments and authorities.

It may be convenient here to notice the statute laws which affected the purchase of commissions.

Act 5 and 6 of Edward VI. c. 16 forbade the sale of

offices, but did not apply to those held in the military service.

Act 49 of George III. c. 126 made it a misdemeanour to buy or sell any office, save commissions in the army sold at regulation prices. It followed from this that all buyers and sellers of army commissions at any price over and above the regulation prices were guilty of a misdemeanour. The eighth section of the Act provided that every officer who accepted or paid any sum in excess of the regulation price should, on conviction by a general court-martial, forfeit his commission and be cashiered; also that the commission so forfeited should be sold, and half its value (not exceeding £500) should be paid to the informer. A copy of this section of the Act was circulated for the information and guidance of the officers of the army in a General Order dated 29th July 1809.

On the 14th August 1783 a General Order had been issued to the army with the object of enforcing by more stringent rules the prohibitions contained in the Royal Warrants against paying any sum in excess of the fixed prices of commissions. By this order every officer applying for leave to sell his commission at the regulated price, was required solemnly to declare, on the word and honour of an officer and a gentleman, that nothing beyond the regulated price was promised or would be given or accepted. A similar declaration was required of the officer desiring to purchase; and the commanding officer of the regiment was required to declare that the established regulation was intended to be strictly complied with, and that no clandestine bargain existed between the parties concerned.

In 1824, an objection was made in the House of Commons to the declarations imposed by the General Order of 1783, on the grounds that "there was scarcely one case in ten in which officers received their com-

missions at the regulated price," and that the declarations were useless. The regulation was accordingly abolished.

The history of all that is officially known regarding over-regulation payments is given in the report of the Royal Commission of 1870. The foregoing information, which has been extracted from that report and from other official sources, shows :—

1. That the practice was strictly prohibited both by law and by regulation.

2. That the most explicit prohibitions and the most stringent regulations had utterly failed to prevent or even check the practice.

3. That the infraction of the law was well known, and was winked at.

CHAPTER X

DIFFICULT POSITION OF MR CARDWELL

THE report of the Royal Commission was received simultaneously with the breaking out of the Franco-Prussian war. The question of how the purchase system could be modified and its evils minimized had been under discussion ever since the Crimean war. The chief difficulty seemed to be the enormous expense to the public that would be entailed by its abolition. The partial attempts which were made from time to time to deal with it piece-meal had all failed. Yet to delay dealing with it seemed likely, as in the case of the Sibylline books, to enhance the cost.

In 1854, without reckoning the Guards and the colonial corps, the purchase corps comprised 23 regiments of cavalry and 103 battalions of infantry. Two battalions of infantry were added during the Crimean War, and during the Indian Mutiny the army was increased by 2 regiments of cavalry and 27 battalions of infantry. Besides these, the Transport corps, which had been raised as a non-purchase corps in the Crimea, was converted after the war into a purchase corps called the Military Train with a strength equal to 2 battalions, so that the 126 purchase units of 1854 had increased in five years to 159 units.

The state of Europe did not point to any reduction, but rather to a probable increase of the British army. It was more than ever necessary that the different forces of the nation should be united and combined into one harmonious and compact body, and that it should be

made possible for officers of the regular army to serve with the reserve forces. Without abolishing the purchase system it would be impossible to amalgamate the purchase officers of the army with non-purchase officers of the reserve forces. Moreover, the admirable results of the Prussian system invited the consideration whether, in some respects, it might not be advisable to adopt some portions of that system; yet no change could be made without either creating new pecuniary interests, or interfering with those already existing.

It appeared therefore to be indispensable to abolish the purchase system, and in so doing, to recognize to the full the over-regulation prices as recommended by the Royal Commission.

Mr Cardwell's proposals could not, however, be made public until he had worked out the details, obtained the concurrence of his colleagues, and submitted the scheme to the Queen for Her Majesty's approval. He was not able to do this before the end of the year. The officers of the army, not knowing his intentions, and fearing from the proposal made in February that the over-regulation value of commissions would not be recognized, began to be uneasy at the prospect of the abolition of purchase.

The Ministry was becoming unpopular from a variety of opposite causes all connected with army administration. Mr Cardwell had given the public the lowest expenditure since the Crimean War, and the largest force at home available for service abroad since Waterloo, and yet they did not seem satisfied. Some of his critics seemed to think they should have everything and pay nothing. Such critics it was not possible to satisfy. The Government were unpopular because they had reduced the army. They got no thanks for having taken two millions off the army estimates, but their safety was seriously imperilled by a demand for additional

expenditure without the excitement of war, and glory, and all that, to carry them through. The dual government of the army was acknowledged to be a source of weakness and an impediment to any military operations which the country might be engaged in, but the War Minister's efforts to unify the administration of the army were regarded with doubt and suspicion. A small but active section of the House of Commons was urging the abolition of purchase, but this measure was objected to by two opposing parties, one on the ground that it would cost too much money, and the other because they feared the Government would not give enough money.

The uneasy feeling of the army was increased by the friction which had attended the introduction of the Control system. That system aimed at the consolidation of the supply departments of the army, and had been introduced by Sir John Pakington, who had placed under the Controller-in-Chief the Commissariat, Military stores, Barrack, and Purveyors' departments; but their work in the districts was not combined until the end of 1869. The title of "Controller" was not unsuitable for an Under Secretary of State wielding the authority of the War Minister, but when applied to a staff officer and to a department charged with the supply of the troops, it engendered false notions as to the position of the officers and subordinates of the department. The name was objectionable not so much from what it was, as from what it implied.

Sir John Pakington, in his office memorandum distributing the duties of the War Office, styled it the "Comptrol" department; and in the Queen's speech of July 1868 it had been said:—

"By the appointment of a Comptroller-in-Chief in the War Office, a considerable reform in army administration has been commenced, which by combining at home

and abroad the various departments of Military Supply under one authority, will conduce to greater economy and efficiency both in peace and war."

Whether there be any subtle distinction between a "Comptroller" and a "Controller" is a question for a lexicographer. The Comptroller of public accounts exercises no executive functions. A Controller may be a controller of expenditure or a controller of the person on whose behalf the expenditure is incurred. Every commissary and every barrack sergeant belonging to the Control department considered himself as exercising an independent authority in the matters which related to his department. In every military district the Controller occupied the double position of the staff officer who conveyed the orders of the general, and the commander of the corps and department which had to carry them out. This would have been a small matter if their duties had only affected themselves, but their duties were wholly concerned in the supply of the troops. If the troops had to complain regarding their supplies, the military staff officers, who were the eyes and ears of the general, might no longer communicate with the officer in charge of the supplies, but the troops had to make their complaint to the officer whose shortcomings they were complaining of. He then represented the case to the general and conveyed the general's decision. The friction caused by this mode of doing business was excessive. After a few years of uneasy existence the "Control Department" was converted into the "Army Service Corps," and the controller, dropping his executive duties, became a staff officer pure and simple, performing the duties formerly carried out by the officer of the Quartermaster-General's department. In this way the benefits which had been intended by Lord Strathnairn's committee were ultimately obtained.

The difficulty of Mr Cardwell's position at this crisis, for want of a professional colleague in the House of Commons, may best be judged from his own words to Mr Gladstone, written in November 1870:—

"I am painfully conscious of the impossible situation in which I am placed, as regards military knowledge, and consequent power of dealing with military subjects. I have spared no pains to learn all that I could, and the more I know, the more conscious I am how small a proportion it bears to what must be known if the Department is to be properly represented in Parliamentary discussion. If there is no soldier in the House of Commons who can speak with that sort of knowledge which springs from a life spent in the service, the Government will come to grief. With such a soldier I should be very ready to undertake what a lawyer ought to answer for. If the Surveyor-General were in Parliament, he would answer all Ordnance questions, and I should be saved many hours of labour every week, which are now devoted to learning up answers to small questions. The great evil of my office is that I am unable to get a complete survey of the whole of my work, because I am compelled to give time to details for which some one else ought to answer; and, since my day, like everybody else's, consists of only twenty-four hours, I am compelled to leave to others much which the head of the office ought to know, and do himself."

The threatened opposition of a large number of military officers to the abolition of purchase and the continuous attacks of the Opposition press on the Secretary of State for War, still further impressed on Mr Cardwell that the Government might be placed in serious difficulty during the approaching session if it had no distinguished soldier to take part in military discussions in the House of Commons. Such an officer at the head of the War Office, even if he were not in the House of Commons but in the House of Lords, would, in the opinion of many friends of the Government, be of great advantage. After conferring with Lord Northbrook, Mr Cardwell placed his

views before Mr Gladstone on the 3rd January 1871. He was not able to suggest any such War Minister in the House of Commons, but he anticipated no difficulty in finding one who would take the office with a seat in the House of Lords. Sir William Mansfield,[1] who was then in London discussing with him the purchase system, would be the most likely, but on that subject Mr Cardwell had no advice to give. He observed that though in quiet times a civilian with Parliamentary aptitude might conduct the business of the War Department with success, yet at a time when army organization was the principal question of the day it was otherwise. For himself, he was quite ready to make way for any soldier whom Mr Gladstone might think it for the good of the Government to place at the head of the War Office, and would endeavour to render him in the House of Commons all the assistance in his power. Lord Northbrook agreed in all the reasons stated by Mr Cardwell. They were both perfectly satisfied with their work in the last two sessions, and it was because of the altered state of the public mind on military questions, and for that reason only, that they had agreed to express their joint opinion to him.

That opinion received no encouragement from Mr Gladstone, to whom every argument bearing on the subject appeared adverse to the plan suggested. Mr Cardwell's retirement would, he believed, be regarded by the bulk of the nation with wonder or with active dissatisfaction, and it would not have the approval of a single member of the Cabinet, whilst it would only minister a momentary solace to the uneasy and morbid state of part of the public mind, of which murmurs about the War Office was only one among a hundred symptoms. It had been said that the power of newspapers lay in an abundant use of iteration, and this, rather than any real ground

[1] Created Lord Sandhurst in 1871.

seemed to constitute the force of the daily reproaches of some of the opposition journals. He remarked that it was a great advantage before 1854 that there was always a considerable soldier[1] either in the Cabinet or at least at the head of an important military department, and politically connected with the government. This was lost by the crude and ill-considered reconstruction of 1855. The measure initiated by Sir John Pakington and carried out by Mr Cardwell had brought Sir Henry Storks into a position which was the best substitute for the former plan that could be had at present. The demand that a soldier should now be appointed Minister of War would hold good *a fortiori* for all periods of greater emergency. This principle had never been admitted, and in Mr Gladstone's opinion the qualities of a good administrator and statesman went further to make a good War Minister than those of a good soldier. "Show me the soldier," he said, "who has these qualities equally with you, and then let him take your place. But not till then." Mr Cardwell had been chosen for his office not because he would do tolerably well for easy times, but because he was the best man the party could supply for the post. The reproaches aimed at Mr Cardwell were really aimed at the Government; he was chosen to be the point of attack because the nation was sore on military matters in times of crisis, and the press which ought to check excitement rather ministered to its increase. His retirement would be a heavy loss to the Government. What was really necessary was to get Sir Henry Storks into Parliament. Mr Cardwell hastened to assure Mr Gladstone that nothing was further from his thoughts than the idea of leaving the position of War Minister at this juncture on personal grounds. His desire was to strengthen the Government and not to weaken it, and he should therefore say no

[1] The Master-General of the Ordnance.

more on the subject unless Mr Gladstone saw reason to change his opinion.

But Mr Cardwell's difficulties did not all proceed from external causes. By doing away with the dual administration of the army and combining the business of the Horse Guards and War Office as one department, he had effected a diminution of 160 persons and a saving in the normal cost of £56,000 a year. The "junior" clerks of the War Office consisted of men of the average age of thirty-four. The senior of them had over seventeen years' service. Since 1866 there had been only three promotions from the third to the second class. In making the new arrangments, the number of places to which, as promotions, these gentlemen could look forward had been greatly diminished. The normal prospect of promotion had been reduced by one half, to say nothing of supernumeraries. In these circumstances, Mr Cardwell proposed an arrangement which would afford some alleviation at a comparatively small cost. His proposal was peremptorily rejected by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Lord Northbrook, who had from the first presided over all the enquiries in the office, and had hitherto carried on the operation most successfully, wrote a strong minute on the unexpected difficulty which had been raised in the Treasury, and ended with these words:—

"If our proposals are rejected I must ask to be relieved of any responsibility as to the working of the new organization of the War Office."

Mr Cardwell, in recapitulating the case in a letter to Mr Lowe, added:—

"I cannot afford with all I have upon my shoulders to sustain the burden which a difficulty thrown upon me in this question would impose."

Nor was this the only instance in which he had to meet with opposition from the Treasury. A Royal Commission had recommended that soldiers should be excused paying school fees for their children. The Treasury twice refused it. Mr Cardwell quietly pointed out to Mr Lowe that it would probably lead to controversy in Parliament, and that it would devolve on the Chancellor of the Exchequer to defend the Treasury decision. This produced a reluctant consent. Mr Cardwell might well say that he was expected to provide everything without payment.

It is a comparatively easy task for a Chancellor of Exchequer to lock the Treasury chest and put the key in his pocket. The Minister who meets with real difficulties is he who presides over a great spending department, and has to meet large demands with insufficient means, whilst pressed on all sides to initiate reforms suggested from opposite points of view. Writing to Mr Lowe after the passing of the Budget in 1870, Mr Cardwell says:—

"*Beatus ille* who has finished a successful Budget, and has no estimates or military puzzles in prospect, and who does not sit upon bayonets."

Open opposition can, however, always be fairly met and dealt with, but it is less easy to foil the secret stab delivered in the dark. Writing to Mr Cardwell in April 1870, Lord Northbrook says:—

"I don't often trouble you with extracts from military newspapers, but I think this is rather too bad":—

"We wish to inform our readers of one fact, that they may form their own opinions on the matter. The Duke of Cambridge, who is the military adviser of the Secretary of State, was never consulted respecting the organization of the Commission on over-regulation prices, nor did he know of it in any way till he saw the announcement in the *Gazette*."

The wording of this would naturally cause the reader to believe that the information had been obtained from some one who was in the confidence of the Commander-in-Chief. It is sufficient to say that the so-called "fact" was a pure invention on the part of some one, for the intentions of the Government were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief on the day following the decision of the Cabinet, and H.R.H. was also consulted as to the composition of the Royal Commission. Those who made these anonymous attacks well knew that no self-respecting Minister could stoop to notice them, but they did immense mischief by inducing the army to believe that the Commander-in-Chief was not treated with confidence by the Government, and a spirit of opposition was thus fostered which added to the difficulties of Mr Cardwell's position and greatly prejudiced the public service.

CHAPTER XI

THE SESSION OF 1871

IN February 1871 Sir Henry Storks was elected for Ripon, and Mr Cardwell had at last the satisfaction of having a colleague on the Treasury Bench who could relieve him from the necessity of learning up answers to the petty questions of detail which formed a large part of the military criticism of the House of Commons.

On the 16th February he introduced the estimates for the coming year. Those estimates amounted to £15,851,700, being an increase of £2,886,700 over the original estimates for the previous year before the assignment of the vote of credit. Mr Cardwell defended the policy of disbanding the colonial corps and increasing the numbers in the United Kingdom. The effect of the Short Service Enlistment Act of 1870 had been put to an immediate test by the vote for 20,000 additional men. Bounty had been abolished, yet recruiting had been more brisk than during the Crimean War. The ranks of the army were so nearly full, that he contemplated carrying out the short service principle to a much greater extent by allowing soldiers to pass into the army reserve before completing their first term of enlistment, and thus not only to give elasticity to the military service, but also to build up the reserve without waiting for the automatic action of the new

Enlistment Act. The force in the United Kingdom would be:—

Regulars	108,000
First Class Army Reserve	9,000
Second Class Army Reserve	30,000
Militia	139,000
Volunteers	170,000
Yeomanry	14,000

The Field Artillery consisted of 336 guns, with 72 guns in reserve, making in all 408 field-guns, a sufficient number for an army of 150,000 men.

As regards the question of compulsory or voluntary service, he urged that conscription, which is at first sight and superficially a cheap mode of recruiting armies, is in reality the most expensive that can be adopted; and falls with special hardship on those who cannot afford to purchase substitutes, since it takes at once their whole capital, viz., their labour and their time. Conscription is peculiarly injurious to a country inhabited by an enterprizing and colonizing people like the English, and would certainly lead to the emigration of many of our best workmen.

Mr Cardwell detailed the general policy of the Government under fifteen heads, which he summed up in the following words:—

"We ask you for no increase of the standing army beyond that which you made at the end of last session; but we propose to raise the army reserve as rapidly and largely as we can by the increased introduction of short service in the army. We desire to pass as many men through the ranks as can be done having regard to the number of recruits and the time required to make a man an efficient soldier. We propose to increase the militia, and to improve the organization of the volunteers; to provide for compulsory service in case of emergency; to abolish purchase; to withdraw from Lords Lieutenant the power they have now in regard to the auxiliary forces;

to combine the whole under general officers; to appoint colonels on the staff in sufficient numbers to this army; to combine recruiting for the line with that for the reserves; to fuse together as we can the regular and reserve forces by appointing officers of the regular army to positions in the reserve, and by giving subalterns in the militia commissions in the line. We propose to brigade them together, to find field artillery for all arms, to enable counties to get rid of the inconvenience of billets, to gain command of the railway communication of the country in case of emergency—in short, we propose to unite all the voluntary forces of the country into one defensive army, with power to supplement by compulsion in case of emergency—all to be under the command of the general officers commanding in the districts, subordinate to one Commander-in-Chief, who will act with the approval of the Secretary of State; and, therefore, the whole will be under the direction and supreme control of Her Majesty's responsible Ministers. I earnestly commend to your favourable consideration these proposals."

In order to carry out these measures he introduced the Army Regulation Bill, the principal features of which were as follows:—

1st. As regards commissions in the army: The sale of commissions was prohibited after a certain day; compensation to be given to officers holding saleable commissions; also to officers of certain Indian regiments which had been added to the British army in 1862 as non-purchase regiments, but in which a system existed of paying a bonus to every officer who retired. The compensation was to be for both regulation and over-regulation prices, and was to be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament.

2nd. As regards army enlistment: Power was given to the Secretary of State to make regulations to vary the conditions of service, so as to lengthen or shorten the period of colour service as might be found expedient from time to time.

3rd. As regards the auxiliary forces: The jurisdiction

of the Lieutenants of counties in respect of the auxiliary forces was revested in the Sovereign. The militia and the army reserve were to consist in future of such numbers of men as might be provided by Parliament. The training of the militia was to be carried out under instructions from the Secretary of State. The enlistment in militia under ordinary circumstances to be voluntary, but provision was made for its increase in time of emergency, if necessary, by ballot. Any volunteer who engaged not to quit his corps without one year's notice was to be exempted from the ballot for militia. The Mutiny Act was to be made applicable to volunteers when out for training.

4th. Detailed provisions were made as to the militia ballot, and Commissioners were appointed for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Bill for purchase of commissions.

5th. Power was given to the Government on an emergency to take possession of any railroad in the United Kingdom. There were also further provisions, giving power to counties or boroughs to build barracks for the use of the militia; and to militia and volunteer corps to acquire land for rifle ranges or other necessary purposes.

The two salient points of the Bill were:—1st, the abolition of purchase; 2nd, the position of Lords Lieutenant of counties in regard to the auxiliary forces, with reference to the relations which ought to exist between the regular and the auxiliary forces of the country.

As regards the second point, the Government proposed that local training centres should be established for the regular troops and the militia. Each of these would be under a colonel on the staff, who would have under him from 15,000 to 20,000 of the auxiliary forces, and

also the whole recruiting service of the sub-district. Mr Cardwell foreshadowed a connection between infantry regiments and the sub-district in which was situated the county to which they belonged. The recruits of the militia to be trained, as far as possible, with those of the regular army, and for a longer period. The adjutants to be selected from captains on full pay of a regular regiment of the same district. The commissions of all officers of the auxiliary forces would in future emanate from the Queen instead of from the Lord Lieutenant of the county. The promotions to be made on the same principles as in the regular army; but in order to retain that valuable element of the militia force—the county influence—the Lord Lieutenant would be requested to give his recommendation for all first commissions.

As regards the abolition of purchase, the Bill provided that after a certain date no pecuniary interest should be taken by any one in a new commission, and no man should be placed in a worse position as to the commission he then held, in respect either to regulation or to customary price. Commissioners were to be appointed who would at once ascertain the over-regulation price in every regiment, and they would stand in the place of purchasers, with money provided by Parliament. When, therefore, an officer wished to retire by the sale of his commission, he would receive from the Commissioners both the regulation and the customary price of his commission. The phrase "customary price" was used as being the most accurate legal definition of the money paid in excess of the regulation value. When an officer wished to retire on full pay or half-pay, and proved that but for the abolition of the purchase system he would have received the over-regulation price of his commission, the amount would be paid to him. Similarly a half-pay

officer might sell his commission if eligible to sell under former rules.

The regulation of 1711 that no officer should be allowed to sell who had not served twenty years, had continued to be observed, but with this modification that an officer of less than twenty years' service was allowed to receive a part of the regulation value of his commission. This was reckoned at £50 for each year of service at home, and £100 for each year of service abroad.[1] After twenty years' service he might receive the full regulation value. This provision was adopted in the Bill; and it was further provided that an officer who had, on the appointed day, a claim by years of service to a price higher than that of his present commission, might, if subsequently promoted, receive that price out of the regulation price of the higher commission; that is to say, the Bill recognized the vested interest of the non-purchase officer, as it recognized the vested interest of the purchase officer.

The Bill also contained a clause which provided that claims to compensation in the old Indian regiments should be considered by the Commissioners according to the recognition given to such claims by the Secretary of State for India. The total estimated cost varied between a minimum of £7,600,000 and a maximum of £8,400,000.[2]

It was on the question of the abolition of purchase that the main opposition to the Bill was manifested. The debate on the second reading was opened by Colonel Loyd-Lindsay, who moved a resolution declaring that the expenditure necessary for the national defences did not at present justify any vote of public money for the extinction of purchase, the cost of which he estimated at £12,000,000, of which £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 would have to be

[1] Prior to 1862, the allowance was £100 for each year's service, whether at home or abroad.

[2] The actual cost has been seven millions.

paid at once. There would be also the cost of retirement amounting to £500,000 a year, and the whole scale of pay and allowances would have to be revised.

The resolution was supported by many speakers, their chief arguments being the stagnation of promotion which the Bill would cause, and the impracticability of separating selection and favouritism. The scheme was also opposed on the ground of its great cost.

The Government defended the Bill on the ground that the abolition of promotion by purchase was an indispensable preliminary to a reorganization of our military service. The system of over-regulation prices was growing to such an extent that it must be dealt with. The cost would now be £8,000,000 spread over a number of years, but if delayed the expense might rise to double or treble that sum unless a war should intervene and commissions fall to comparatively low value. Sir John Pakington supported the resolution, stating that his experience at the Admiralty led him to the conclusion that promotion by selection was impossible without injurious suspicions of favouritism; but this statement exposed him to the retort that his argument was not so much against abolishing purchase in the army as for introducing it into the navy.

Other members proposed that the regulation prices should be paid at once, and that the over-regulation prices should be ignored, whilst some advocated that it would be well to encourage the operation of the *bonus* system. To this it was replied that to pay the regulation prices down, and leave the over-regulation on one side, would be a great mistake, as it would be paying for the abolition of purchase without abolishing it.

Among the curiosities of the debate was a speech by Mr Bernal Osborne, who expressed a distrust of "professional" soldiers, reminding the House that Colonel Pride, who "purged" the House of Commons in 1648, was a

professional soldier and a non-purchase officer, whilst Cromwell, who had turned the House of Commons out of doors, was a lieutenant-general by "selection." Whilst announcing his intention to vote against the Bill, he advised Colonel Loyd-Lindsay to withdraw his resolution.

The Government were supported by but few speakers, and it was left to Mr Cardwell to defend the proposals of the Bill. He had been challenged to combine, in the closest possible manner, the regular army with the militia and the rest of the reserve forces. How was this to be accomplished? A battalion of the line could not be touched without coming into contact with the subject of purchase; and a battalion of militia could not be touched without coming into contact with the question of the control exercised by the Lords Lieutenant of counties. Therefore both these subjects were contained in the Bill. His opponents had said there was no difficulty in dealing with the army, notwithstanding the system of purchase. Yes, it could be done; officers could be reduced to half-pay; but with the result of causing the loss of a large sum of money to an unoffending individual, continual complaints, a constant sense of injury, and a feeling neither agreeable nor easy to describe on the part of those who had to administer the system. He had already had more than once to take measures, necessary on public grounds but entailing pecuniary loss to officers concerned, and he could conceive no stronger argument against the system. He said:—

"You cannot touch any battalion in the regular service, nor the position of any officer, by a change in your regulations, without doing one of two things. If you make any increase you add to the burden of the purchase system, which the public, if it ever puts an end to the purchase system, will have to bear; while if you make a reduction, you inflict an undeserved and serious pecuniary injury on the officers. You cannot make any

change, short of the abolition of the system, without coming into contact with one or the other of these two objections."

He had been challenged to state how it interfered with reorganization. He replied by asking a few questions.

"Do you wish to increase the number of double battalions with a view to the Indian branch of the army, and to short terms of service—a point of the greatest possible importance? If you do so wish, you will be met immediately by difficulties arising from the purchase question. When the short term of service has furnished the country with a great reserve according to the Prussian system, do you wish so to alter the constitution of the reserve battalions as to bring a large number of men into those battalions? If you do, you will be met again at once by the system of purchase. Do you wish to unite closely the militia and the regular forces? If you do, one of the first things you will have to do will be to give subaltern officers of the militia, commissions in the line without purchase, and how can this be done if there remain any conditions in reference to the purchase system?"

It had been said that there was no argument at all in favour of its abolition. That of course was a matter of opinion. One might say, perhaps, that there is no argument on the other side. It is not known in any other country; it is not admitted in the artillery, the engineers, the marines, or the navy. The Royal Commission of 1857 described it in the following terms:—

"Vicious in principle, repugnant to the public sentiments of the present day, equally inconsistent with the honour of the military profession and the policy of the British Empire, and irreconcilable with justice."

The cardinal question, however, was whether the abolition of purchase would increase the professional efficiency of the Service? Mr Cardwell expressed his cordial concurrence in the eulogies which had been passed on the

heroism and gallantry which had always been displayed by British officers.

"But," he added, "if there is one lesson which we have learned from the history of the late campaign, it is this—that the secret of Prussian success has been more owing to the professional education of the officers than to any other cause to which it can be ascribed. Neither gallantry nor heroism will avail much without professional training, in these days when arms of precision shoot down soldiers at immense distances."

Allusion had been made to the charge at Balaclava—

"We cannot afford to have many repetitions of the Balaclava charge."[1]

It had been said that we ought to be content with abolishing regulation prices, and that by so doing, and permitting over-regulation prices to continue, all the evils of the present system would be got rid of. But that was not the opinion of Sir Henry Hardinge and Lord Palmerston when the certificate[2] was abolished. Sir Henry Hardinge said:—

"It (the tariff of regulation prices) was introduced to remedy a great evil, namely, the constant traffic in commissions, by which the officers of the army had been seriously injured."

Lord Palmerston said:—

"If commissions were allowed to be sold, it was obviously necessary to limit the price that was to be paid for them; for if not, and if every officer were permitted to bid according to his means and to his desire for promotion, abuses would take place beyond all calculation."

[1] It was a just remark of General Bosquet, when he witnessed it, "*C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre.*"

[2] By the Royal Warrant of 8th March 1721-2, the colonel was required to give a certificate "that the officer doth purchase according to the regulation price and no higher."

Again, it had been said that the non-purchase officers would be the most injured by a change. Lord Clyde, a typical old soldier who fought his way up to the rank of field-marshal in campaigns extending over fifty years from the Peninsula to the Indian Mutiny, was examined by the Royal Commission of 1856.[1] He gave the case of an officer of the 55th Regiment.

"This officer," said Lord Clyde, "had been promoted for service in the field, and he had obtained his brevet majority. He led the assault at Ching Kiang-foo, and though he became brevet lieutenant-colonel, and was in command of the 55th Regiment in the field in the presence of the enemy, a young captain who had just come out purchased over his head and took the command of a regiment, and he was obliged to descend to the command of a company. This poor fellow was killed leading his company against the Redan; his name was Lieutenant-Colonel Cuddy. The young officer was very young; and, in this case, a man of experience, who was fitted for his position for that particular occasion, and had proved himself a bold and intrepid soldier, was superseded in his command by one who, I dare say, was equally so, but who did not possess his experience."

Lord Clyde was also asked this question:—

"You purchased to avoid being passed over by somebody else; if you had not purchased, you would have been passed over?"

Lord Clyde's answer was:—

"Most assuredly. The officer next below me was a man whom I would bow to as possessing every quality that a man ought to possess—possessing abilities as high as any man I have ever known. He could not purchase. It was in 1825 that I bought my majority, and in 1847 I passed through Cawnpore and found him just promoted to be a major in that regiment, having in the meantime been to Australia. Finally, he left the service; he remained in the

[1] See Report of Royal Commission. Evidence of Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell. He was created Lord Clyde in 1858.

service till he got this majority; he did sell out—he had some little income to maintain himself; but all hope was gone, and all that interest which it is so necessary for a man to take in his profession."

This was what the purchase system did for the non-purchase officers. But had the purchase officer no ground for complaint? One argument used in favour of the system was that frequently an officer who had paid nothing for his commission received a large sum of money on selling out. Also that the very best officers forfeited their money because they wanted to get on and become general officers. So the argument amounted to this, that the best officer forfeited his money to somebody else who, presumably, was not the best officer; and that the purchase officer forfeited his money to the non-purchase officer.

Objections had been made to promotion by selection. On this point Lord Clyde's evidence was noteworthy.

This question was put to him:—

"If, instead of the system of promotion by purchase, a system of promotion by selection were adopted, it would be equally the case that many excellent officers would be passed over?—No doubt; but there is this difference in that which caused them to be passed over—it is a very different principle. The one is by the possession of a little money, whereas, by selection, there may be unfairness in it sometimes; but one has a right to expect that men in a high station who would select the officers, would select proper and fitting men for the service."

Then he was asked:—

"Do you think that the feelings of an officer would be more wounded by another officer of less merit but of greater influence being put over his head, than if he passed over his head by purchase?—It is to be presumed that the officer so selected is one of merit. Of course, when you are passed over at any time, human nature is such that men may not like it; but still I think that the principle of selection would give less pain and less cause for regret

and displeasure on the part of the individual—to the man who could not purchase—than finding his junior stepping over his head by possessing a little more money than he had."

The Royal Commission of 1856 pointed out that if officers were not selected from the lower ranks, there would be no field for selection when they were wanted for higher command. They added that this country commences a war under a disadvantage with respect to foreign states where officers of higher rank are subject to the principle of selection.

Then it was said that it would break down the regimental system and that purchase was the life-blood of our regimental system. How could this be? Was there no regimental system, no *esprit de corps* in the non-purchase regiments? Was there no *esprit de corps* in the Prussian regiments? Was there no life-blood, no *esprit de corps* in the artillery, the engineers, or the navy?

The regimental system had thus been defined by an opponent of the Bill:—

"We are all members of one family; we all spend our lives together; we all desire to be commanders, not of *any* regiment, but of our own."

This did not seem to be supported by facts, since an examination of the services of commanding officers showed how small a proportion of regiments were commanded by men who had risen in those regiments.[1]

Indeed, one of the great evils of the purchase system was the inducement it offered to officers to exchange into

[1] The services of fifty-two general officers of the highest distinction were examined, with the following result:—

12	had served in	1	regiment.		11	had served in	5	regiments
4	,,	,,	2	regiments.	4	,,	,,	6	,,
8	,,	,,	3	,,	3	,,	,,	7	,,
9	,,	,,	4	,,	1	,,	,,	9	,,

other regiments. An officer who had money would naturally endeavour to go into a regiment in which the majority of the officers were not able to purchase, as he would thereby secure more rapid advancement. It was a notorious feature of the purchase system that officers were constantly exchanging, a practice which was very detrimental to the efficiency of the regiment.

It had been stated, as an advantage of the purchase system, that an officer whom it was desirable to remove from the army might be required to resign, without his being thereby placed in destitute circumstances. This was true, but it was also the case that the knowledge that a young officer had a saleable commission made him a special mark for money-lenders; for it was an undoubted fact that the money-lenders confined their circulars almost entirely to officers of the purchase corps, and avoided soliciting the officers of non-purchase corps. Mr Cardwell quoted some observations by a general officer, who said, "the system of money-lending and exchanges is fast breaking down our much boasted regimental system," and he gave an instance where a young man, on getting his commission in the line, received over sixty letters from money-lenders offering to advance money. The purchase system placed within reach of a young officer a large sum of money which he could not otherwise have touched, and no public act has operated so powerfully for the protection of young officers against money-lenders as the abolition of purchase.

Although the Government had so many critics in the debate, it did not appear that their arguments made many converts. The leader of the Opposition (Mr Disraeli), whilst criticizing some of the details of the government scheme, recognized that it was the first attempt to weld together in one organization all our varying forces. As regards the subject of purchase, he classed it among such questions as marriage with a

deceased wife's sister—affairs which go on pretty much as usual, whatever might be the decision. If the country determined that the sale of commissions was wrong, the Government was justified in proposing its abolition; but he warned them that the cost might prove to be intolerable. In conclusion, somewhat unexpectedly, he advised Colonel Loyd-Lindsay to withdraw his amendment.

Mr Gladstone warmly defended the government measure insisting that the country required a small army highly trained, and a large army of reserve ready for service at any moment. For this purpose, the militia alone were not adequate. Those reserves must be seasoned men, regularly trained, corresponding to the German Landwehr. He vindicated Mr Cardwell's estimate of the cost of the abolition of purchase, and his decision to sweep away the whole system by paying over-regulation as well as regulation prices. With regard to the suggestion that it would entail the necessity of an increase of pay, he pointed out that the officers would be relieved of the dead weight of a mortgage of £8,000,000, or about £320,000 a year; why, then, should their emoluments be increased? He gave reasons for disbelieving that the officers of the army would come hereafter from a different class of society, and he advocated the change as the first step towards drawing together a highly trained army.

Colonel Loyd-Lindsay offered to withdraw his amendment; but the Government insisted that it should be negatived, and the Bill was read a second time. The strongest obstacle to the proposed abolition was the necessity of spending several millions for a purpose which tended but indirectly to promote the efficiency of the army, and which had no bearing on its numerical strength. But, as Lord Derby observed in the House of Lords, no institution is tenable in England which cannot be defended by arguments intelligible to the mass of the constituency.

A Royal Commission had recently reported that the practice of bargaining for commissions was inseparable from the permission to buy them; and there was a decided scandal in the notorious frequency of transactions which were still prohibited by law.

Although the second reading had been carried without a division, the further progress of the Bill was opposed at every step and on every clause. The House did not get into Committee until several dilatory motions had been exhaustively discussed. The first of these was by Lieutenant-Colonel Anson,[1] who led the opposition to the Bill, and who moved;—

"That in order to give the State that unrestricted power over the officers of the army which it is desirable that it should possess, and also in justice to the officers of the army themselves, the regulation value of their commissions should be at once returned to them."

This motion met with support from some members who were opposed to paying the over-regulation prices, and who thought this might prove a means of dealing with the whole question once for all. It was supported by others who saw in it a means of getting for the officers of the army a large sum of money down, together with the prospect of a further payment for over-regulation prices at a future date, since the motion made no allusion to over-regulation payments.

The Government challenged Colonel Anson to state what were his real views, and a circular which had been sent by him to officers of the army was read to the House. That circular invited officers to state whether they

[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. A. Anson, V.C., was an officer who had served with distinction in the Indian Mutiny. He had also served in the Crimea and in China. Promoted to an unattached majority for service in the field, he entered Parliament and took a leading part in advocating the claims of officers of the purchase corps.

would, in the event of purchase being abolished, accept the regulation value of their commissions, to be paid on the day appointed for purchase to cease, waiving all future rights to sell and all claims to over-regulation money; or whether they would prefer the government scheme, taking their chance of being able to sell and leave the service on some future day, receiving the present value of their commissions with any over-regulation price they might have paid.

The circular did not state the government case fairly, because it said officers were to take their chance of getting any over-regulation money *they might have paid*, whereas the actual proposal of the Government was to pay to the officer the customary over-regulation price, whether he had paid it or not. But in any case it was impossible for the Government to accept a proposal which would give officers much more than they were entitled to under former conditions. Thus a half-pay major, instead of relinquishing his half pay for the price of his commission, would receive £2300 down, and would continue besides to draw half pay for the rest of his life. The proposal at once gave rise to the demand that general officers should also be recouped the money they had paid for their commissions. In fact it led the way to a vista of impracticable suggestions, and interminable payments. It would also be manifestly unfair to officers who had been purchased over, that those who had gone over their heads should have their money refunded to them by the State, and nevertheless retain the rank which they had purchased.

The proposals of the Government were indeed very liberal. They secured to every officer the over-regulation value of his commission, although that value would have been liable to considerable reduction in the event of war, or the regiment going to an unhealthy station, or the

officer below him refusing to give him more than the regulation price. An officer wishing to sell would have no need to look about for a purchaser, or make a bargain, but would find the Consolidated Fund ready at any moment to pay him full value. Sir George Grey, who had been chairman of the Royal Commission on over-regulation prices, said that the proposal to pay the prices down was so extravagant that it was scarcely necessary to argue it. The most extraordinary statements were advanced by opponents to the Bill. One was that all purchase officers had acquired a vested right to promotion without being superseded by selection—an assertion which went far to justify the argument of the Government that the purchase system made the army the property of the officers and not of the nation. Indeed that argument derived support from Colonel Anson's motion, which admitted that the State had not got "that unrestricted power over the officers of the army which it was desirable that it should possess."

Then it was said that the "regimental system" would be destroyed. What is the meaning of the "regimental system"? It means the influence which the officers of the army possess over the men under their command. It applies also to the means adopted for the preservation of order and discipline, and the instruction of officers and soldiers. How could these be destroyed by the abolition of purchase? If it had been proposed to *introduce* the purchase system, what forcible arguments would have been adduced to show that the knowledge that their officer had obtained his rank by payment must infallibly weaken or destroy the influence which he ought to possess over his men. If it depended on the purchase system, then we must come to the conclusion that neither the artillery, nor the engineers, nor the navy, possess proper means for the preservation of order and discipline, nor

have their officers the influence which they ought to possess over their men.

When the House was at last got into Committee, the opposition continued, and obstruction by alternate motions for the adjournment of the debate and of the House was systematically practised, with a view to impeding the progress of the Bill. The same arguments were brought forward over and over again, and all through the months of May and June the Bill dragged its weary way through Committee.

So persistent was the resistance of the military members that even Sir Roundell Palmer, no friend to radical measures, rose to rebuke them.

"A course had been taken, the like of which he never remembered. Other great measures had been opposed without the minority endeavouring to baffle the majority by mere consumption of time. The minority who resisted the Irish Church and Land Bills had recognized the duty of respecting the principle of Parliamentary government, that the decision of the majority shall be binding. Conduct like that was neither in the interest of the country, of the army, nor of conservative principle."

In these circumstances the Government determined to lighten the Bill by dropping some of its provisions. These were three in number:—

1. A proposal to carry still further the Short Service Act of the previous year.

2. To amend the Act of 1860 for compulsory service in case of emergency.

3. A power to counties to borrow money for building militia barracks.

These three things were of comparatively little importance, although from the numerous amendments proposed by the party of obstruction, and the opportunities they would have offered for irregular warfare

in Committee, they were formidable in point of time. To carry them had become, as Gladstone expressed it, "a physical impossibility" owing to want of time, and an attempt to do so would have caused failure in the main object, and would have brought both the measure and the Government into difficulty. The abandonment of the three proposals just named lightened the Bill by eighteen out of its original thirty-six clauses. An enumeration of the provisions which remained will show how important were the measures which had been carried in the teeth of an unprecedented opposition.

1. The sale of commissions was abolished, and full provision made for the payment of both regulation and over-regulation prices; also compensation to the officers of the non-purchase Indian regiments.

2. The jurisdiction of Lords Lieutenant of counties in respect of the auxiliary forces was revested in the Sovereign.

3. The statutory limit to the numbers of the army reserve and of the militia was removed, and they were placed on the same footing as the regular army in this respect.

4. The training of militia recruits was provided for and extended.

5. The Mutiny Act was made applicable to volunteers when out for training.

6. Power was given to militia and volunteer corps to acquire land for rifle ranges, etc.

7. Power was given to the Government, on occasion of emergency, to take possession of railroads in the United Kingdom.

Thus lightened, the Bill was reported, but when it came for the consideration of the House on 30th June, Lord Elcho moved:—

"That it is inexpedient to consider the Bill, as amended, until the whole of the scheme of the Govern-

ment for first appointment, promotion, and retirement of officers, together with an estimate of its probable, possible, or ultimate cost, have been laid upon the table."

Mr Disraeli, however, again intervened, expressing a hope that this discussion would end, and the Bill was allowed to advance another stage.

The opposition did not, however, yet cease, and the third reading of the Bill gave rise to a renewed and adjourned debate, in which the calamities that were awaiting the army through the abolition of purchase, were once more marshalled, and passed in review before the weary legislators. That the Bill would certainly destroy the military power of this country was the melancholy prediction of one military member of the House of Commons.

That was not the opinion of the author of the Bill. Writing to Colonel Ponsonby, the Queen's Private Secretary, with a copy of the Bill as finally passed by the Commons, Mr Cardwell summed up the results in these words:—

"The regular army will for the first time become in reality, as well as in name, *The Queen's* army, instead of belonging to those who have paid for their commissions; and the auxiliary forces will be united with them under the direct government of the Queen, instead of under that jealous Parliamentary system which we have inherited from former times."

CHAPTER XII

CONTEST WITH THE UPPER HOUSE

THE third reading was carried in the House of Commons on the 3rd July, and the following day the Bill was read a first time in the House of Lords.

On the 13th July, Lord Northbrook moved the second reading, when the following amendment was moved by the Duke of Richmond :—

"That this House is unwilling to assent to a second reading of this Bill until it has had laid before it, either by Her Majesty's Government, or through the medium of an enquiry and report of a Royal Commission, a complete and comprehensive scheme for the first appointment, promotion, and retirement of officers; for the amalgamation of the regular and auxiliary land forces; and for securing the other changes necessary to place the military system of the country on a sound and efficient basis."

This motion appeared to show that the Opposition, who commanded a considerable majority in the House of Lords, did not wish to meet the Bill with a direct negative, but rather to inflict a defeat on the Government by wrecking the work of the session. The Government had distinctly declined in the House of Commons to do what the Duke of Richmond now asked. As Mr Cardwell said, "we must first clear the ground before we can begin to build."

One of the Conservative peers, more far-sighted than the majority, observed that an Act of Parliament was

not required, except for over-regulation prices, as the purchase system could be abolished by Royal Warrant. "Get rid of the system now," said Lord Derby, "while public opinion is favourable to a fair and liberal settlement, and while you can do it without wrong or injustice to any individual or class."

But though the long struggle in the House of Commons had led the Government to anticipate a strong opposition from the Conservative party in the House of Lords, they had some right to count on support from the peers who had been prominently associated with all the Liberal measures of the last thirty years.

The veteran reformer, Earl Russell, announced his intention of supporting the Duke of Richmond's amendment, and Lord Grey "could find nothing in the Bill that would tend to increase the efficiency of the army." The latter considered the abolition of purchase to be unwise, though he recognized its necessity when it had been determined on by the Ministers of the Crown.

It is only just to say that Lord Grey, in his evidence before the Royal Commission of 1856, had given his opinion in favour of the purchase system. It is not easy, however, to reconcile that opinion with the sentiments expressed in his memorandum of 17th October 1846, to which allusion has been already made, and in which he stated his views as to the defects in the education and habits of the officers of the army, which he partly attributed to the purchase system. Three of the peers[1] who were now listening to him had been his colleagues twenty years before when his memorandum had been circulated to the Cabinet. The opposition of Lord Russell was, however, very damaging to the Government.

Some speakers objected that the army reserve was

[1] Earl Russell, Prime Minister 1851; Lord Halifax, Chancellor of Exchequer 1851; Lord Granville, Foreign Secretary 1851.

not large enough, oblivious of the fact that the Government had, the previous year, passed a Short Service Act, by which, in a few years, a reserve of 60,000 to 80,000 men would be created. Some counselled that the Bill should be thrown out altogether, though others reminded the House that, in that case, there would be no machinery for paying over-regulation prices.

The Duke of Cambridge considered the offer of the House of Commons a very liberal one, more liberal than could have been expected, and he added: "I do not see that by making the proposed change we shall be doing anything calculated to lower the tone of the British army."

The influences at work against the Bill were, however, too powerful for the Government, and after three days' debate in the House of Lords, the Duke of Richmond's amendment was carried, on the 17th July, by 155 votes to 130.

The decision of the House of Lords was not favourably viewed by the general opinion of the public. It was felt that by their action a grave public difficulty had been raised, and there was the prospect of a recrudescence of the struggle which had been agitating the army for so many months, and which, in the interests both of the officers and of the public service, it was necessary to terminate. The case was pithily summed up in these words by *The Times*:—

"The L[illegible] have prevented the Government doing justice to the [illegible]r; the Government is bound to prevent the further cre[illegible]n of costly interests by illegal transactions."

The disapprobation with which thoughtful and dispassionate politicians regarded the decision of the House of Lords was, however, soon diverted to another object. The course of the debate in the Upper House had led

Mr Cardwell to contemplate the possibility of the rejection of the Bill. It appeared to him that the Act of 1809 rendered all purchase, except such as might from time to time be sanctioned by Royal regulation, in the highest degree penal. The Royal Commission of 1870 had reported that while regulation prices exist, over-regulation prices cannot be prevented. Till the report of the Commission it was the custom for all persons in authority to profess ignorance of the existence of over-regulation prices. However flimsy that veil may have been before, it had no existence now. A Minister cannot be expected, and ought not to be permitted, to administer his department in open violation of the law. The Bill (so far as regards purchase) was necessary for three purposes, viz. :—

1. To authorize the Crown to submit to the House of Commons a vote for the over-regulation prices.

2. To give the officers a statutory title to the purchase money, both regulation and over-regulation.

3. To indemnify past offences, when beginning strictly to enforce the law.

If the Bill failed, the Government must—

1. Enforce effectually the Act of 1809.

2. Vote money for the regulation prices.

3. Wait events as to any indemnity for the over-regulation prices.

This would be hard upon the officers, but the hardship would be no fault of the Government. Any other course would involve a continued participation in the open violation of the law by the servants of the Crown, a course which it was impossible to contemplate.

Although the vote of the House of Lords was, in substance, only a postponement of the Bill, it was practically equivalent to its rejection, and this was the situation which the Cabinet had to face when they met in council the next day. The situation was one of great difficulty.

It was impossible to allow the continuance of the illegal practices by tacit acquiescence. It was equally impossible to legalize over-regulation prices; that course had been tried in 1821, and had rather made matters worse. The House of Commons had agreed to extinguish the purchase system on terms that were very liberal to the officers, and if those terms were not accepted, the public might force terms much less liberal than were now offered—a course which had been openly threatened by a radical member; while to postpone the question for another year would be most prejudicial to the discipline of the army. The House of Lords had tied a Gordian knot, which the Government must needs cut if they wished to regain liberty of action. An Act of Parliament was not needed for the abolition of purchase, for the Act of 1809 prohibited it except so far as "fixed by regulations made or to be made by the Crown." The Cabinet therefore determined to advise the Queen to cancel the existing Royal Warrant by a similar instrument, and they tendered their advice to Her Majesty in the following Cabinet Minute.

ARMY PURCHASE WARRANT

MINUTE OF CABINET[1]

In 1870 a Royal Commission was appointed to enquire into the extent of the system of over-regulation prices, the incidents of that system, and the degree of recognition it had received. The two main conclusions of the Report were: First, that "there has been a tacit acquiescence in the practice, amounting, in our opinion, to a virtual recognition of it by civil and military departments and authorities"; and secondly, that "not the least important incident of the practice is the habitual violation

[1] Published with the King's permission.

of the law by officers of all ranks under that of major-general, supported by long-established custom and unchecked by any authority."

Your Majesty's Servants being in possession of that report felt bound to deal with the question, and had to consider the manner in which it should be dealt with. They asked themselves, could they venture to render over-regulation prices legal? That course they consider to be impossible.

Could they determine for the future deliberately to connive at the illegal practice? Sir G. Grey, chairman of the Royal Commission, speaking on the 30th June, said:—

"With regard to the future, it was the bounden duty of the Government to declare in the most explicit manner that they would no more be parties to this violation of the law, and that they should take every means in their power to stop the practice."

It is no light matter for those at the head of the government of the country to connive deliberately at the violation of an Act of Parliament passed for the regulation of service in the army.

The last and only other alternative was to put an end to the practice, and at the same time to condone past violations of the law; and that is the course which has been recommended to Parliament.

It may be suggested that for this purpose it was not necessary to abolish the Purchase System, but that over-regulation prices might have been prevented and the system of purchase for regulation prices left untouched. The answer is that the experience of two centuries has proved it to be impossible. The Royal Commissioners say on that point:—

"Where one man has something of value to sell which can legally be sold, and another man is desirous of purchasing it, the opportunity being afforded them of coming to a mutual understanding, it has been found useless to prescribe by law or regulation the precise terms on which the sale is to be effected."

It was not necessary to come to Parliament to abolish the Purchase System. By the Act of 1809, purchase became penal, except so far as "fixed by regulations made, or to be made, by the Crown." Therefore, for the purpose of abolishing purchase, nothing more was required than that the Crown should be advised to cancel the existing regulations, and all purchases of commissions would at once become illegal.

An Act of Parliament is not necessary for the purpose of securing to the officers repayment of the regulation prices. A vote of the House of Commons is sufficient for that purpose.

The reasons why your Majesty's Servants thought it desirable to apply to the Legislature in relation to the abolition of Purchase were these: It was advisable in their opinion in a matter of such importance to give a statutory guarantee to the officers who would be affected by the proposed change. It is advisable also to protect officers from prosecution for the illegal acts which had been committed by them up to the present time, and it was expedient to terminate Purchase for ever, which required an amendment of the Act of 1809. But the main reason was to enable a pecuniary indemnity to be given to officers for over-regulation payments. Those payments, however sanctioned by custom, were illegal acts, and your Majesty's Servants thought it necessary to obtain for the indemnity the sanction of the same authority which created the illegality, that is, the sanction of the whole Legislature.

Under these circumstances your Majesty's Servants first obtained in the most formal manner, that is to say by Bill, the sanction of the House of Commons to the great expenditure involved in the abolition of Purchase, and then sent the Bill to the House of Lords. By that House it was met, not by rejection, but by a dilatory motion; and that motion was carefully drawn so as not to imply any disapproval

> of the abolition of Purchase. By this motion the Bill was not defeated but delayed, and it became necessary for your Majesty's Servants to consider by what course they could at once put an end to the violation of the law, secure the interests of the officers, maintain the discipline of the army which might be imperilled by the indefinite continuance of a state of uncertainty, and avoid as far as possible the risk of collision between the two Houses of the Legislature. It appeared to them that the best course was to put an end to Purchase, by cancelling the Royal Warrants which have excepted regulation prices from the operation of the statute of 1809, and to move the further progress of the Bill, under the altered circumstances, in the House of Lords: and on these grounds they have advised Your Majesty accordingly.
>
> *Wednesday, 19th July* 1871.

In accordance with the advice tendered by her Ministers, a Royal Warrant was signed by the Queen on the 20th July. By this instrument, all regulations fixing the prices at which any commissions in the army might be sold, purchased, or exchanged, were cancelled from the 1st November 1871.

The issue of this Warrant was announced the same day by Mr Gladstone in the House of Commons, in answer to a question whether, as the House had agreed to indemnify the officers, the Government intended to take measures to prevent the future violation of the law involved in the payment of over-regulation prices.

He stated that army purchase was a question not of the constitution but assigned by statute to the Executive. Its legal basis depended on the action of the executive government. But the question of indemnity belonged to the House of Commons, and, in a matter of such magnitude and importance, the Government would not have

thought it reasonable to proceed without recourse to the opinion of the House. That opinion, obtained after long debates and passed to the Lords, had conveyed to the other House and to the country the judgment of the House of Commons so fully and absolutely that it was no longer incumbent on them, or required for public convenience, that they should again solicit that House for a declaration which they had already obtained in the most authentic form. The Government had therefore advised the crown to exercise in a legal way the legal power it possessed, for the purpose of abolishing an illegal practice.

To the question why the Warrant had not been issued at first, instead of wasting time for so many months, he replied that a statute was required to condone illegal practices, and to grant over-regulation payments.

He said :—

"We have nothing in view but the observance of constitutional usage and the speedy termination of a state of suspense which we think most injurious to the army, and calculated to delay the progress of a measure that is likely, in our judgment, to do full justice to the fair pecuniary claims of the officers, and the loss of which might make it difficult to find means of doing justice to those claims."

In conclusion, Mr Gladstone said :—

"One thing I must state on behalf of the Government, that is, come whatever may under all circumstances, we shall use the best means in our power, mindful of the honourable pledges we have given, to secure the ends which Parliament has had in view, and just and liberal terms for the officers."

The issue of the Royal Warrant was, however, strongly condemned on both sides of the House. The Government

were charged with having made use of an exercise of Prerogative to override an adverse vote of Parliament. Their reply was that Prerogative is an act emanating from the independent authority of the Crown, whereas this was the exercise of a power under an Act of Parliament. The system of purchase stood on the authority of the Sovereign as the system according to which the Sovereign was pleased (for the time being) to exercise the right of appointing officers. That right must be exercised according to some rule, and if that rule be of the Sovereign's own making, the Queen might change it without any exercise of prerogative. The rule might regard age, education, or standard of size, or any other qualification. Purchase was a mere rule for the exercise of patronage, and a rule of the patron's own making. The Government and the House of Commons thought so ill of it that they thought it ought not merely to be discontinued by the Queen, but prohibited by law. The House of Lords declined to aid them in passing an Act to prohibit it, and therefore the Queen, by the advice of her Ministers, resolved to discontinue it. This was very different from a law prohibiting purchase, but it was no exercise of Prerogative.

Whatever it was, whether an act of Prerogative or not, the issue of the Royal Warrant evoked a chorus of disapproval from all quarters. The Opposition were wroth because the Government had turned their defeat into a victory by what was deemed to be an unfair procedure. The House of Lords considered that they were flouted by the action of the Government. The radical supporters of the Government disapproved of a measure having been carried by the sole exercise of the Royal power. The press generally took the same view. But the general public regarded it with indifference; they had made up their mind that purchase ought to cease, and so long as

that object was attained they were not disposed to quarrel with the means by which it had been done.

However much the step taken by the Government might be disapproved, there was evidently only one course to be pursued. The Bill must be passed, so as to secure for the officers indemnity for past violation of the law and payment of the over-regulation prices. It was therefore intimated that the second reading would be brought on again in the House of Lords. The Duke of Richmond stated that no further opposition would be made to the passage of the Bill, but that a vote of censure would be passed at the same time. The Peers submitted to the coercion of the Government; but the Government would have to endure the censure of the Peers. As soon, therefore, as the Warrant was laid on the table, the Duke of Richmond appealed to the Government to fix the second reading for the 31st July, and gave notice of the following motion:—

"That this House, before assenting to the second reading of this Bill, desires to express its opinion that the interposition of the Executive, during the progress of a measure submitted to Parliament by Her Majesty's Government, in order to attain by the exercise of the Prerogative, and without the aid of Parliament, the principal object included in that measure, is calculated to depreciate and neutralize the independent action of the Legislature, and is strongly to be condemned."

This step would have been graver if it had been immediate. The Lords were resolved to pass a vote of censure, but wished to defer it till after the Goodwood Races. The propriety of delay was solemnly discussed. The Government suggested that "to put off a matter of such importance for ten days would be open to misconstruction." The Opposition thought "it would not be fitting the dignity of the House to precipitate its decision

on a constitutional question of the magnitude of that raised by the action of the Executive Government." Accordingly the Duke of Richmond was allowed to entertain his guests at Goodwood, and on the 31st July, the House of Lords passed the second reading, accompanied by a vote of censure on the Government. With this Pyrrhic victory the Lords had to be content.

When the Bill was returned to the Commons with the amendments which had been rendered necessary by the issue of the Warrant, the Government had to sustain another joint attack from their opponents and from their own supporters below the gangway. One of the latter challenged the advice given by the law officers of the Crown, and, drawing his bow at a venture, said that a member of the House who stood still higher in the estimation of the public and the profession (Sir Roundell Palmer) had been absent from the discussion. If he approved the action of the Government, he would not now be absent, adding, "until I hear him say so, I will not believe he agrees with the course taken by the Government."

The arrow, however, missed its mark. It so happened that Sir Roundell Palmer was absent for his own private convenience; and when the Commons were summoned a few days later for the prorogation of Parliament, Black Rod was kept waiting to give his historic three taps while Mr Cardwell read a letter from Sir Roundell denying that he objected to the issue of the Royal Warrant. He had always said that to issue such a Warrant was within the undoubted power of the Crown, though it would not have been just to do so without having a sufficient assurance that Parliament would provide the necessary compensation. The votes of the House of Commons having settled the question of compensation, it appeared to him that the course which the Government

took (after what he must consider the ill-advised resolution of the House of Lords) was the least objectionable course which could be taken under the whole circumstances of the case.[1]

Thus was the contest at last finished, and the "Regulation of the Forces Act," received the Royal assent.

On the 30th October 1871, a new Royal Warrant was issued, laying down the regulations under which first appointments and regimental promotion would take place on the abolition of the purchase system. The Warrant was framed on the principle of seniority, tempered by selection. It was not intended to give undue preference, but that every appointment and promotion should be given to thoroughly competent men. The separate grade of cornet and ensign was abolished, and first appointments were made as sub-lieutenant, which rank was given on probation only, and if at the end of three years the officer was not qualified to be a lieutenant, he would be required to quit the army without having any claim on the Treasury. With a view to reduce expenses, the uniform of a sub-lieutenant was to be of a simple and inexpensive kind. If in the cavalry, he would ride a troop horse; and all subalterns were relieved from contributions to bands.

With the abolition of purchase, a change was made in the position of Military Secretary. That officer ceased to be the personal staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief, and was placed on the same footing as other staff officers at headquarters, his tenure of office being limited to five years. In this respect an exception was made as regards the Commander-in-Chief. Mr Cardwell informed the House of Commons, with the Queen's approval, that the position of the Officer Commanding-in-Chief must be

[1] The correspondence with Sir R. Palmer on the subject of the Royal Warrant is given in the Third Appendix.

looked upon as an exceptional one, as compared with any other Staff Officer, and therefore could not be regulated by a mere reference to time. It was of course necessary for him to be in harmony with the Government of the day, and his continuance or removal must depend on considerations of public policy.

The Horse Guards staff, including the Commander-in-Chief, Military Secretary, Adjutant-General, and Quarter-master-General, were removed to Pall Mall and placed under the same roof as the Secretary of State. All correspondence between the different divisions of the Horse Guards and between the Horse Guards and the War Office ceased, and a general registry for letters having been established, the dual government of the army came to an end. The immediate result was that the number of registered letters, which two years before had been 1500 a day, was now diminished to 900, a reduction of 40 per cent.

It had been suggested in some quarters that the actual move should be deferred till the new War Office, which it was in contemplation to build, should be ready for occupation; but it was apparent that this would practically be a postponement *sine die*, and that it would not be wise to defer any longer the convenience in the transaction of business which would be afforded by the union of the principal offices under one roof. That this was a wise decision few will doubt, when it is considered that now, thirty-two years later, the new War Office is only just approaching completion and the principal departments of the army are still occupying the rooms into which they moved in 1871.

The Officer Commanding-in-Chief was formally installed as the Principal Military Adviser of the Secretary of State, and a civilian was appointed Permanent Under Secretary of State in place of the military officer who had hitherto held that office.

The new organization of the War Office had been modelled to some extent on the Admiralty arrangements. Following the Admiralty practice, Mr Cardwell now appointed a lieutenant-colonel from the active list of the army to be his private secretary, being desirous of having by his side an officer who was in direct touch with the army. When he finally quitted office in 1874, Mr Cardwell informed his successor, who sought his advice on that point, that "under the new arrangement of the office the unrecognized adviser of the Secretary of State is gone. The official adviser on military matters is the Commander-in-Chief. But as to all private applications and communications, it will be very valuable to have an experienced soldier at your side." Mr Gathorne-Hardy accordingly selected an officer as his private secretary, but the practice has not been continued. It must be added that the position of the private secretary at the Admiralty rather resembles that of the Military Secretary at the War Office than an ordinary private secretary.

The close of the year 1871 witnessed the introduction to the War Office of Mr Henry Campbell, M.P. (now Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman), who commenced his official career as Financial Secretary at the War Office, in succession to the Hon. J. C. Vivian, who was appointed Permanent Under Secretary of State.

In effecting the reforms that have been described, Mr Cardwell was much indebted to Mr (now Lord) Thring who, as Parliamentary draughtsman, had the responsibility of preparing the Acts of Parliament that carried out the intentions of the Government. The principal of these Acts were, The War Office Act; The Army Enlistment Act (Short Service); The Army Regulation Act, and subsequently the Localization Act. He also drafted the Royal Warrant which abolished the Sale of Commissions.

CHAPTER XIII

LORD JUSTICE JAMES' COMMISSION

ALTHOUGH the abolition of purchase had been carried out, the opponents of the measure did not cease their complaints, and those complaints were echoed both in Parliament and out of it.

The system of purchase had been defined by an opponent of the Bill as "a system of retirement provided by the officers themselves at no cost whatever to the country." Why then should the officers object to being relieved of that cost? It was very puzzling to the public. They were going to pay a sum which the Prime Minister told them would practically add £320,000 a year to the pay of the officers of the army; they had indemnified the officers for the over-regulation prices which, though they had been tacitly acquiesced in, were in violation of the law; they would ultimately, and at no distant date, have to support an increased annual charge for retirement in place of that which the officers now provided at their own cost; and yet the officers of the army were said to be dissatisfied with the terms. What was it that they were giving up in exchange for the large sum of money which Parliament was willing to pay them? The truth of the matter was that it was a similar case to that of the labourers in the vineyard who each received his penny. The Act gave to every officer what he would have received had the purchase

system continued; subject to this condition, that he could reap no further advantage by purchase, but on the other hand he would get all his future promotion without paying for it. The addition of £320,000 a year to the officers' pay was not in respect of any existing commissions, but of *future* promotions and appointments. The claim to have the value of their commissions returned to them at once arose from the feeling that the officer of the future would be receiving better pay than those who had invested money in the purchase of their rank. The purchase officer had been placed in the position that he could, at any time on leaving the army, receive the whole of the money which he had invested in the purchase of commissions, though it was probable that an officer of junior rank would find it more profitable to accept the future terms of retirement than to claim the comparatively small sum which he had paid for his commission. But why should he forfeit any sum at all? Would not the future officer get the same terms of retirement without forfeiting anything? That was the fault of the purchase system which was being abolished. It was not a valid ground of complaint that the next generation would be better off than the present. Nevertheless, there were some grounds for complaint. Those who benefited by the abolition of purchase, and they were many, held their peace; but there were individual cases of hardship, and these continued to make their voices heard.

In 1873, the House of Lords presented an address to the Crown praying for enquiry into the grievances contained in memorials put forward by certain officers, and the Government accordingly determined to meet these complaints by the appointment of a Royal Commission which assembled in October 1873. The Commission consisted of three Privy Councillors, viz., Lord Justice

James as chairman, Lord Penzance a retired Judge of the High Court, and Mr Ward Hunt who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer in Mr Disraeli's ministry in 1868. After an exhaustive enquiry the Commission made their report in June 1874, three months after Mr Gladstone's ministry had quitted office. They stated that many of the grievances were cases of individual hardship which were not traceable to the abolition of purchase, but arose out of the accidents, irregularities, and personal ill-luck which were at all times inseparable from a service such as the army.

The more prominent grievances complained of were—

1st. That, although in future officers would obtain their commissions without purchase, they were debarred from selling these commissions and thereby from realizing large sums of money.

2nd. That in future, the commission of major or lieutenant-colonel would only be conferred upon them for the limited period of five years, whereas before the Act there was no limitation.

As regards the first of these questions it was not the abolition of the opportunity to "purchase," but the abolition of the right of "sale," which pressed upon the officers and seriously damaged their prospects. This prospective loss varied in the different branches of the Service.

The prospective loss was greatest in the infantry of the line, and in their case the Commissioners recommended certain pecuniary compensation on retirement.

In the Foot Guards and in the Household Cavalry, they found that no pecuniary damage had been caused by the Act, but on the contrary their position had been improved by their not having to pay the high prices which were customary.

Similarly, with regard to the cavalry of the line, the

Commissioners came to the conclusion that the losses were more than counterbalanced by the gains under the new system. The only exception was in the case of certain officers of cavalry who had risen from the ranks. These were very few in number, and for them a special rate of half-pay retirement was recommended as compensation.

There was one point, however, as to which the Commissioners thought there was a just ground of complaint, and that was the prohibition of paying and receiving money for exchanges between officers on full pay. The prohibition had been included in the Act from an apprehension that to allow any pecuniary bargaining between officers in respect of their commissions might be as a letting out of the waters, bringing back bonuses, over-regulation prices, and the other incidents of the abolished system. The Commissioners did not share this apprehension, and they recommended that the practice should be permitted with the sanction and under the control of the authorities, and on such conditions as to ensure that nobody else should be superseded or affected.

With regard to the complaint that the future appointments to the ranks of major and lieutenant-colonel were to be for five years only, though with power of reappointment, it was to be observed that to whatever extent the new rule would diminish the duration of the tenure, it would increase the rapidity of promotion. Also the localization of the forces had afforded full pay employment for sixty-six lieutenant-colonels, who were taken from those who would be placed on half-pay under the new rule. Still there would be loss in some cases, and the Commissioners recommended that a lieutenant-colonel or major who retired after completing the five years service, should receive the regulation value of that commission in addition to the over-regulation value

of the commission which he held on the 1st November 1871.

In closing their report, the Commissioners remarked on the extreme complexity of the subject, which rendered it difficult, if not impossible, to mark out a general system of recompense which should adjust itself with accuracy to all cases. The officers had said that, their grievances having been heard, "they would be satisfied with whatever the nation chooses to decide for them." The Commissioners having entertained the subject with no other desire than to do them justice, ventured to hope that the discontent which had been expressed might now be dissipated.

The hopes of Lord Justice James and his colleagues were fully realized. In the following year an Act was passed (the Regimental Exchanges Act[1]) which authorized the payment of money for exchanges between officers on full pay, and shortly afterwards a general system of retirement was introduced, by which officers after a certain length of service might, on retirement, receive a sum of money which approximated to the sum which officers who had not bought their commissions had been allowed to receive under former regulations.

On the 1st November 1892, after the Act had been in operation for twenty-one years, a report was published in *The Times* by Mr O'Dowd,[2] one of the Army Purchase Commissioners, in which were set forth the results of the operation of the Act.

There had been only three possible methods of dealing with the claims of officers.

[1] Lord Cardwell opposed the second reading in the House of Lords, on the ground that when an officer had paid money for an exchange of commission, he would be apt to imagine that he was possessed of a property in that for which he had given a consideration.

[2] Sir James O'Dowd, the sole survivor of the Army Purchase Commission, performed such duties as were required, up to the time of his death, which occurred in December 1903 after this book had gone to press.

1. To give every officer the regulation value of his commission at once, and the over-regulation value upon retirement.

2. To take stock by actuarial calculation of the then value of every commission and pay it at once to the holder by way of commutation.

3. To give to every officer the full value at the time of retirement, of the commission then held, at the same time and to the same amount as if the privilege of selling to his juniors had not been taken away.

The first of these alternatives was summarily disposed of by the Royal Commission as being inapplicable to the circumstances. A lieutenant-colonel would have the largest compensation without the slightest injury, and it would in numberless other cases be wholly unequal in its operation. It was not easy to conceive the principle on which the claim was made. But the chief objection lay on the surface. Those who had purchased their steps had secured their promotion by the payment of a sum of money upon the express condition that the money should be lost to them in case of death, and should only be returned on the occasion of their quitting the army. To return it at once would be to give them the benefit of these steps and the rank attained by them, while relieving them of the cost at which they purchased them.

The second alternative was clearly impracticable. If the officer remained in the service till death or attaining the rank of major-general, the State would have been unjustly amerced of every shilling thus paid to him. On the other hand, if the officer retired the next day, he would be unjustly amerced of every shilling that had been paid to him under the full value of his commission.

The third was the only practicable alternative, and had been adopted by the House of Commons. Every purchase officer was to be paid the sum which he would have

received from his juniors. If he sold out, he got regulation and over-regulation, as before. If he went to half-pay, he got over-regulation, as before. If he went on retired full pay, he got the customary bonus, as before. If he died, or was cashiered, or was removed from the service, or became a major-general by promotion directly from his regiment, he got nothing, as before. The pledge of the Government was that no officer should, in respect of the commission then held, be placed in a worse position than if the Act had not passed, and that in case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in his favour.

Some years were needed to give a length of time sufficient to obtain a proper perspective in looking at the subject, and in commenting on Mr O'Dowd's report, *The Times* observed that for the generation that had grown up in the interval, it was very difficult to realize the strength of the passions aroused by the removal of one of the most astounding anomalies ever produced by our peculiar institutions and habits. The least experienced among us has learned to listen with tolerable equanimity to the perennial assertion that the service is going to the dogs, but its immediate perdition was painted in those days with a vividness of colour and a force of imagination that went far to perturb the judgment even of ordinarily cool observers. The officer's commission was an asset realizable only in certain conditions. There was no compulsory sale. It was simply decreed that when in ordinary course an officer would sell his commission to another officer, he should sell on the same terms to the State. The State became the universal purchaser of all commissions as and when they came into the market. Nothing more could in equity be demanded than that the State should scrupulously pay what would have been the market price had the old system continued to exist. The system had been dealt with in a manner which on the strictest

computation was equitable, and might even be regarded as generous.[1]

Eleven more years have passed since this judgment was pronounced. During the thirty-two years that have elapsed since the abolition of purchase, the British army has been engaged in many wars, the latest being the most arduous that this nation has entered upon in living memory. It would have been impossible for the purchase system to have survived that ordeal, and it was well that it should have been abolished deliberately in time of peace.

When the Army Regulation Bill was passing through Parliament, Mr Cardwell stated that it was the intention of the Government that the flow of promotion should be maintained in future substantially at the same rate as before. He gave the assurance in the following words:—

"That a reasonable rapidity of promotion such as is necessary for the benefit of the service is a vital consideration, and must be always provided by the Crown and Parliament; by a reasonable rapidity is meant some such rapidity as existed under the purchase system."

That pledge has been amply fulfilled, and much more has been done. The old captain of forty years service has disappeared; nay, it is impossible for one of thirty years to exist, and there are not many captains who can claim even twenty years service. The regulation that "a regimental lieutenant-colonel shall retire from the command of a regiment or battalion on attaining the age of sixty years," has become a dead letter, for no lieutenant-colonel may now remain in command after the age of fifty-five. The spectacle of an officer who had served in the Peninsula leading his battalion into action in the Crimea more than forty years later,[2] would be impossible

[1] *The Times*, 1st November 1892.

[2] Colonel Bell, who commanded the 1st Battalion of the Royals in the Crimea, and Colonel Garrett, who commanded the 46th Foot, had both served in the Peninsula.

under present conditions, and the Army List may be searched in vain for the old half-pay officer whose name was Legion, and who beset the anterooms at the Horse Guards to obtain some staff appointment to help him to struggle through the autumn of life.

CHAPTER XIV

MODERN ARMIES

PUBLIC expectation was now eagerly looking for the reorganization to which the abolition of purchase had been declared by Mr Cardwell to be an indispensable preliminary. On the 22nd February 1872, he moved the Army Estimates for 1872-73. In introducing them, he briefly reviewed the measures of the three previous years. The Royal Commission on Recruiting which reported in 1867 had laid stress on two points:—

1st. That there was no reserve for expanding the army to a war establishment.

2nd. That service in the army was unpopular because two-thirds of a soldier's time was spent on foreign service.

The first measure taken by the Government had been to reduce the number of regiments serving abroad, with the result that the number of battalions of the line at home was now equal to the number abroad. The threatened incursions of Fenians in Canada had caused misgivings as to the reductions in that Colony, but Canada had now a force of 44,000 men on foot, armed with the Snider rifle; of whom 37,000 had been out in camp of exercise during the previous year.

The next step taken was the introduction, in 1870, of a system of short service, without which it was impossible that any real reserve could exist.

In 1871, the system of purchase had been abolished,

and Mr Cardwell was now ready to propose a scheme for uniting and combining together all the forces which were supported by votes from Parliament.

Before explaining his scheme he touched upon the details of the estimates for the year, in which he was able to show a reduction of over £1,000,000, although there was no substantial reduction in men or *matériel.* Of the 71 line battalions at home, the first 18 for foreign service, besides the 7 battalions of Guards, had each 820 men. The next 18 line battalions were of 700 men each. The remaining 35 battalions had each 520 men. The First Class Army Reserve, including the Militia Reserve, consisted of 35,468 men liable to serve abroad, a number more than sufficient to raise every battalion at home to 1000 men. The recruiting under the new Act was very satisfactory. The militia, which in 1868 had 487 subalterns deficient, now showed a balance of 36 supernumerary subalterns. Including the volunteers, the total forces in the United Kingdom amounted to 467,000, of whom 146,500 were liable to service abroad. Having explained the estimates for the coming year, Mr Cardwell turned to his scheme for the consolidation of the military forces of the Kingdom into one harmonious whole.

Before entering upon the measures that he proposed, it is necessary to allude to the great change that had taken place of late years in the constitution of the standing armies of Europe. Formerly the idea of a standing army was a collection of regiments composed of soldiers who were enlisted for life, and who formed a regular caste or profession quite apart from the ordinary civil population. These regiments were fed by drafts of recruits, drawn from the civil population either voluntarily or by conscription, who, either with or without a brief preliminary service at a depôt, received their military

training with the regiments to which they belonged. There was no power of expansion except by enlisting more men, and the military strength of a nation was estimated by the number of soldiers whom they could keep under arms in time of peace.

The difficulty of sufficiently increasing the British army during the Peninsular War was so great that the practice was largely adopted of enlisting foreigners, who were formed into separate regiments. Hanoverians, Germans, Sicilians, Greeks, Corsicans, and even Frenchmen were freely enlisted, the latter being often recruited from prisoners of war and deserters. Even during the Crimean War it was found expedient to raise three foreign legions,—German, Italian, and Swiss,—comprising two regiments of cavalry and sixteen battalions of infantry, and a difficulty occurred with the United States in consequence of an attempt to levy recruits in their territory.

The disastrous defeats sustained by the Prussians at the beginning of the nineteenth century led them to form the idea of training the whole nation to arms by means of universal military service which required every able-bodied man, on reaching manhood, to undergo a short period of military training, after which he was released to enter on any civil occupation he might choose, but subject to an obligation to return to the colours in case of war. This obligation was of gradually diminishing stringency in accordance with his age. The result of this system was that the whole nation was trained to arms, and in time of peace the army was employed in making soldiers, in the same way that a factory manufactures arms and ammunition which are put away in store ready for use.

The conditions which attend the British army differ widely from those of every other army in the world, in

this cardinal point, that the greater part of the British army is always on foreign service. This foreign service approximates to active service, partly owing to the severe climatic conditions of the majority of those possessions abroad which are garrisoned by British troops, and also because at any moment they may be called upon to take the field. On the 7th December 1845, the Governor-General of India was peaceably making his winter tour along the frontier according to the usual custom of his predecessors,[1] and the troops were in their usual quarters. On the 18th December, the battle of Moodkee was fought by troops of whom the major part had quitted their cantonments on the 10th December, and marched 150 miles to the scene of action. The British loss was 215 killed (including two general officers), and 657 wounded. On the 21st and 22nd two more battles were fought, in which the British loss was 694 killed and 1721 wounded. The campaign was ended by the victory of Sobraon on 10th February 1846, two days after the first news of the outbreak reached England. During this brief campaign of two months, the British fought five battles which cost them over 6000 in killed and wounded, and in which they captured 220 guns from the enemy.

In 1884, the 10th Hussars and the 1st Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment were returning to England after long service in India. The ships in which they were embarked were stopped in the Red Sea, and the troops landed at Suakin. The Hussars, landing on 18th February, were mounted on Egyptian horses; the infantry regiment disembarked on 28th February. Both regiments were engaged at El Teb on 1st March, and at Tamai on 13th March, after which they continued their voyage to England. Such instances might easily be multiplied.

The peculiar condition, then, attaching to the British

[1] Despatch of Sir Henry Hardinge, 31st December 1845.

service is that a large proportion of the army has to be in a state fit for immediate field service. To keep the *personnel* of the foreign battalions in an efficient state has been a difficult problem, and the difficulty has been increased when the number of battalions serving abroad has largely exceeded the number at home. Thus in 1840, three-fourths of the infantry was serving abroad, viz., 77 battalions out of 103. Of these, 21 were serving in the tropics and 20 in India.

While the foreign battalions in such circumstances could with difficulty be kept efficient in time of peace there was no system at all for doing so in time of war.

During the Crimean War, after the first effort to send out 25,000 men, we could do nothing more than send out young recruits who had not yet become fit for foreign service.[1] The peace establishment was very low in 1854, and the depôts at home were not strong enough to feed even the battalions that were already at the seat of war. Lord Raglan reported that he wished he had been able to place a more considerable force in the position of Balaclava after the battle of the 25th October, and he did add two battalions to the scanty force which held that position; but he had so small a force to prosecute the siege, that on the 5th November the heights of Inkermann were defended by no more than 8000 British infantry.

After the original force of 25,000 men, the first reinforcement sent consisted of seven battalions, numbering 6000 men; the second reinforcement consisted of eleven battalions with 6500 men; while drafts to the number of 9000 men, not under nineteen, had also been sent up to May 1855. Later, when the Duke of Newcastle acquainted Lord Raglan that he had 2000 more

[1] Lord Hardinge's evidence, House of Commons Committee, 11th May 1855.

recruits to send him, he replied that those last sent were so young and unformed, that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away like flies; he preferred to wait.

It was to prevent a recurrence of such a state of affairs that Mr Cardwell's efforts were directed.

The measures already taken had equalized the number of battalions serving at home and abroad, but superficial observers are apt to overlook the fact that the home army and the foreign army are constituted in a different manner. The battalions on foreign service are fit to take the field at a moment's notice, and that is the duty they are required for. The functions of the battalions at home, *in time of peace*, are the same as those of other European nations, that is, they are factories for making soldiers, and their business is to train as many soldiers as possible, who, after completing their Colour service, pass into the reserve and stand ready for war. And they have this advantage over the soldiers of other armies, that whereas the latter pass all their Colour service in training battalions, varied only by short annual manœuvres, British soldiers pass a large part of their Colour service with active battalions abroad.

Owing to the army being equally divided between home and abroad, the battalions are constantly being passed from one to the other, and officers and soldiers are apt to lose sight of the fact that in so doing their battalion changes the military purpose for which it exists. In time of peace, the home battalion is a training unit and not a fighting unit. In time of war, it becomes at once a fighting unit by dismissing its recruits to the depôt battalion, and recalling to the colours the trained soldiers who have passed through the service battalions. The battalions on foreign service resemble the old British regiments, but are better than they were, as the rank and file are all between twenty and thirty years of age

instead of between eighteen and forty. The battalions at home resemble the armies of modern European nations, containing many men who are not yet fit for field service, and who will consequently on the outbreak of war be sent to the depôt battalion to mature, their places in the ranks being taken by trained men from the reserve.

This fundamental distinction between the home and the foreign armies has to be borne in mind. Critics at one time take the point of view of the ordinary peace requirements of the British empire, requirements which include frequent active service on a small scale. At another time they take the point of view of a great continental war, in which no nation can take part without having large reserves of trained men, temporarily absorbed among the civil population, but ready on the outbreak of war to join the fighting line. These two functions are distinct, and British statesmen have to bear this distinction in mind when dealing with the organization of the British army.

Some confusion also exists from the use of the word "Reserve." As already pointed out, the word was used, up till 1870, to include not only the men available for strengthening the first line for service abroad in case of war, but also the troops of the second class, *e.g.* militia and volunteers, who were only enlisted for service in the United Kingdom. In order to avoid confusion, Mr Cardwell changed the designation of the latter to "Auxiliary Forces," keeping the term "Reserve" for those who immediately join the fighting line; but there are still critics who, holding that the word "Reserve" applies only to reinforcements sent to replace casualties, or to strengthen troops already engaged, object to a system which requires such men to be placed in the first line before it goes into action. Such criticism is merely verbal. The object of the army reserve in

every nation is to provide an adequate fighting force, and not merely to supplement the peace establishment.

The organization of the British army must therefore provide for the double duties which the army has to perform. The obligation of keeping up a foreign army of about 100,000 men necessitates a longer period of Colour service than is required in other armies, and the best method of providing for the twofold functions of the British army was the problem that presented itself to Mr Cardwell.

CHAPTER XV

LOCALIZATION OF THE FORCES

IT is clear that when any regiment consisting of a single battalion is serving abroad, it must have a depôt at home, which either forms a small independent body by itself, or is affiliated to a regiment at home. The first of these plans is wasteful, because a certain number of cadres are maintained which cannot be brought into line of battle. The latter course is an endeavour to obtain those administrative advantages which would be more thoroughly obtained by a double battalion organization. Perhaps no system had given so much satisfaction to the army generally, as the old four company depôts. These were, in fact, small battalions, and for many purposes, such as garrisoning posts in Ireland, were useful; but they were too small to take their place in line of battle. They were abolished because they were too large and expensive for mere depôt purposes. If the depôt were increased to the size of a battalion it would be useful both for training and as a fighting unit. A double battalion system offers the further advantage that the recruit, from the day he enlists, is surrounded by the feelings of the particular regiment to which he belongs. This tends to foster *esprit de corps*, and to develop the sentiment of attachment to the colours.

When the select Committee of the House of Commons in 1855 enquired into the administration of the Crimean

War, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hardinge, attributed the great difficulty of maintaining the regiments efficient to their being on a single battalion system. In a memorandum written by him on the outbreak of the war in 1854, he said that—

"During the Peninsular War each battalion on service had its second battalion of 1000 men and 49 officers at home, by which double set of officers and men the war battalion was generally kept very effective. In fact, to fight 1000 men in the field, we had 2000 trained officers and men to rely upon, but we rarely exceeded 800 in the ranks."[1]

In the same paper he wrote—

"The Guards, though low in numbers, is the most effective infantry force we have, because they have second battalions and, therefore, a better reserve than the line for keeping the battalions abroad effective in officers and men."

This point was dwelt upon by the Duke of Richmond when he was opposing the abolition of the purchase system. If the Government, he said, would only form second battalions and so feed the service companies, retaining the young men at home till they are of an age at which they can endure a foreign climate, they would be dealing in a comprehensive and statesmanlike way. The Guards were fed in this way during the Crimean War by their second battalions at home.[2]

At the end of the Crimean War, Lord Hardinge again recorded his opinion that—

"The experience of the last two years affords a practical proof of the inefficiency and danger of relying on small regimental depôts as a reserve for the field battalions, when the country may be suddenly involved in war."

[1] In 1814, out of 104 British regiments of the line there were only 33 single battalion regiments. The remainder had each two or more battalions.

[2] Hansard, Vol. 207.

What infantry battalions most require, he said, is to have the reserve of *officers* and men increased.

"It is quite obvious that an establishment of two captains and four subalterns as a reserve of officers to battalions in the field is utterly insufficient for the most ordinary purposes of war. I should fail in my duty to Her Majesty and the army if I hesitated to declare my strong and unchangeable opinion on this important point."

Lord Hardinge fortified his argument by referring to the advantages possessed by the Royal Artillery in their organization.

"In the artillery," he said, "where fourteen battalions constitute *one* regiment, the men can be selected for field service out of 112 companies (equal 17,376 rank and file) unfettered by any restriction as to the battalions or companies to which they may belong. The system is most valuable, as it gives on any emergency the right to choose the best men from a very large field of selection."

The advantages of a double battalion system were so obvious that when it was found necessary, in 1857, to raise a large number of additional battalions of infantry, this was effected by adding second battalions to the first twenty-five regiments, and an additional battalion each to the 60th Rifles and to the Rifle Brigade.

Moreover, the introduction of short service, which had become a necessity both for recruiting requirements and for the purpose of building up a reserve, made it almost impossible to continue a single battalion system. It had been laid down that no soldier should be sent to India till he had attained the age of twenty years, or had served at least a year in the army. There would always be a number of men either too young to go abroad, or too near the expiration of their service to make it worth while sending them abroad. By transferring these men to the home battalion, that becomes a depôt for the foreign

battalion and at the same time an organized unit capable of taking its place in line of battle for home defence. The adoption of a double battalion system had therefore become indispensable.

The question indeed arose whether a three-battalion system would not be better still, so that the soldiers of a regiment might be made interchangeable between three battalions. For if a regiment consisting of two battalions has one battalion at home and one abroad, and the home battalion be suddenly required by the exigencies of war to go abroad, all the faults of the single battalion system would recur, and there would then be no available support for either of the two battalions. With a three-battalion system, two battalions might be abroad in case of necessity, and the third battalion would supply the organization for replacing the casualties in the other two battalions.[1]

The difficulties, however, which would attend the organization of a triple battalion system appeared to be insuperable. It could not be done without such an extensive breaking up of existing regiments, or the abandonment of the names of many regiments with noble traditions, to such an extent as would deeply wound the *esprit de corps* which exists to a greater extent in the British army than in any other, and which is not the least valuable part of our military system. Moreover, a three-battalion system could not conveniently be fitted in with the county organization of the militia, with whom it was desired to establish a territorial connection.

To reorganize on a double battalion system offered fewer difficulties, since that system was already in force

[1] This was actually exhibited during the recent war in South Africa, when the three regiments of Foot Guards each had two battalions with the army in the field, supported by the third battalion at home.

in twenty-seven regiments, and the colonial reductions had established an equilibrium between service at home and abroad.

The question was, how was this to be effected? It could only be done either by adding second battalions to some regiments and disbanding a corresponding number of other regiments, or by brigading regiments together for recruiting and depôt purposes. Although the preservation of the regimental feeling of unity was of great importance, the adoption of a double battalion system was of such paramount necessity and presented such solid advantages, that it appeared necessary to carry it out even at the risk of doing some slight injury to the existing regimental system. It was therefore decided to adopt the latter alternative.

Two-fifths of the infantry of the line (58 battalions) were already organized on a double battalion system, and it was decided to complete the organization of the remaining three-fifths (83 battalions), by linking two single battalion regiments together and so forming them into one double battalion regiment. One battalion of each regiment would be abroad and one at home, the latter acting as a feeder to the former to supply its casualties both of officers and men. Recruits were to be enlisted for the whole regiment, and would be available for service in either battalion.

But besides organizing the regular army for its ordinary duties both in peace and war, Mr Cardwell had undertaken to combine in one harmonious scheme the whole of the forces which were supported by the votes of Parliament.

The militia had always been regarded as the main reserve for the regular army. Their organization was purely local and territorial, and in order to combine militia regiments with the regular army, it was necessary

to localize the regular infantry. Localization, however, could not be the same thing as it was in the Prussian army. Our people do not always live in the same place, but migrate in search of labour. Our troops go to India and the Colonies, and when they take part in war they are moved by sea to some other country, where they establish a new base of operations. With us, therefore, localization means identification with locality for purposes of recruiting and training, for connecting the regular regiments with the auxiliary forces, and the reserves with those who are actually with the colours.

The county was the territorial unit upon which the militia was based, each county having to maintain one or more battalions according to its population. The unequal sizes of the English counties produced a corresponding inequality in the militia quotas, ranging between the two extremes of Lancashire, with its male population of 1,356,251, supporting seven strong regiments of infantry and one of artillery, and Radnorshire, with 13,047 males, supporting 119 militiamen organized in two companies.

By dividing the British Isles into seventy districts,[1] it would be possible to apportion two line battalions to each district, affiliating to them the militia and volunteer corps belonging to that district. In order to bring about this connection it was proposed that in each district there should be a local depôt or centre under the command of a lieutenant-colonel, who would also have the administrative command of the militia and volunteer corps belonging to the territorial district. As each infantry battalion consisted of ten companies, it was proposed to detach two

[1] When it came to the detail of partitioning the country into brigade districts, it was found more convenient to create only sixty-six districts instead of seventy; and it was therefore determined to leave the 60th Rifles and the Rifle Brigade outside the district organization, and treat them separately in the same way as the Guards.

companies to the depôt, leaving eight companies for each of the service battalions. The depôt would thus consist of four companies, and with this depôt were to be associated the permanent staff of the militia and volunteer corps. Both officers and non-commissioned officers of the permanent staff were hereafter to be appointed from the regular army, and if not found satisfactory could be sent back to their regiment. The duties of the lieutenant-colonel included the immediate command of the depôt; the command and inspection of the militia, volunteers, and army reserve within the territorial district; and the superintendence of recruiting both for the line and militia battalions of the territorial regiment.

The general outline of the scheme was dictated in a Memorandum by His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, which was as follows:—

MEMORANDUM

BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE FIELD-MARSHAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF, ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS MILITARY LAND FORCES IN THE COUNTRY

With reference to the Secretary of State's proposal to form Local Depôts or Centres, as the mode of bringing about a closer connection between the Regular Army and the Reserve Forces with Militia and Volunteers, I think the following plan should be adopted:—

1. Double Battalion Regiments to be worked as one Corps, to be formed into three distinct bodies,—one Battalion abroad at whatever fixed establishment may be required, with one Lieutenant-Colonel, two Majors, eight Captains, sixteen Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, one Adjutant, one Quartermaster, and one Paymaster; one Battalion for home service at a reduced home establishment, with one Lieutenant-Colonel, two Majors,[1] eight

[1] One Major attached to Depôt Centre.

Captains, fourteen Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, one Adjutant, one Quartermaster, one Paymaster. The Depôt Centre to be formed by two Companies from each of the two Battalions, with one Captain and one Subaltern to each Company.

2. The Local or Depôt Centre to be in charge of a Lieutenant-Colonel, assisted by a Substantive Major, one Quartermaster, one Paymaster.

Two Militia Regiments to be included in each such District, with the Volunteer Corps of the District and the Army Reserve men and Pensioners making up the entire force of the Local Centre. The two Militia Adjutants and the permanent Militia Serjeants to do duty with the Depôt Centres, when their Regiments are not embodied or out for training.

Each Militia Regiment to have its Serjeant-Major, Quartermaster-Sergeant, and Orderly-Room Clerk as part of its fixed establishment of Non-Commissioned Officers.

The Depôt Companies to have one Colour and one Company Serjeant at all times distinct from the Militia Serjeants.

3. All other Regiments to be linked by Brigades of two and two, and to be in every respect organized as the Double Battalion Regiments as regards one Regiment at home, one abroad, and with a combined Depôt Centre as specified above.

4. (*a*) The present number of Battalions of the Army, 141, to be maintained as at present, and the Regiments linked to be continued as separate Corps for the Officers, and made to act as much as possible in mutual support. The Majors for the Depôt Centres to be taken from the Home Regiment or Battalion, and to take this duty in alternation by periods of two years.

4. (*b*) All recruits to be raised and drilled both for the Line and the Militia at the Depôt Centres, and to be passed from these as rapidly as possible into the two Service Battalions or Militia Regiments, as the exigencies of the Service may require; but in cases of war and Militia embodiment these Depôt Centres to be the nuclei for the formation of a Local Reserve Battalion. The Reserve men in each District to be trained equally for a certain number of days in each year at these Depôt Centres.

The present accommodation to be thoroughly examined

into and made available for the above purpose, and supplemented whenever necessary by additional accommodation.

5. The first Battalions for Foreign Service to be on an increased Establishment, and those to form the first *Corps d'Armée* for service abroad.

(Signed) G.

This memorandum formed the basis for the guidance of a committee[1] which was assembled to report on the details involved in carrying out the scheme of organization. The essential idea was that of territorial districts, each of which would consist of two line battalions, two militia infantry battalions, and a certain quota of volunteers, formed into an administrative brigade, the whole to rest on the brigade depôt or centre. The depôt was on the principle of a four-company depôt, but with this condition that recuits were not to remain more than three months with the depôt, but were to be sent to serve with the home battalion until they were needed for foreign service. The army reserve men residing in the district were to be attached to the depôt centre for the purpose of payment, training, and discipline. The arms and clothing of the militia and of the army reserve were to be stored at the depôt centre, which was to be the headquarters of the militia battalions.

In the event of the training or embodiment of a militia battalion, it would at once draw away from the depôt centre its Adjutant, Sergeant-Major, Quartermaster Sergeant, and sixteen sergeants. Similarly if the second militia battalion were called out. In this case the depôt would be left with its four companies complete in staff together with the battalion staff.

In case of emergency the depôt could be readily

[1] The committee was composed of the following officers—Major-General P. MacDougall, Colonel W. A. Middleton, R.A., Colonel Sir Garnet Wolseley, Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Ewart, R.E., and Mr Ralph Knox.

expanded into an eight-company depôt battalion, the non-commissioned officers being supplied from the army reserve non-commissioned officers, or by such others from the home battalion as might not be fit for field service.

Recruits were to be enlisted for service during peace in either of the line battalions of the district, and during war in either the line or militia battalions of their district.

Supposing, in case of war, it were desired to send fifty battalions to the scene of action without diminishing the Indian and Colonial garrisons, the despatch of that force would leave fifty out of the seventy pairs of line battalions without any battalion at home. On such a contingency the following steps would be taken:—

1. All line battalions at home to be raised to war strength, by calling up army reserve men to the colours, supplementing the deficiency, if any, by militia reserve and volunteers from militia battalions.

2. In each of the fifty districts to which the expeditionary battalions belonged, embody both militia battalions.

3. In each of the remaining districts embody one militia battalion.

4. Complete each depôt centre to a full battalion to serve as a training battalion for recruits.

5. Complete all embodied militia battalions to war strength.

6. Make all enlistments during the war for general service in the line and militia battalions of the district.[1]

Thus fifty districts would each have one of its battalions in India or the Colonies, and the other at the seat of war. These would depend for the supply of their casualties on

[1] It would have been better to have made it a condition of enlistment during peace, that in case of war a soldier might be required to serve in the militia as well as the line battalions of his regimental district.

the two embodied militia battalions of their brigade district, and below them on the depôt, recruits being passed from the depôt as soon as drilled to the militia battalions; and reinforcements for the army in the field, consisting of the best trained soldiers of the militia battalions, being obtained from those battalions by volunteering, or transfer, as the case might be.

For the purpose of this supply the district would represent the grand reservoir; the depôt the expense reservoir; the two militia battalions would represent the grand cistern from which two channels uniting would pour a stream of reinforcements into the cistern of the field battalion.

The twenty remaining districts would each have one of its line battalions in India or the Colonies and the other at home. In these districts the battalion abroad would depend for the replacement of casualties on the home line battalion and the depôt below it. The home line battalion, kept up to war strength, and backed moreover by the one embodied militia battalion of its district, also at war strength, would be available either for reinforcing the field army, or for relieving one of the battalions of that army as occasion might require.

If it were desired to reinforce the field army by line battalions drawn from the Colonies, and to replace the latter by militia battalions that might volunteer for such service, the latter might be found by embodying to the required extent the second militia battalions in a certain number of the twenty districts. The condition of a district thus treated would be as follows:—

One line battalion in India or the Colonies.
One militia battalion in the Colonies.
One line battalion at home.
One militia battalion at home.
Depôt battalion.

The line battalion abroad would be kept up to full strength by drafts from its twin line battalion at home, or from the depôt, or from both sources. The militia battalion abroad would be fed from its twin embodied militia battalion at home, or from the depôt, or from both sources. While the gaps thereby created in the ranks of the line and militia battalions at home would be filled up straight from the depôt.

It was by no means intended that militia battalions, any more than the line battalion serving at home, should be regarded merely as recruiting agents for battalions serving abroad. They would be liable to be called up into the line of battle in case of an invasion of this country. They would be in the same position as line battalions serving at home, and would, like them, be called upon to contribute most materially towards the successful termination of the war by training good soldiers to be sent against the enemy.

The objection had been urged that militia regiments would be deteriorated by the transfer of their best men to the regular army in the field. But the question for consideration is, not what is best for a particular regiment taken alone, but what is best for the interests of the nation; and whether it is preferable to send raw recruits to fill up gaps in the army in the field, or to pass those recruits through the ranks of the militia first, and to supply the war casualties by militiamen who would have had some experience in drill and discipline.

It is, however, of such paramount importance that the battalions in the field should be composed of the very best soldiers that can be obtained, that before resorting to the militia, the army reserve ought to be exhausted and drafts taken from the line battalions at home without hesitation. Those battalions would indeed suffer temporary deterioration, but it would be of little practical use to maintain a

number of battalions at home at a full establishment of highly trained soldiers if those soldiers are not to be permitted to take part in the fray.

It is quite conceivable that the despatch of our very best soldiers to the seat of war in the first instance might have an important effect in shortening the duration of the war.

It was hoped that the principle of localization to be carried into effect would attract to the standards classes which had not hitherto joined them, would spread abroad a knowledge of the advantages which are offered by service in the army, and would associate the army with ties of family and kindred; that it would induce men from the militia to join the army, and destroy competition in recruiting between the army and the militia. These advantages would be secured, and at the same time a local connection would be established with regard both to officers and soldiers.

Although the organization which has been described, mapped out the whole of the United Kingdom amongst the infantry of the line, the other branches of the service were not omitted. For the Artillery, the kingdom was divided into twelve sub-districts, of which eight were in England, two in Scotland, and two in Ireland. They were so arranged as to be coterminous with the military districts, so that each general officer's district contained either one or two artillery sub-districts. Each sub-district was under a lieutenant-colonel of Royal Artillery, in whom was vested the administrative command of all the artillery militia and artillery volunteers in the sub-district. The organization of the Royal Artillery allowed of this being more easily managed than the localization of the infantry, and it had been established in 1871 and was in full operation more than a year before the first infantry sub-district was created. The principle that the permanent

staff of the militia and volunteers should be officers and non-commissioned officers belonging to the regular army was at the same time adopted for the artillery corps of the auxiliary forces. The system gave great satisfaction, and it may be said that the success which attended its introduction for the artillery in 1871 gave a great impulse to its adoption for the infantry in 1873.

As regards the cavalry, there was no cavalry militia which could be affiliated to the regular cavalry. The only mounted corps were the Yeomanry and a few corps of Light Horse and mounted rifle volunteers. There were none of these in Ireland. It was only deemed necessary therefore to appoint two inspecting officers of auxiliary cavalry for Great Britain, whose duty it was to inspect these corps and deal with them administratively, under the orders of the general officer of the district in which they were situated. As vacancies occurred in the permanent staff, the places were filled by officers and soldiers belonging to the regular army in the same manner as was proposed for the artillery and infantry of the auxiliary forces.

With a view to establish a closer connection between the militia and the line, a certain number of commissions in the army were given to subalterns of militia on the recommendation of their commanding officer and subject to their passing a qualifying examination. The number of commissions given was based on the proportion of one commission annually for each militia regiment of eight companies. Smaller regiments received a commission less frequently; larger regiments more frequently; all being given in due proportion. On the other hand, captains in the army on full pay were made eligible for transfer to the militia, and while so serving with the militia might receive half pay for a period of ten years.

The linking together of the single battalion regiments

in pairs was a problem of considerable difficulty and delicacy, it being necessary to take into consideration the following points:—

1. The nominal connection of particular regiments with particular counties.

2. The susceptibilities of particular regiments.

3. The dress and facings of particular regiments.

4. The fact that many regiments, although nominally connected with particular counties, had a more real connection, through recruiting, with other counties.

5. The exigencies of the roster, so that the new system might be brought into complete operation in the shortest possible time, and so that regiments then at home should not be sent abroad without some reference to their term of service at home.

The Committee carried out this duty with great care and judgment. Before the linked regiments were finally fused together in 1881, a few changes were made which were dictated by experience.

On the whole, it may fairly be said that the measures taken have been attended with much success. A strong local attachment has sprung up between the regiments and the counties with which they are connected, an attachment which was happily illustrated during the late war when county associations were universally formed for rendering aid to the soldiers' families left at home, for sending clothing and other comforts to the regiments in the field, and for giving aid and succour to the invalids sent home for discharge.

Apart from the benefit to individuals, the State has derived great advantage from the affiliation of the militia and volunteers to the regular regiments of their district. When the demands for reinforcements for the army in South Africa reached a point which no army organization in Great Britain has ever pretended to meet, and the idea

of which would have been scouted five years ago as an impossible chimæra by those who now blame the Government for not having foreseen it, the battalions in the field were strengthened by incorporating with them companies of the volunteer battalions affiliated to them, thus not only strengthening the fighting line, but also giving to the volunteers an invaluable experience which they had never hoped to get under any emergency short of an invasion of the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TURN OF THE TIDE

THE new scheme was received on both sides of the House with a general chorus of approval, as a measure which contrasted most favourably with our previous military legislation. Colonel Barttelot, who had been a strong opponent of Mr Cardwell's military measures, warmly welcomed it as "the very scheme the country had been asking for." Mr Holms, a radical critic of the same measures, declared that the War Minister's speech "contained the very essence of military reform." Outside the House the scheme was received with striking enthusiasm. It was said that Mr Cardwell had surpassed the expectation of his hearers, had turned to account the powers entrusted to him, and had made good use of a great opportunity. A great constructive scheme had been successfully perfected, and he had laid a foundation on which the edifice of our military organization might be systematically and safely erected. The benefit to be derived from fostering a local feeling of emulation was strongly insisted on. Every district of the country would have a regiment, identified with special triumphs and achievements, and the memory of these would be the common pride of the inhabitants. A hope was expressed that the navy would make a similar exposition of a clear policy of organization. It was long since any ministerial proposals had given the country such solid assurances

of permanent security and strength. Such were the comments which poured forth daily from the press for several successive days after the publication of Mr Cardwell's speech. All hostile criticism was hushed under the universal satisfaction with which his proposals were acclaimed.

Even the details of the scheme were not unfavourably criticized, and Colonel Anson strongly advised that each pair of regiments should be fused together at once instead of being merely linked together. He asserted that the *esprit de corps* would be just as strong as before, for what soldiers value is not so much their regimental numbers as their badges, their names, and the words inscribed on their colours. In some regiments he declared that it was almost an insult to call them by their number[1] instead of some peculiar designation which attached to them. Eight years were allowed to elapse before this sound advice was acted upon, for although the linking of regiments by pairs was carried out in 1873, it was not till 1881 that the officers were amalgamated into one corps, a delay which was of great prejudice to the system and which tended to foster a spirit of opposition to the change.

The weak point of the scheme was that no definite provision was made for a "little" war, such as the British army is frequently called upon to engage in. For a war of this sort, it is not desirable to call out any portion of the reserves, and yet the home battalions are not fit for taking the field without it. If it be objected that they ought to be fit for active service without calling upon the reserve, this would be making a demand which no other army in Europe is called upon to meet. The rank and

[1] Old officers will remember that in former days, regiments that had any distinguishing names were always so addressed on parade, *e.g.* "Royals," "King's Own," "Royal Welsh," etc.

file of half the battalions of the British army are constantly maintained in a fit state for immediate field service. If the same were demanded from the home battalions it would amount to the whole British army being always kept on a war footing; a consummation which, however agreeable from a professional point of view, is obviously impracticable.

If therefore the reserves be not called out, the fighting must, as a rule, be done by the foreign battalions which are not only composed of efficient soldiers, but can also be kept supplied with efficient soldiers from their home battalions. When the "little" war is in India—and of these there were no less than twenty-four in the ten years ending 31st March 1902—no difficulty is experienced, as India has fifty-two British battalions all fit for immediate service, in addition to a powerful native army. For a small war, such as in Ashanti in 1873, there was no difficulty, because the nature of the campaign made it convenient to have small battalions, and this allowed of the young soldiers being left at home. Moreover, as the troops were not intended to operate for more than three months, there was no need to supply drafts to replace casualties. In other cases it has been found convenient to draw the battalions required for field service from colonial garrisons, replacing them temporarily, if necessary, by home battalions; but if the "little" war drags on and begins to assume larger dimensions, difficulties begin at once to arise, as in default of calling out the reserves, or completing the depôt to a full battalion, the first line cannot be kept efficient in the mode contemplated by General MacDougall's Committee.

The occupation of Egypt in 1882 made a permanent increase to the number of battalions serving abroad, and at once upset the equilibrium which had been established in 1872, and which had been so closely adjusted that it

left only one battalion at home in excess of those that were feeding battalions abroad. This disarrangement has thrown discredit upon the double battalion system. The real fault has been the attempt to make one man do the work of two. It was an essential part of the scheme that when both line battalions were abroad, the depôt should be completed to a full battalion to serve as a training battalion for recruits. This was not done. Any failure therefore has been due, not to any fault in the scheme, but to the scheme not having been carried out.

Under the conditions above mentioned, a regiment so treated would consist temporarily of three battalions, two of which on foreign service would be supported by the third battalion at home.

When it was found necessary, during the war in South Africa, to make a considerable addition to the infantry, eight regiments were augmented by two battalions each. If, instead of this, a third battalion had been added to sixteen regiments, they would have been more easily raised both in officers and men, and the third battalion, with the aid of an enlarged depôt, could have well supplied the wants of the two battalions in the field. The addition of a third battalion to existing regiments appears to be the most economical and advantageous method of meeting the increasing requirements of our expanding empire.

The craving for uniformity, which is so strongly developed by military training, has gone so far as to deprive the new four-battalion regiments, as well as the King's Royal Rifles and the Rifle Brigade, of some of the advantages accruing to them from their being organized in four battalions, by dividing each regiment into two pairs of double battalions for mutual supply, thus limiting their elasticity in order to produce a Procrustean uniformity with the double battalion regiments.

The adoption of a double battalion system for the

infantry was a great advantage, but should not be treated as a perfectly rigid system admitting of no elasticity. The Foot Guards are formed in regiments of three battalions which are perfectly homogeneous, and their organization has been found well suited to their requirements in time of war.

It is of such primary importance that the fighting line should be kept supplied with trained soldiers, that it would have been well to have taken advantage of the territorial system to have enlisted soldiers for service in any of their county regiments. Thus Lancashire men would have been available for service, on emergency, with any Lancashire regiment; and similarly with other counties which support more than two battalions of the line. The difficulty now experienced in supporting five kilted regiments, each of two battalions, might have been avoided by enlisting men for a Highland Brigade, composed of six of the old regiments, all of which might have preserved their ancient tartans and distinctions while forming one body for mutual strength and support.

In the same way a Welsh Brigade would have furnished a rallying point for the national aspirations of the inhabitants of Wales, whilst the Irish regiments might have formed respectively a North and a South Irish Brigade.

The regimental *esprit de corps*, so valuable a feature in any army, would not be interfered with, and would well co-exist with a brigade *esprit de corps*. We have an example of this in the Guards, who have great regimental *esprit* and also have the *esprit* of the brigade of Guards.

While thus preserving local associations, enormous strength would be added to the power of the fighting line, and each brigade would be able to support itself. The success which would have undoubtedly attended this organization in the large English counties and in Scotland,

Wales, and Ireland, would have paved the way for a similar organization throughout England.

Thus would be imparted to the infantry some of that elasticity of organization which is so distinguishing a characteristic of the navy, and which is not found in their case to impair in any degree their *esprit de corps.*

The complement of the scheme was the Military Forces Localization (Expenses) Bill, of which the second reading was moved in the House of Commons on the 15th July 1872. By this Bill, the sum of £3,500,000 was granted for the purpose of establishing the brigade centres throughout the United Kingdom; to provide barracks for the continuous training of the militia in Yorkshire, Lancashire, Staffordshire, and Essex; to give a new tactical station in Yorkshire; to complete the tactical stations of Shorncliffe and Colchester; to provide for a brigade of infantry always under training for siege operations at Chatham; to provide a new depôt for stores in Yorkshire, and a new training ground for regulars and volunteers in London.

The counties were to be relieved of the charges which they had been in the habit of bearing for the militia buildings, while the abolition of militia billeting relieved a certain portion of the Queen's subjects from a most oppressive tax.

The localization scheme was not, however, the sole cause of the additional buildings. The withdrawal of twenty-five battalions from foreign stations, and concentrating them at home, had caused the necessity of providing additional accommodation in barracks in this country. On the completion of the scheme, there would be in every sub-district training grounds available for the training of recruits, both for the regulars and the militia, and for training the regiments of militia and volunteers in connection with the regular troops. Recruiting would be made systematic under one control, and the colonel of the

sub-district would be able to put on foot militia, volunteers, and army reserves under his command, immediately on receiving notice to do so.

There would be store-houses in every district for the arms of the regulars, the militia, and the volunteers. There would be power to the general officer to combine the whole of the forces in his district when ordered, including camp equipage and stores, without having recourse to the War Office. There would be a large tactical station in the north with barracks for the training of militia; these barracks would be available in winter for the regular troops. Mr Cardwell claimed that the system would be as complete as the necessities of the country required, or as was justified by a reasonable regard for economy.

The Bill was well received by the House; the only adverse suggestion being that the scheme would prove exceptionally popular if in two or three years' time it were not assailed by the representatives of the Service as wholly unsatisfactory, if not absolutely worthless, for such had been the fate of every modification of our military establishments during the last twenty-five years.

Some persons had hinted that the brigade centres would spread immorality, but Mr George Trevelyan asserted that "instead of being centres of immorality they would be centres of public confidence."

Colonel Stanley, a member of the Opposition, destined before long himself to become responsible for the working of the system,[1] warmly supported Mr Cardwell's policy, eulogizing his scheme as consisting of three parts: abolition of purchase, organization of the army, and localization of the military forces.

When the events of the year were summed up,[2] it was

[1] Colonel Stanley, now Earl of Derby, was Financial Secretary at the War Office 1874-77, and Secretary of State for War 1878-80.

[2] *Annual Register* for 1872.

said that of the heads of departments Mr Cardwell was at the same time the most ambitious and the most successful. The merits of the great measures which he had introduced in two successive sessions could only be tested by experience, but friends and enemies would agree that no other Minister of War had effected changes so great and so comprehensive.

Nor were these mere paper preparations. The reserves liable to serve abroad had been raised to 38,524, and if a war had broken out in 1872 we should have been able to place on foot two *corps d'armée*, consisting of 42 battalions each of 1000 rank and file, with the proper proportion of cavalry, 7284; and of artillery, 180 guns.

There would have remained in England 36 infantry battalions of 1000 rank and file; cavalry, 3138; and 156 field-guns. Behind these there were 100,000 militia, the enrolled pensioners and the volunteers.

CHAPTER XVII

FURTHER CHANGES

IN Mr Cardwell's Memorandum of 3rd December 1868, one of the questions which he foreshadowed as a subject of debate in the House of Commons was the distinction between the Guards and the line, owing to the peculiar position held by the regiments of Foot Guards. The Royal Warrant of the 10th February 1766 shows that in those regiments the majors held the rank of colonel in the army, the captains that of lieutenant-colonel, the lieutenants that of captain. After the victory of Waterloo, a similar privilege was conferred by the Prince Regent on the ensigns, who thenceforward held the rank of lieutenant in the army. The higher rank thus pertaining to a commission in the Guards was substantive rank, and the holder could exchange with an officer of similar rank in the line. Thus a lieutenant in the Foot Guards, on promotion to the command of a company in his regiment, acquired with it the substantive rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was eligible by exchange for the command of a regiment of the line. Nor were such exchanges uncommon, though they were limited in practice by the Commander-in-Chief refusing to allow such an exchange when the Guards officer was of very junior standing.

The privileged rank of the Guards caused a good deal of heart-burning in the line. This had been notably the case in the trenches before Sebastopol, where the Guards

and the line were serving together, which in peace time rarely occurred. Every lieutenant of the Guards who obtained his company, at once superseded all the majors of the line, and became senior to all lieutenant-colonels of the line who might be promoted subsequently to him, although his own command remained that of a company only.

Moreover, prior to 1855, the rank of lieutenant-colonel was the most important step in the army for an officer to obtain. A lieutenant-colonel could not be superseded by a junior (except by a lieutenant-colonel being appointed aide-de-camp to the Queen, of whom there was a very limited number), but was moved up regularly by seniority to the rank of major-general. The double rank of the Guards gave them, in consequence, a very great advantage towards attaining the rank of general officer. After the fall of Sebastopol, Sir William Codrington was appointed General Commanding-in-Chief in the Crimea, and Sir Colin Campbell, who was senior to him, went home but came out again at the Queen's personal request. "I have come out to serve under a man who, at the beginning of the war, commanded a company in the division in which I commanded a brigade," were the words of the fiery old Highlander, "war-bred Sir Colin," as Sir Charles Napier called him. And such was the case, for when the Eastern Expedition set forth in 1854, the First Division included a brigade of Guards and another of Highlanders. In the former, Colonel Codrington held the rank of Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel Coldstream Guards, while the Highland brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Sir Colin Campbell. Both officers were promoted to major-general in June 1854.

The abolition of the system by which promotion in the army was obtained by purchase made it impossible to retain a system which gave promotion by privilege. Existing interests were, however, very carefully maintained.

The promotion to which officers already in the service had looked forward by purchase was continued to them without purchase; and the rule that regimental promotion in the Guards should only carry its own, and not an exceptional rank, was made applicable only to those who entered the Guards after 26th August 1871. One distinguished officer of the Guards,[1] writing to Mr Cardwell, said, "It appears to me that you have treated the officers not only fairly but generously, and as you have respected existing interests, no word of complaint from Guardsmen can be uttered."

It may be observed here that the mode of dealing with the privileges of the Guards was carefully considered by the Cabinet, who felt the difficulty of maintaining either towards the army, or towards Parliament and the public, the exceptional rank which had hitherto obtained in the regiments of Foot Guards. One difficulty connected with its abolition was that in course of time the officers of the Guards might, it was feared, be among the oldest of their rank in the army, and personal service on the Sovereign would cease to be considered among the highest objects of the profession. That fear has not been realized. The system under which the battalions of the Guards do not serve abroad except in case of war, leaves their officers free for special service in the small wars and expeditions that are constantly occurring. Guardsmen have not been backward in availing themselves of these opportunities and in sharing the risks and dangers that await the pioneers who open new districts to the British empire. Some indeed have laid down their lives in these expeditions, but many have returned with added experience, beneficial both to themselves and to the army, qualifying them for promotion which has not been grudged by their brother officers in the line.

[1] Colonel Ponsonby, Private Secretary to Queen Victoria.

There was another branch of the privileges of the Guards which affected discipline. These were the compliments paid by guards and sentries of the Guards to officers and armed parties of other branches of the service. These privileges were not generally known in the army, as they were not mentioned in any general regulation. Consequently it happened that when the Guards were serving in camp or garrison with other troops, some officer on duty reported that some guard or sentinel of the Foot Guards had neglected to pay him the proper compliment due to his rank.

It appears that the salutes were originally not privileges of the Guards, but privileges of the Royal Family; but they had come in process of time to be considered as privileges pertaining to the Guards, and their existence when brought into contact with the Line was occasionally the cause of some friction, which was due solely to the fact that the Sovereign's orders on this head had never been made known to the army, nor were they issued through the Adjutant-General.

It appeared to Mr Cardwell,—and in this he was supported by the opinion of more than one superior officer of the Guards whom he consulted,—that whatever rule was approved for the Guards should be incorporated with the Queen's regulations, as nothing was more annoying to an officer of the Line than being met by a rule out of the Guards' regulations, a book he had never heard of.

Those rules were accordingly revised by two general officers, of the Guards and Line respectively,[1] and having received the Queen's approval, were added to the general regulations of the army, thus putting an end to the difficulties which used to occur at intervals under the former system.

[1] Lieutenant General Hon. Sir James Lindsay, and Major-General C. R. Egerton.

Allusion has already been made to the admirable training of the Prussian army. Part of this training consisted in annual manœuvres, when large bodies of troops were assembled for a few days under conditions approaching to active service. Divided into opposing armies, these manœuvres were of special value for the instruction of staff and commanding officers.

While the Franco-German War was still raging, Mr Cardwell had determined to introduce this practice into the British army, and an Act of Parliament was passed in 1871 in order to give facilities for assembling troops for military instruction during the ensuing autumn. The territory scheduled for this purpose included the county of Berkshire and parts of the counties of Hampshire and Surrey. Precautions were taken to prevent unnecessary damage to lands, and the regulations as to the passage of the troops over lands were made by a Commission, which included the Lord Lieutenant and the members of Parliament for the county. The cost of such damage as could not be avoided was assessed on the spot by a court of arbitration. The result was a great success, and while much satisfaction was given both to the army and to the public, the claims for damage amounted only to £1200.

In the following year it was determined to have manœuvres on a still larger scale, and another Military Manœuvres Act was passed in which the territory scheduled for the manœuvres included the counties of Wilts and Dorset. The force assembled was considerably larger than that which landed for the invasion of the Crimea in 1854, and representatives from all foreign continental armies were invited to attend. The claims to compensation for damage were under £6000.

In 1873, manœuvres were again carried on, in three separate places, viz. Dartmoor, Cannock Chase, and the Curragh. The estimates for 1874, which had been

prepared by Mr Cardwell, again provided for manœuvres; but after that year no more manœuvres were carried out.[1]

In addition to annual manœuvres, a tactical training station was established in the north of England where all arms of the service might have the opportunity of training.

Of those who had taken part in the labours attendant on working out the scheme of reorganization which was laid before Parliament in 1872, no one had borne a heavier share than Lord Northbrook. During the three years that he had been Mr Cardwell's Under Secretary he had worked with unflagging industry, collecting information, working out details, getting into touch with general military opinion, and acting on behalf of the Secretary of State in smoothing difficulties from whatever quarter they arose. His great abilities and unselfish co-operation had been of the greatest assistance to Mr Cardwell. That assistance was lost during the session of 1872, for when Lord Mayo fell by the hand of an assassin on the 8th February, Lord Northbrook was appointed to succeed him as Viceroy of India. But the seed had been sown and had already sprung up and was bearing fruit. Lord Northbrook had taken a leading part in the arrangements for the financial supervision and the co-ordination of the administrative work of the War department; in the formation of an army reserve based on short service; in the unification of the dual government of the army; in the abolition of purchase and the details connected with future admissions to the army; and lastly, in the localization of the forces and the affiliation of the militia and volunteers to the regular army. The framework of organization had been completed; it only remained to

[1] It was not till the year 1898 that manœuvres were again carried out on a large scale.

tend the machine, to remove causes of friction and let it run smoothly. Nevertheless, by his departure Mr Cardwell lost a valued colleague and an experienced counsellor.

The new Under Secretary of State was the Marquis of Lansdowne, a young peer of considerable promise, who had been for three years a junior Lord of the Treasury. Colonel Napier Sturt of the Grenadier Guards, a Conservative M.P., but a personal friend of Mr Cardwell and a general supporter of his military policy, urged him to take as his Under Secretary the young Earl of Rosebery, who had not yet entered public life, but for whom he predicted a brilliant future. But Lord Lansdowne was already a subordinate member of the Government, in addition to which his hereditary claims derived from his grandfather, so recently the Nestor of the House of Lords, were too prominent to admit of an unknown young peer being preferred before him, and indeed Lord Lansdowne's appointment was justified by his subsequent career. Colonel Napier Sturt's prediction is, however, interesting from the fact that twenty-two years later Lord Rosebery was Prime Minister of England.

During the session of 1872 an incident occurred which, though wholly unconnected with the War department, nearly caused Mr Cardwell's retirement from office. Among the chief measures brought forward by the Government was the Ballot Act which had long been a promised measure in the Liberal programme. While the Bill was passing through Committee, an amendment was proposed by a private member by which a penalty of two years' imprisonment would be imposed on a voter who disclosed his vote at the polling place. The Government first suggested as an alternative a fine of £10, then proposed three months' imprisonment, and finally agreed to the creation of this new criminal offence with a penalty

of six months' imprisonment with, or without, hard labour. Mr Cardwell immediately wrote to the Prime Minister to express his feeling about the proposal to inflict *imprisonment* of any duration upon a man who shows his ballot paper. No such law, to his knowledge, obtained in any other country, and it could never be enforced in this. If such impracticable crotchets were sought to be enforced by penal enactments, there would be a reaction against the Liberal party like that of the Restoration against the Puritans. Having regard to the crimes that were expiated by a short imprisonment, the proposed penalty was out of all proportion; while imprisonment for two years expiates almost any offence short of rape or murder.

The question came again before the House a week later with the support of the Government, who were defeated by a majority of twenty-eight on an amendment proposed by Mr (now Sir William) Vernon Harcourt. Mr Cardwell did not vote, and the next day wrote to Mr Gladstone to place his office in his hands, intimating that if the question were revived he might be compelled to express his opinions in the House. Mr Gladstone, however, would not entertain the idea of his leaving the Government, and the question was ultimately settled by the adoption of an amendment proposed by Mr Vernon Harcourt, whereby any person inducing a voter to show his ballot paper after he had marked it, was to be liable to three months' imprisonment, but the voter himself was not penalized.

Mr Cardwell was most averse to social measures being carried out by penalties, and in conversation at this time he predicted that such action on the part of the Liberal party would lead to their being swept out of office by so great a majority that they would not return to power for years.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SCIENTIFIC CORPS

AMONG the questions which had devolved upon Mr Cardwell for settlement was the stagnation of promotion in the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. Complaints had long been made that the scientific corps had not a sufficiently rapid promotion to keep them in a state of efficiency. In 1867, a committee of the House of Commons, of which Mr Childers was chairman, recommended a greatly increased expenditure upon retirement in order to remedy this acknowledged evil. Sir John Pakington referred the subject to actuaries for calculation, having laid down the following periods as those which it was desirable that promotion in these corps should attain, viz:—

To be Captains after twelve years;
„ First Captains after eighteen years;
„ Lieutenant-Colonels after twenty-five years.

These were afterwards called the "standard" periods. Sir John Pakington had not dealt with the subject before he quitted office in 1868, but he bequeathed it to Mr Cardwell in a formal memorandum as one of the questions which most required to be settled. The question of providing a proper flow of promotion for the Artillery and Engineers had become still more pressing now that purchase had been abolished in the line. If placed at a disadvantage with regard to promotion, as compared with the other branches of the army, officers would not be so willing to

enter those corps, now that entry into the whole army was equally free to all.

The reference to Mr Childers' committee included *retirement* only. To have carried into effect their recommendations in the form adopted by Parliament on Mr Childers' recommendation in 1870 for the marines, would have involved an additional annual cost of £84,000 for the Artillery, and £36,000 for the Engineers.

But to retire young men is costly to the State, and not satisfactory to the service. If men are invited to retire voluntarily at an early age, there is the risk of losing those whose services are most valuable in the market, and of retaining those whose services are less valuable to the public. After a very careful examination of the subject, Mr Cardwell thought that promotion might be helped by establishing a better proportion of ranks in the corps, rather than to expend money in retirement. Acting on this principle, a reduction in the number of subalterns of Artillery had been made in 1870 with especial view to the question of promotion. He now proposed a change of organization, viz., that a battery of Artillery should be commanded not by a captain, but by a field officer. The battery is the tactical unit of Artillery, and is a far more important and responsible command than is allotted to a captain in the other branches of the service. This had always been recognized, especially in the Peninsula and in the Crimea, when officers commanding field batteries were classed with officers commanding regiments for appointment to the Order of the Bath, which was given to them in addition to brevet promotion. It was therefore proposed to substitute the rank of major for that of first captain, while, in order to keep the batteries effective, all majors, captains, and lieutenants holding extra-regimental appointments were to be supernumerary. An equivalent promotion was proposed for the Royal Engineers, and pro-

vision was made accordingly in the estimates for 1872-73 at a cost of £19,000 for the Royal Artillery and £10,000 for the Royal Engineers.

This proposal was announced to the House of Commons on the 22nd February, and for a long time appeared to receive general assent. On the 7th June, however, the question was asked in the House of Lords, "What steps Her Majesty's Government propose to take to remedy the injustice to the captains of the purchase corps in consequence of their supersession by the first captains of the scientific corps."

The following objections were raised:—

1. That the proposal would cause a supersession by Artillery officers of officers of the line.

2. That it would call into existence a disproportionate number of field-officers of Artillery, as compared with the number of field-officers of the line.

3. That by giving the rank of major, it would tend to retard promotion, as officers who might have been willing to retire as captains would remain if they obtained, or expected to obtain, the rank of major.

To these objections Mr Cardwell answered *seriatim*.

1. It would certainly promote some captains who were now junior to some officers in the line. This was, however, the object of the whole scheme of 1867, and of the committee, and of Sir John Pakington. Indeed the increased retirement proposed by them would have promoted a number of captains to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. No objection had been made to this. The present proposal would not supersede the line in general, for the average service at which majors of the line attained that rank was $17\frac{8}{12}$ years, while the normal of the Artillery under this arrangement would be $20\frac{1}{12}$ years, although at the moment a few of the juniors were of less service, a typical case being the junior first captain of Bombay

Engineers, who had only 16½ years' service. This officer had, however, risen exceptionally by the Indian bonus system, and could only be quoted as an example if cases of army promotion, accelerated by purchase, were admitted as examples on the other side. But it was said it would supersede *some*. That was certainly true, and so must any plan for accomplishing the object of the Committee. But was this a hardship? Was it not rather the remedying a hardship under which the Artillery and the Engineers had long laboured, as compared with the line? For instance, of the field-officers then serving the following percentages had attained their regimental majorities (and some their lieutenant-colonelcies) in a shorter period of total service than the junior captain (16½ years) about to be promoted, viz:—

Cavalry, 66 per cent.; Foot Guards, 97 per cent.; infantry of the line, 42 per cent.; whilst the service of the officers about to be promoted ranged up to 27½ years.

Under the old system of purchase, supersession was the rule, and supersession of a man in his own arm of the service, nay, in his own regiment, the putting over his head of a man whom he had commanded the day before, simply because the one had money and the other had not.[1] Now, supersession had been reduced to a minimum, and this it was impossible to prevent under a system of separate regimental promotion. There were indeed some old captains in the line on whose behalf this remonstrance had been alleged, but these were the very men who under the old system had been hopelessly superseded because they could not purchase, but were now passing into the higher rank without obstruction as fast as opportunities offered. Would it be right for such a cause that the Artillery should

[1] The peer who brought forward this motion in the House of Lords had become a lieutenant-colonel by purchase after nine years' service, superseding hundreds of officers in the army.

be kept down at a standard of promotion, considered in 1867 to prejudice the service by infusing despair?—a standard much lower than that of the line? Still more, would it be right for such a cause to hesitate to introduce into the Artillery an organization suited to its present requirements, and proportioned to its increased tactical importance?

Such supersession as there would be at first, would be but slight and temporary, for the actuarial calculations showed that (in the normal state) a lieutenant of the line would, on the average, become a captain in four years less time than a lieutenant of artillery, and on being promoted to be major he would be two years in advance, and would become a lieutenant-colonel in three years less time than his brother officer in the Artillery. The present proposal was therefore not an excessive concession to the scientific corps, but, on the contrary, appeared to require thereafter some supplementary proposal in order to place the latter on an equality with the line.

With regard to future promotion, it might appear at first sight probable that the artillery would rise to field-officer's rank more quickly than the line, since the proportion of field-officers to captains and subalterns would be greater in the former than in the latter; but there were two causes which tended to neutralize this advantage. The first was the existence of the unattached List, which doubled the number of field-officers in the line. The next was that the infantry is the arm which is most easily entered by young men of position who design to lead a military life for a few years. Under the purchase system these officers entered to so large an extent that out of 1000 officers who entered, no less than 627 sold out before attaining the grade of field-officer. The effect of this large exodus (under purchase) was to make the proportion of field-officers in the line to captains and subalterns, 36

to 40, or 1 to $1\frac{1}{9}$. It was not likely that so great an exodus would continue, but it would probably continue to an extent more than sufficient to neutralize the more favourable proportion of field-officers to be given to the artillery.

Of every 100 officers in the army who entered to serve continuously, the following percentages were found in the several ranks, under the purchase system, viz. :—

Rank.	Infantry of Line.	Artillery.	Engineers.
General Officers . . .	23.386	14.060	10.823
Field-Officers	36.413	14.251	15.433
Captains	18.967	36.119	31.547
Subalterns	21.234	35.570	42.197
	100.	100.	100.

One thing appeared certain, viz., that purchase being abolished in the line, there would not be candidates for the harder examinations of the Artillery, unless the prospect were at least as good as that offered by the line.

Moreover, the Government was pledged to maintain line promotion from captain to major at about eighteen years, so that if the former processes failed to give that promotion, other means were promised which would preclude supersession by the artillery.

2. The second objection was that the proposal would call into existence a disproportionate number of field-officers in the artillery, and so give them a preponderating number on field service. The proportion of guns in an army had been fixed at three guns per 1000 infantry. Therefore forty-eight guns with twelve field-officers would be the quota for 16,000 infantry with forty-eight field-officers, whilst in a cavalry brigade there would be one

field-officer of artillery to six or eight of cavalry.[1] Without counting cavalry or staff, the artillery field-officers would be outnumbered as four to one.

3. With regard to the third objection, it was only necessary to state that, under existing regulations, no captains of Royal Artillery or Royal Engineers actually did retire except those compelled to do so from ill health. The number could not therefore be diminished.

Mr Cardwell summed up his conclusions as follows:—

1. That increased promotion for the Artillery and Engineers has long been a recognized necessity, and has become so more than ever since the abolition of purchase.

2. That in a seniority corps, the cheapest and best way of accomplishing this object is by a due proportion of ranks, and that retirement should not be resorted to further than is necessary, when that due proportion has been already established in the corps.

3. That the importance of the command of a battery, whether field or garrison, is such as to be proportioned to a field-officer's and not to a captain's command.

4. That it is impossible to expect efficiency in any one branch, especially a highly scientific branch, of the service if the promotion to be obtained in that branch is entirely behind that of the other and less highly educated branches.

5. That the proposed introduction of the rank of major is necessary (unless retirement were very extensively resorted to) in order to give the Artillery an approach to equal promotion with the line.

6. That if the promotion of captains, thus shown to be necessary, were effected by retirement on the present organization, the captains promoted would be raised to

[1] At the autumn manœuvres the previous year, there were 131 field-officers of cavalry and infantry, while the field-officers and first captains (proposed majors) of Artillery only numbered twenty-one.

the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and would thus supersede the majors of the line.

7. That whichever way the promotions of the captains be effected, it *must* of necessity cause the captains promoted to supersede some officers of the line.

8. That such supersession, however, is an inevitable consequence of the existence of different lists for promotion; and that the existence of such different lists is inevitable, and is to be preferred as giving elasticity to the service.

9. That supersession, which was the more general result under purchase, has been reduced now to an exception, and that the supersession caused by this proposal is less than that which any other proposal would occasion, unless the retirement of younger men from the lower ranks were resorted to.

10. That as between the army generally and the scientific corps generally it is not a supersession at all; since it does not (by itself) go far enough to bring up the scientific corps to the level of the army in the normal state.

11. That it is to be admitted that for a period of about two years, the Artillery and Engineers will have a promotion somewhat in advance of the standard periods; but that, considering the principle on which the arrangement has been made (viz., the importance of the command of a battery), and also certain difficulties in regard to the Indian lists, it was not thought expedient to delay the immediate application of the scheme.

12. That the particular officers of the line, on whose behalf the objection is made, have been the greatest gainers by the abolition of purchase, especially in this very matter of supersession.

Lastly, that the change is necessary for a reason more important than any question of promotion, viz., the proper

tactical organization of the Artillery, and that there is abundant reason for it in the case of the Engineers, whom also it is evidently necessary to place upon a level with the Artillery.

On the 18th June Lord Abinger moved a humble address to Her Majesty praying for a Commission of Enquiry into the alleged injustice towards the captains of the late purchase corps occasioned by their proposed supersession by first captains of the scientific corps, and that the publication of the Royal Warrant on the subject might be delayed pending the report of such commission. This was strongly supported by most of the military peers, and although the Duke of Cambridge made a temperate and well-balanced speech in favour of the Government proposal, the motion was carried by a majority of three.

The action of the House of Lords did not receive the approval of public opinion. *The Times* observed that the Peers had thought fit, on Lord Abinger's motion, to obstruct one of the most urgent and salutary of Mr Cardwell's administrative reforms. The stagnation in promotion in the scientific corps had been recognized not merely as a grievance, but as being dangerous to the efficiency of the service. The chief advocate of the objection was an officer of the Guards, a corps which had enjoyed the luxury of supersession to excess. To the supporters of the motion it seemed quite proper that a guardsman should supersede all captains of the line, but that it was intolerable that the officers of the scientific corps should receive rank due to length of service. Even in the line it was thought right that an officer should supersede his seniors in his own regiment by mere right of money. It would seem that money could make any violation of the natural course of promotion just, but service and responsibility could be allowed no similar claim.[1]

[1] *The Times*, 19th June 1872.

To such comments there could be no answer, and little surprise was excited by the Sovereign's reply to the address, which was read to the House of Lords on the 27th June in the following words:—

"I have been advised that the establishment in the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of the rank of major, already existing in the other branches of the service, having been decided upon, after full consideration, and provision having been made for carrying the arrangement into effect, the revocation or delay of that arrangement would be inexpedient."

On receipt of this message, the adjournment of the House was moved, and a somewhat acrimonious debate ensued, but the Government could hardly have been expected to have given other advice, seeing that the House of Commons and the public generally did not agree with the motion that had been passed by the Lords by a scanty majority.

On the following day, General Sir Percy Herbert moved in the House of Commons for a select committee to enquire whether the intended promotion of first captains of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers to the rank of major was justified by any commensurate advantage to the public service. The motion received no support, and after a vigorous reply from a private member (Mr Bernal Osborne), followed by a brief explanation from Mr Cardwell, it was withdrawn.

A Royal Warrant conferring the rank of major on the first captains of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers was accordingly prepared and sent to Windsor on the 4th July for submission to the Queen. It so happened that Her Majesty left Windsor the next morning to attend a review at Aldershot, before she could deal with her correspondence. The Warrant therefore received the Royal Sign Manual in the camp, the only occasion on

which a Royal Warrant was ever "given at our Court at Aldershot."

The promotion of so large a number of officers of Artillery and Engineers together did, however, create a hardship in two ways. (1st) Owing to the general system of army promotion then in force, by which every vacancy which occurred among the general officers gave a step of brevet promotion to the senior major and captain in the army. When the large batch of majors of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers should come to the top of the list of majors, they would absorb all such promotion for a long time. (2nd) There was a considerable number of old captains of the line, including many whose promotion had lagged behind under the effects of the purchase system, who were superseded by the newly promoted officers of the scientific corps.

Mr Cardwell therefore obtained the consent of the Treasury to the brevet rank of major being given to all the captains in the army and marines who had attained that rank before the 1st April 1860. This measure, having received the approval of the Queen, had the effect of promoting about 200 captains, and removed the chief objections that had been raised to the establishment of the rank of major in the Artillery and Engineers.

CHAPTER XIX

IMPROVEMENTS FOR SOLDIERS. OTHER REFORMS

By the end of 1872 Mr Gladstone's Government had completed four years of office, and was beginning to experience the unpopularity which often attends a Ministry about that period.

The Prime Minister had been twice charged during the last session with an evasion of statutory law; first, by his appointment of Sir R. Collier to a seat at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; second, with reference to his appointment of Mr Harvey to the rectory of Ewelme. The Government had been defeated by a large majority on a resolution on local taxation introduced by Sir Massey Lopes. The Budget of 1871 had been a failure, and that of 1872 had not aroused any enthusiasm; while the general rise in prices threatened an increase of expenditure both in the army and the navy over which the heads of those departments could exercise no control.

Public opinion was irritated by the indirect claims in connection with the *Alabama* arbitration, and although those claims were ruled out by the Geneva Court, yet the amount ultimately awarded was deemed to be excessive, and the Government had to bear the weight of the public displeasure. Numerous strikes, especially the strike among the Metropolitan Police, and that among the stokers of the Gas Companies, added to the general annoyance and discomfort.

In Mr Gladstone's view, the most important step

for regaining public confidence was to effect a reduction in public expenditure. To this end he strongly urged a reduction in the army estimates both in men and money. This reduction was the more pressing because the navy estimates showed an increase. The close of the Franco-German War left a state of foreign relations that was very favourable to England as a defensive Power, and it was not unreasonable to expect that some reduction should be made in the 20,000 men who had been added to the army in 1870. Mr Cardwell was willing to meet the demand so far as was consistent with the efficiency of the military establishments, but he was not willing that the army should be placed on the low establishments which had been assigned to it in the estimates for that year. The growth of the army reserve allowed indeed of some reduction in the infantry, but the additions to those forces which require longer preparation, and for which no reserves existed, could not be dispensed with. Mr Gladstone viewed the question from considerations of general finance, rather than of military requirements. Mr Cardwell's estimates were framed from the latter point of view; and the difficulty of making these views meet on the same plane was so great, that it became a question with the Secretary of State for War whether he should not ask the Prime Minister to relieve him from the responsibility of submitting to Parliament estimates which he would be unable to defend against those who complained of too much reduction.

The army estimates were moved on the 24th February 1873, when Mr Cardwell explained that they had been framed on the principle of retaining at the strength to which they had recently been augmented the various services for which there was no army reserve in readiness, viz. the Artillery, the Engineers, the Cavalry, the Army Hospital Corps, and the Army Service Corps. The

infantry battalions at home were reduced to 520 rank and file, with the exception of the Foot Guards, whose strength was to be 750, and the first ten battalions of the line preparing for foreign service, whose strength was raised, three to 820 and seven to 700.

With regard to the Colonies, the strength of the battalions at Hong-Kong, the Cape, the Straits Settlements, Ceylon, and the West Indies was fixed at 820 rank and file; that of other battalions in the Colonies at 600. The effect of these proposals was that of the 20,000 men added in August 1870, there remained:—

Artillery	5,194
Engineers	411
Cavalry	1,870
Army Service Corps	819
Army Hospital Corps	476
Infantry	2,413
TOTAL	11,183

But against this increase there was set off a reduction in colonial infantry (Ceylon Rifles and Malta Fencibles), and the return to India of two regiments of Madras Native Infantry hitherto employed at Hong-Kong and the Straits Settlements. This left the total increase since July 1870 at 8119 men.

The army reserve would not begin to show the result of the Short Service Enlistment Act until 1876, but it had meanwhile been augmented by other methods, and there were, including the militia reserve, nearly 40,000 men liable to serve abroad. The strength of the militia, exclusive of the militia reserve, was 99,000 men. The total number of regulars and auxiliary forces in the United Kingdom was 436,838.

As regards the volunteers, the returns for the past year showed a reduction in their total number, but this falling off in number was more than compensated by the rise in

general efficiency. In 1863 the proportion of non-efficients was 30 per cent.; in 1871 it was 10 per cent.; in 1872 it was 9 per cent. The extra efficients, who were only 35 per cent. of the force in 1863, were now 79 per cent. The certificate of proficiency that was instituted in 1870 showed good results. No fewer than 10,638 officers and non-commissioned officers had earned the increased capitation grant in 1871, and 11,580 in 1872. Camps of instruction, which were instituted in 1870, were attended that year by 10,492 volunteers. In 1872 they were attended by 16,300; and the camp of Artillery Volunteers at Shoeburyness had elicited most favourable notice. 3400 volunteers had attended the autumn manœuvres on Salisbury Plain, where their conduct and appearance attracted the commendation of the regular troops.

Mr Cardwell referred to the progress that had been made in carrying out the localization scheme, and dwelt on the special feature by which every regiment of Militia became an integral part of the regiment of the line with which its county was territorially connected, so that during war or times of emergency, soldiers could serve in either of the line battalions or in either of the militia battalions of the regiment to which they belonged.

He emphasized the importance of the localization scheme by quoting the words of Mr Pitt in 1803:—

"The army must be the rallying point. The army must furnish example, must afford instruction, must give us the principles on which that national system of defence must be formed, and by which the volunteer forces, though in a military view inferior to a regular army, would, fighting on their own soil for everything dear to individuals and important to a State, be invincible."

As regards cost, the army estimates showed a reduction of £408,100 to be added to the saving on those of the previous year of £1,027,000. An increase of prices had,

however, added £450,000 to the votes for stores and works, and the system by which the cost of guns, ammunition, and ordnance stores required by the navy was defrayed from army votes, caused an augmentation to those votes over which the Secretary of State for War could exercise no control, and which had no relation to the efficiency of the army.

Besides the increased cost of provisions and other supplies, due to a general rise in prices, there was another large item of expenditure caused by an increase of pay which was included in the army estimates for 1873-74. This was connected with other questions relating to the welfare of the individual soldier which closely affected the efficiency of the army.

One of the most important of these was the discharge of men of bad character from the army. The tradition of nearly two centuries had established the notion that any man would do for the army, no matter how bad his character, because he would be kept in order by severe punishment and a never ceasing system of supervision and discipline founded on the principle of fear. When enlistment was for life, few but those who were reckless, or whose character prevented their obtaining employment at trade, were willing to enlist. Sometimes men were impressed, and sometimes criminals were pardoned on condition of their enlisting into the army. The presence of thieves and other criminals in the ranks naturally tended to deter respectable men from enlisting. A man of good character was sometimes (not always) allowed to purchase his discharge. It naturally followed that a man of bad character was rarely (if ever) discharged, otherwise an inducement would thereby have been offered to men to behave badly in order to obtain a free discharge. Bounty was always given on enlistment, varying in amount according to the exigencies of the period, and this formed an inducement

for soldiers to desert, so that they might fraudulently re-enlist and obtain a fresh bounty. To prevent this practice a soldier might be sentenced by court-martial to be marked with the letter D. if guilty of desertion, or with the letters B.C. if guilty of certain offences of a disgraceful nature. These marks, being indelible, would preclude a man so marked from offering himself for re-enlistment. The very fact of a soldier being liable to corporal punishment, or to be marked as above described, tended to prevent men of good character from enlisting. In 1869, corporal punishment was abolished in consequence of a resolution of the House of Commons. Marking was retained, not as a mode of punishment, but only as a precaution to prevent deserters and men of bad character from re-enlisting This principle being accepted, Mr Cardwell's attention was drawn to two practices. First, that men were retained in the service after being marked with the letter D. Second, that men were marked with the letters B.C. in addition to the letter D. The latter practice was clearly inconsistent with the principle under which marking was retained. The first practice was justified on the ground that it would prevent a man who had once deserted from again deserting with a view to fraudulently re-enlisting. As, however, it was desired to improve the class of men who enter the service, it seemed to be an anomaly to retain in the ranks men who were marked so as to prevent their re-enlistment. Mr Cardwell therefore decided:—

1. To abolish marking altogether.

2. To discharge from the service men of bad character.

3. To abolish bounty on enlistment and so remove the chief inducement for men of bad character to enter the army.[1]

The necessity for the last measure was illustrated by a case which was noticed in the House of Commons,

[1] These three measures had been adopted in 1870.

in which a soldier was apprehended, three days after his enlistment, for an offence committed before enlistment, and sentenced by the civil power to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. The Adjutant-General declined to discharge him, on the ground that "there was nothing to prevent his enlisting into another regiment on discharge from prison, and thus obtaining bounty and a free kit a second time." Mr Cardwell also found that there were 120 men in civil prisons whom it was *not* intended to discharge at the end of their sentences, many of whom were imprisoned for terms of one year or more for crimes of a nature which ought to forbid their continuance in the army.

In abolishing bounty on enlistment, Mr Cardwell proposed to make up the value to the soldier in another way, viz. by rearranging the rate of good conduct pay so as to give an extra penny a day, after two, six, and twelve years' service, in lieu of three, eight, and thirteen years' service. At the same time, he abolished the extra penny a day on re-engagement.

The maintenance of a system of bounty and re-engagement pay under the operation of short service would lead to very heavy charges, whereas the proposal now made would effect a considerable saving. Mr Cardwell, however, was not prepared to realize this saving at the expense of the soldier, and he therefore adopted a measure for giving the soldier the full benefit of it, and at the same time simplifying the complicated system under which a soldier was liable to stoppages for cost of rations. Formerly the soldier paid for his bread and meat ration whatever was the actual price, up to 6d.; but in 1854, a fixed sum of 4½d. was adopted, the cost to the Government being about 7d. As the soldier's pay, including beer money, was 1s. 1d. a day, his net pay came to 8½d. In 1867, 2d. a day was added to the soldier's pay, raising

the net amount to 10½d. Mr Cardwell now proposed to pay the soldier a shilling a day besides his ration of bread and meat; thus adding 1½d. a day to his net pay, and immensely simplifying the accounts.[1] This arrangement was extended to the militia.

The adoption of a short service term of enlistment was also the means of conferring a considerable boon on the well-conducted soldier. Formerly, if a soldier wished to leave the army before he had completed the first term of his limited engagement, and his character allowed of his application being favourably considered, he was allowed his discharge upon payment of £20. Under the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, the period of his service with the colours was reduced from ten years to six, and it was in the Secretary of State's power to allow him to go to the reserve at a still earlier period. If he wished to get rid of his obligations to the State altogether, he was still required to purchase his discharge; but in most cases, when a soldier wants to leave the colours, it is to support his father or mother, or to avail himself of some proffered opening in civil life. In such cases, a transfer to the army reserve amply meets his needs; this transfer he obtains without any cost to himself, while the State retains a right to his service in any national emergency. The old terms of military service were hard, rigid, and unbending; the new were easy and elastic.

The result of the change was to make the army far more popular than before. The last year under the old system was 1869, when 11,742 recruits were raised for the army with bounty. The year 1870 was a year of transition from the old system to the new. In the year 1871, 23,165 recruits were raised without bounty, and although the year 1872 did not present so favourable a return, yet the number

[1] The rates given here relate to the pay of a private soldier of infantry of the line. The same benefit was conferred on all other soldiers.

was far in excess of what could have been raised if short service had not been introduced. Before many years had elapsed, the Inspector-General of Recruiting was able to report that nearly 40,000 recruits had been added to the army in a single year.[1] So large a number had never previously been raised in time of peace. Mr Cardwell was also able to point to one excellent result of the abolition of bounty and the discharge of bad characters, viz. that whereas the Royal Commission of 1860 had stated that in 1859, 5000 recruits deserted before joining their regiments, the number in 1872 was less than 800.

Mr Cardwell also laid before the House another very important matter in connection with the preparations for war, viz. the organization of the duties which in Germany were performed by the "Chief of the Staff," and the successful performance of which by Count von Moltke had made his name illustrious throughout Europe. The special organization for these duties had never been provided in this country. They involved an accurate knowledge of the preparations of other countries and of our own, and the possible application of those preparations to every circumstance that might arise, so as to enable generals to act best according to the exigencies of the case, and so as to prevent those mistakes which, at the outset of warlike operations, are sometimes fatal and always difficult to retrieve.

During the Crimean War, a great want was felt of some department in the War Office whose duty it should be to procure maps and statistical information of the seat of war. The Duke of Newcastle determined therefore to establish a "Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office"; and in February 1855 he placed at

[1] In 1885, the number of recruits raised for the army was 39,971. This number was exceeded in 1898, when 40,729 were enlisted.

the head of it an officer of the Bombay Engineers. In April 1857 that officer died, and on the advice of a departmental committee, Lord Panmure ordered the Topographical Department, the Ordnance Survey, and the Quartermaster-General's Military Depôt[1] to be united and placed under one head directly responsible to the Secretary of State. Some extension of the department took place in 1866, and on 1st April 1870 the Ordnance Survey was severed from the War Office and placed under the Office of Works; Captain Wilson,[2] R.E., becoming the Director of the Topographical Department of the War Office. In 1871, the duties of the officers of the department were defined as follows:—

To collect and classify all possible information relating to the strength, organization, etc., of foreign armies; to keep themselves acquainted with the progress made by foreign countries in military art and science, and to preserve the information in such a form that it can be readily consulted, and made available for any purpose for which it may be required.

In 1872, Mr Cardwell decided that the scope of the department ought to be enlarged, and when moving the estimates for 1873 he announced his intention of transforming it into an *Intelligence Department*, at the head of which was to be a general officer who should be free from executive duties, but whose function it should be to be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Government for the proper conduct of what might constitute a real Intelligence Department, so that, under all the varying circumstances of the country, whenever the Commander-in-Chief might be called upon to solve any problem, or consider any circumstances which might be of more than

[1] The Military Depôt was a branch of the Quartermaster-General's Office, which kept a record of every military expedition.

[2] Now Major-General Sir Charles Wilson.

usual importance, he should know where to lay his hand on information required by himself or by the Executive Government. Whatever the matter might be, the Intelligence Department was to furnish the necessary information upon it at any moment. Major-General MacDougall was appointed to be the chief of the new department, with the rank and status of Deputy Adjutant-General at Headquarters.[1]

Thus was established a department whose services, though inconspicuous and not courting public notice, have already been of great value to the public. It is destined to further development and to the performance of duties not less important than those executive functions which hold a more prominent position in the public eye, and to which it stands in the relation of the human brain to the limbs of a healthy man.

The increasing value of the auxiliary forces, and the growth and importance of the army reserve, led Mr Cardwell to consider the necessity of strengthening the staff at headquarters, which dealt with the disembodied forces of the Kingdom. The militia and volunteers had been placed under the general officers of districts, and attached to the new sub-districts, but many of these latter were still in process of formation, and the officers of the regular army were almost wholly unacquainted with the organization of the militia and the conditions which related to the auxiliary forces. The administration and training of every militia regiment largely depended upon local considerations, and its transfer from the Lord Lieutenant of the county to an officer of the army rendered it necessary that special care should be taken in carrying out the new administration.

[1] General MacDougall's appointment was a fitting recognition of the services he rendered in the preparation of the Localization Scheme.

The Inspector-General of Auxiliary and Reserve Forces at the War Office, who had hitherto been assisted by only one officer, was now given the aid of two officers with the rank of Assistant Adjutant-General, and all the business relating to the auxiliary forces was dealt with in that branch. The training and inspection were carried out locally by the officers commanding districts and sub-districts, but the examination of the inspection reports, and the general management of business in one branch wholly devoted to the care of the auxiliary forces, led to uniformity of administration, and prevented those forces from dropping into the secondary position which is apt to be the fate of disembodied troops when their interests are dealt with by the same officer who has under his charge the more immediately important care of permanent troops.

The army reserve was also an entirely new force in the experience of the officers of the army, and needed careful supervision. There were not wanting critics who predicted that the men would never be found when they were wanted, or would be of no use if they were called out. Those predictions were not verified. In the spring of 1878, the whole of the first class army reserve, including the militia reserve, was called out in anticipation of an expected war with Russia. Very few men failed to answer the summons, and many of these were absent from causes beyond their own control. Of the whole number, only 2·4 per cent. were ultimately not accounted for. As regards their efficiency, it may be sufficient to quote the testimony of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief as given in a public speech,[1] in which H.R.H. said :—

"We have been passing for some time through considerable changes in the army under the new system

[1] Royal Academy Dinner, 1878.

of short service enlistment, and we were not aware what the exact effect of that system might be; but circumstances have enabled us to test it, and I am happy to say that the success of the measure has been complete. When it was first introduced by my noble friend, Lord Cardwell, I had some doubts whether it would answer, but it has succeeded in a manner that neither I, nor any one connected with the army, could have expected.

"I have seen large numbers of men from every portion of the country, not only Englishmen, but Scotchmen and Irishmen, belonging to the reserve, who both physically and in every other respect were entirely fitted to take their place in the ranks. I can only say, though we are supposed to be given somewhat to grumbling, I have heard no complaints from any quarter. So far as the army is concerned, it is everything that could be wished."

CHAPTER XX

CLOSING SCENES. ASHANTI WAR

THE departmental measures which were carried out in 1873 may be said to have fitly crowned the edifice of army reform which had engaged the unremitting attention of Mr Cardwell during the last five years.

The same success had not attended the recent efforts of the Government. In the middle of the session they sustained a defeat on one of their principal measures, the Irish University Bill. The Cabinet at once resigned, but the leader of the Opposition declined to carry on Her Majesty's Government in a House of Commons in which he did not command a majority, and Mr Gladstone with his colleagues resumed office. His Ministry was, however, much weakened by the defeat, and more so by the loss of several seats at by-elections, nearly every one of which was now adverse to the Government.

In these circumstances, Mr Gladstone felt that the authority of the Government was so seriously impaired that if they could not soon mend their position, it would have to be abandoned altogether. The best mode of restoring their prestige would be by the adoption of a successful fiscal policy which would throw into the background the untoward events that had recently cast a shadow over the career of his Ministry.

An income tax in time of peace had been first adopted by Sir Robert Peel in 1842, avowedly as a temporary tax, partly to cover a serious deficit in the revenue, but

principally to allow of important fiscal changes in the direction of free trade. The temporary nature of the tax was indicated by its having been imposed in an annual Act since 1860, and the House of Commons had often been reminded in Budget speeches that the income tax formed no permanent part of the revenue. The tax stood at 6d. when the Government acceded to office in 1868, and had been gradually brought down by Mr Lowe to 3d., yielding £5,500,000. Was it feasible now to relinquish altogether a tax which yielded so large a revenue? Mr Gladstone anticipated a surplus, on 31st March 1874, of about £5,000,000, and he hoped that a reduction in army and navy estimates would enable him to obtain an additional sum sufficient to allow of his sweeping away the whole of the income tax. His operations were facilitated by his taking on himself the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer in succession to Mr Lowe, who had become Home Secretary.

When the previous year's Budget was being prepared, Mr Cardwell had resisted the reduction then demanded of him, and had only yielded under a feeling of loyalty to the Prime Minister. He had brought the estimates for 1873-74 down to the level of the model year, 1850-51, with the sole addition of the Indian depôts, which had been created since, and for which India paid. Those estimates were lower by £700,000 than the estimates of 1868-69, besides providing for an excess of £500,000 due to rise in prices and pay.

For the coming year he had to provide for a further rise in prices, which would cause an increase of £126,000, while the increase of pay sanctioned in 1873 would cost £110,000; and other increases, for which he was not responsible, would cost £60,000 more. Against these he was able to effect reductions to the extent of about £165,000 and a diminution of the purchase vote of about

£200,000. The net result would show a reduction on the whole of about £100,000. Beyond this he was not prepared to go, as he considered that he had already reduced the men and the money to the lowest point compatible with the good of the public service. Mr Gladstone thought that the growth of the army reserve ought to allow of a further reduction being made in the regular forces. But apart from the question of a national emergency when the reserve could be called out, the home battalions had to supply men for the foreign service battalions, and their strength was already not more than sufficient for that purpose. No further reduction could be made in the Indian and colonial garrisons, nor was it possible to effect a saving by reducing the number of battalions at home, for if that were done, it would dislocate the new system and sever the territorial connection between the regular army and the militia, which was its most important feature. For these reasons, Mr Cardwell, though admitted by Mr Gladstone to be "not an extravagant minister," objected to the Prime Minister's demand, and would not give way. Thus, on questions of finance, an appeal to the country had become almost inevitable; and that appeal was made known to the public by an address to the electors of Greenwich, issued by Mr Gladstone on the 24th January 1874.

The result of the general election gave a majority of fifty to the Opposition. The last days of Mr Gladstone's ministry were nevertheless brightened by a gleam of success, which, however, came too late to be of any service to them at the polls.

During the year 1873, the British Government had to undertake an expedition to the Gold Coast to repel an invasion of the Ashantis. The British and Dutch settlements on the coast were formerly so intermingled as to be a continual source of embarrassment, and a partition of the

coast between the two countries was effected in 1868. The portions ceded to the Dutch did not willingly submit to their authority, and a new Convention was made in 1871, by which the Dutch abandoned to Great Britain the whole of their rights on the coast. Before the Convention was ratified, an assurance was sought and received from the King of Ashanti that he had no claim on the Dutch settlements of Elmina. Nevertheless, in December 1872, he despatched from Kumassi an army of 40,000 men to invade the British Protectorate. Having defeated the Fantis, it attacked Elmina, but was repulsed by the seamen and marines of the fleet, in conjunction with the colonial forces, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Festing, Royal Marine Artillery. The force at the disposal of the British only sufficed, however, to hold the forts on the coast, and the Ashanti army continued to overrun the Protectorate, so that the trade of the settlements was practically destroyed. In these circumstances, the question of sending a force to capture Kumassi had to be considered. It was evident that native levies alone would not be sufficient for this purpose, and that the expedition would need to be stiffened by a small force of British soldiers. White troops could not, however, operate in the rainy season, and before sending them it was necessary to have a report from a competent military officer, who would also make the necessary preparations for their reception on the coast. It was therefore decided that Sir Garnet Wolseley[1] should be appointed Governor of the Gold Coast, and invested with chief civil and military control of the operations to be undertaken.

It has often been said that officers have owed their advancement to private or family influence. This has probably been the case to some extent in all armies. Whatever it may have been in time past in the British

[1] Now Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley.

army, it was not so in the case of the brilliant young officer who was selected to lead the Ashanti expedition. The son of a major who died while his eldest son was only seven years old, Garnet Wolseley entered the army an unknown young officer, devoid of all family or professional influence. While still an ensign of a few months' service, on the way to join his regiment in Burmah, he volunteered to lead a storming party, and was severely wounded. For this service he was promoted into another regiment, which enabled him to take part in the Crimean War, where he was again severely wounded. In the Indian Mutiny he bore a distinguished part, and again in the China War of 1860. In less than nine years he had been four times promoted for distinguished service in the field. When war appeared imminent with the United States in 1861, Lieutenant-Colonel Wolseley was selected for staff employ in Canada, where he was chosen to lead the Red River Expedition in 1870. The success which he achieved on that service, and the ability which he displayed in the management of it, brought prominently before the public the qualities which were already known to his brother officers and to those under whom he had served. He was made a K.C.M.G., and appointed an Assistant-Adjutant-General at Headquarters, where he soon acquired the confidence of Mr Cardwell, to whose reforms he afforded a valuable and effective support.

When difficulties arose at the Gold Coast, Wolseley prepared a Memorandum on the military situation, which Mr Cardwell sent to Lord Kimberley with a note, saying:

"Sir G. Wolseley, who so successfully went to the Red River, is now ready to capture Kumassi. Pray read his paper."

A few days later, the Government decided that the writer of the Memorandum would be the best man to be entrusted with the management of affairs at the Gold

Coast, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, having been given the local rank of Major-General, left England on the 11th September 1873, accompanied by twenty specially selected officers to assist him in his preparations.

The Government had no desire to send an expedition to Kumassi if it could be avoided, but it was necessary not only to clear the British Protectorate, but also to secure some guarantee against any future invasion of the Ashantis. If an expedition into the interior should be found necessary, the employment of some white troops as a backbone to the force, seemed indispensable. The climate, however, would not admit of white troops being landed before 15th November. Pending the receipt of Sir Garnet Wolseley's report, every preparation was made for the despatch of three British Regiments. The following Memorandum was submitted by Surgeon-General Sir William Muir of the Army Medical Department.

1. The success of the expedition, medically considered, will depend chiefly on the quality of the troops employed, and the expedition with which the operation is conducted.
2. Officers and men should be picked and medically inspected.
3. The troops must not be kept idle in transports off the Coast. They should not arrive there until all preparations for a forward movement have been made.
4. Once landed, they should be pushed on as quickly as possible to Kumassi, and, the object of the expedition attained, as rapidly withdrawn.
5. The best season of the year should be selected.
6. All sanitary measures as to food, water, clothing, shelter, sick transport, prophylactics against malaria, etc., should be taken in time, and the means of receiving and rapidly removing the sick to England, provided.
7. A solid element of success will consist in there being no stint of money.

Sir William Muir's suggestions were implicitly followed. Though the expedition was on a small scale, never was there a better illustration of administrative foresight and

success, without which the losses might have been very severe, as there was much sickness. The total number of deaths from disease among the white troops was forty.

It does not fall within the scope of this history to narrate the details of the success which attended the war in Ashanti. It is sufficient to say that in five months after landing at Cape Coast Castle, Sir Garnet Wolseley had brought the expedition to a successful conclusion, and had falsified the pessimist predictions of some who said that the Government had miscalculated the proportion of the war, and had mismanaged its conduct. It was more justly declared that there had been "few expeditions in which British troops earned more legitimate honour." Before a report of the success of the expedition reached England, Mr Gladstone's government had quitted office in consequence of the adverse results of the general election of 1874, and the same day on which the news of the capture of Kumassi was made known, witnessed the publication of the list of the new Ministry.

It was truly said that Mr Cardwell's last act as Minister of War was to make an effective use of the army he had diligently re-organized, and the following extract from a letter written by him to Lord Northbrook on the day before he gave up the Seals of Office, testified to the efficient state in which he left the War Office.

[EXTRACT.]

"It would gratify you if you could see the working of the War Office, as it has come out of the cauldron which you boiled. It moves like a clock, and now that our administration has come to a close, the expressions of kind feeling on all sides are most agreeable, and, I am sure, sincere. How it works for a military purpose you have seen in the case of the Gold Coast Expedition. Dr Home,[1] to whom next to Wolseley our greatest debt is due,

[1] Deputy Surgeon-General A. D. Home, V.C., the principal Medical Officer with the Expedition. He was made a K.C.B. for his services.

returned the other day invalided, and we asked him whether he could detect any defect in our home arrangements. He said none. Precision had anticipated everything that could be desired, and if it were to be done over again, he could suggest nothing different. How was this accomplished? Not by any knowledge on my part of such affairs, but by the simple fact that, having an admirably organized office, I sat at the head of the long table with the chiefs of all the departments round it, stated what was wanted, and let each chief, all acting in concert, conduct his own department in respect of those wants, each referring to me, or I to him, as occasion required.

"I have been sadly visited by sickness; not indeed in my own person, for I was never better. But at one and the same time, while the expedition was at its height, and the estimates were being prepared, Storks,[1] Vivian,[2] Egerton,[3] and Howell,[4] were all reported very seriously ill at once. Yet, notwithstanding all this, we have gone on as smoothly as if we had had no absentee.

"To-morrow I give it up, after more than five years' tenure. Depend upon it, the work you and I have done together will soon vindicate itself, and wisdom will be justified of her children."

Writing again to Lord Northbrook a little later, he said:—

"You and I have great reason to congratulate ourselves on the result of the Ashanti Expedition. We were told that we had disorganized the War Office, and reduced the army to a force 'that could not march.'

"For the first time in history, the selected General sat down at the table in the War Office with the heads of the various departments—the Secretary for the Colonies and the First Lord of the Admiralty being present—and made the arrangements every one of which resulted in complete success."

The expedition was carried out at the moderate cost of £900,000. Without any desire to institute an invidious

[1] Sir H. Storks, Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. Died 7th September 1874.

[2] Hon. J. C. Vivian, Under Secretary of State.

[3] Major-General Egerton, Military Secretary. Died 27th May 1874.

[4] Sir T. Howell, Director of Contracts. Retired in 1874.

comparison, this cost may be contrasted with the expense of the Abyssinian expedition. No doubt a larger force was employed on that occasion, and for a somewhat longer period, but its cost was £8,600,000.

The Ashanti Expedition was on a small scale, but it was a difficult service performed in an unknown country where European troops had never previously served. A single fault in any link might have entailed great cost, or caused a great disaster; and credit was justly due to those whose labours had created an efficient instrument for army administration.

With this service Mr Cardwell's labours came to an end. On the 20th February 1874, he surrendered the seals of the War Department, and on 6th March he was raised to the Peerage as Viscount Cardwell of Ellerbeck in the county of Lancashire.

NOTE.—It does not fall within the scope of this work to express any opinion on points where Lord Cardwell's successors may have departed from the lines laid down by him. It is due, however, to Colonel Stanley (now Earl of Derby) and to Mr Childers, to recognize the good work done by them in building on the foundations which he had laid.

CHAPTER XXI

GENERAL REVIEW OF LORD CARDWELL'S MILITARY POLICY

IN 1868, when Mr Gladstone's Government came into office, there could not be said to be any system in the military administration of the country.

The regular army was under what was commonly, though not accurately, called a "dual" Government; for though, no doubt, the Secretary of State as the organ of the Cabinet could assert a supreme control, yet as far as organization was concerned, the civil portion was conducted by the Secretary of State in Pall Mall, while the executive authority was exercised by the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards. Communications between these two offices were conducted by official correspondence, just as between any two offices of the State, which were entirely independent of each other.

The auxiliary forces were not subject to the Commander-in-Chief—nor even the reserves of the army—but were under the executive direction of the Inspector-General of Reserve Forces, who reported to the Secretary of State. The Lord Lieutenant of each county, and not the Sovereign, gave commissions to the officers of these forces.

The supply and manufacturing departments were under the control of an officer called the Controller-in-Chief, who also reported to the Secretary of State.

The army was dispersed in many Colonies, and the

long absence from home which was the necessary consequence operated very prejudicially upon recruiting.

There was no real reserve composed of men liable to serve abroad. This could only be obtained efficiently by a system of short service. Such a system, passing men through the ranks and after a few years' training sending them to civil life under an engagement to return to the colours in case of emergency—in short, such a system as prevailed in Prussia, with the variations necessary for a voluntary service—was the only mode by which an efficient reserve could be provided.

The estimates of 1869 were laid before the House of Commons within a few weeks after the Government was formed. There was no time for any definite scheme to be prepared. But while a saving of more than a million was effected, chiefly by the reduction of troops in the Colonies, the general principles of the reform subsequently achieved were laid down by the Secretary for War in two speeches, which he delivered in the House of Commons during that session.

But in 1870, while a second million was reduced, the Horse Guards was united with the War Office, and by an order of Her Majesty in Council the relation of the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State was for the first time defined, and short service was introduced. The result of the operations of the War Department down to the end of the session of 1870; *i.e.* to the time when all Europe was startled by the outbreak of the Franco-German War, was as follows, viz:—

1. Two millions had been taken from the estimate.

2. The authority of the Secretary of State over the whole of the military administration had been definitely settled.

3. Short service with a view to a reserve had been instituted.

4. A Royal Commission had been appointed to examine the question, how far in the event of the abolition of purchase the over-regulation payments made by officers ought to be considered to be entitled to compensation.

At this time an animated debate, occasioned by the outbreak of the war in Europe was raised as to the efficiency of our preparations, and Mr Cardwell[1] clearly showed that those preparations were greater than would have been the case if such an emergency had arisen at any previous time since the reductions which took place in 1815.

The occasion, however, admitted and required an entire review of the whole military system of the country; and on the assembling of Parliament in 1871, Mr Cardwell proposed and carried, after long and obstinate resistance, the Army Regulation Act.

This provided for:—

1. The abolition of purchase in the Army.

2. The transfer of control over the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, from the Lords Lieutenant of counties to the Queen: thus settling a controversy, which had subsisted from the time of the Great Rebellion.

3. Control over the railway system by the War Department in case of threatened invasion.

Concurrently with these organic changes, various additions were made to the more highly trained portions of the army, *i.e.* the Artillery, the Engineers, and the Supply and Hospital Corps.

Military manœuvres on a great scale were for the first time held in the autumn of 1871. Those held at Salisbury in 1872 were without doubt the finest military exhibition that had ever been seen in England.

In 1872, a scheme for the combination under the

[1] Hansard, 11th August 1870.

Secretary of State of all the forces, regular and auxiliary, whether with the colours or in the reserves, was laid upon the table. This scheme involved the division of the United Kingdom into seventy districts, each under an experienced army colonel, in whom was vested the command and inspection of the whole of the auxiliary and reserve forces in the district, as well as of the nucleus of regular forces immediately attached to his own depôt. For the accomplishment of this scheme a sum of three and a half millions for buildings at the several depôts was authorized to be raised by loan.

In 1873, the addition of an Intelligence Department completed the scheme of the Government. The duty of that Department was to combine all the information which might from time to time be requisite for His Majesty's Government or for the Commander-in-Chief, so that complete preparation might always exist on paper for any action at home, or for any action which it is at all probable may be required in any of His Majesty's foreign possessions, or abroad. If, for instance, an invasion of this country were threatened, there should be found in one hand in the Intelligence Department complete information as to the numerical force of every kind in every part of the country, the means of supply and transport, the works most desirable to be executed, and the means most readily available, so that without any time lost in deliberation immediate orders may be given for all the measures necessary.

The result of the whole was that a system was introduced, where no system could be said to have existed before; and that a force could be called into action, and kept in action either at home or abroad, to which no comparison could be made in respect of any force which had existed in any former time of peace; while the sure foundation was laid of a system of reserves, which was

calculated to fill the country in a few years with men of an age for service who had been trained to arms in the regular army...

That expectation was afterwards fully realized. On the 1st October 1899, the army reserve numbered 81,133 men. During the earlier stages of the South African War, about 64,000 of these were ordered to join the colours, and of that number only 1·03 per cent. were absent. When Mr Brodrick moved the Army Estimates on 8th March 1901, he said: "I cannot help feeling that we owe something to Lord Cardwell's memory, in view of the use to which we have put his great reforms in the course of the last few months. After thirty years that system, with but small modification, gave us 80,000 reservists, of whom 96 or 97 per cent. were found efficient, and has enabled us to keep an army of 150,000 regulars in the field for fifteen months."

But it was something more than 80,000 trained soldiers who were given to the army by the Act of 1870. Under our system of voluntary enlistment, recruits have to be enlisted at an age before they have entered upon a regular trade or calling; consequently the ranks of the army are filled with unskilled labourers. The men who leave the army to go into the army reserve, are absorbed into regular civil occupations, and when recalled to the colours they rejoin the army as skilled labourers. This was found to be of the greatest value to the army in South Africa. Those who have served in the field know the difficulty that has always been experienced in finding men who are skilled tradesmen. During the late war, every trade and calling was represented in the reservists. As an instance may be cited what occurred during the march from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg, when it was necessary to make a railway deviation at Kroonstadt owing to the Boers having de-

stroyed the railway bridge over the Valsch River. The infantry regiments of the 7th division furnished nearly two hundred men, more or less experienced in platelaying, whose labour afforded most useful aid to the Royal Engineers who were charged with making good the deviation. The men were all reservists.

The purchase system so largely affected the personal interests of those classes who possessed great social influence, and who were closely connected with Members of Parliament, and the contest for its abolition was so fiercely disputed, that that measure is more closely associated than any other with Lord Cardwell's memory, and some imaginary idea that he carried out a measure hostile to the interests of the officers may still be found floating in the minds even of those who would strenuously oppose the very idea of reverting to the former system; somewhat after the fashion of those sentimental Jacobites who still weep over the deposition of James II., but whose actions will certainly never endanger the crown of Edward VII.

Lord Cardwell's memory should rather be revered in that he did not fear to undertake a costly and unpopular task, from which his predecessors had recoiled, and by which he secured very liberal terms to those whose interests were affected, while throwing open to the educated youth of the British Empire a career that enables them to take a share in a service which is associated with the ancient glories of the nation.

But though that reform looms large in the history of Lord Cardwell's administration, it should not be allowed to obscure the solid benefits of the more important measures which signalised his tenure of office. Of these, the formation of the army reserve by means of short service enlistment, must stand first

and foremost.[1] Without that measure, no efforts which this country could have made, would have enabled her to emerge with success from the South African War. Though neither he nor any other English statesman ever foresaw the possibility of such a large demand being made on the British army, all the more credit should be given to a system which enabled Great Britain to call into action, and keep in the field for over two years, an army containing 150,000 regular troops. For that act alone, Lord Cardwell's memory is entitled to the grateful recognition of his countrymen.

The union of the militia with the line, and the affiliation of the volunteers to the regular army, have been the means of increasing the efficiency of the auxiliary forces, while strengthening the regulars in the recent war, and it may be justly claimed that Lord Cardwell's object, that the whole of the forces supported by votes of Parliament should be welded into one harmonious whole, has been fully attained.

The regiments of infantry militia which had always been looked upon as a nursery for the line in time of war, and which had regularly supplied the ranks of the army during the war with France, now became battalions of the regular regiment assigned to their county; the whole being formed into one administrative brigade, so that all the officers and men of every battalion at home might feel that their first duty and the primary object of their ambition ought to be the keeping up the fighting strength of their foreign battalions in the highest state

[1] The personal influence exercised by Lord Cardwell in the formation of the Reserve is indicated by the fact that it steadily increased in number each year that he remained in office. After he left, its growth ceased, and by 1st January 1876 it had actually *decreased* by 3418 men. In that year the Short Service Act began to operate, and to create automatically an Army Reserve, which thenceforward increased rapidly till it attained the numbers for which the Act was designed.

of efficiency. It was hoped that the territorial regiments might become as homogeneous as are the regiments of Foot Guards, among whom no question has ever arisen as to the propriety of using the battalions at home to feed the battalions in the field.

The formation of a large army reserve had become a necessity, but such a reserve could only be formed by a system of enlistment for short service, and that system was a practical impossibility in conjunction with an organization of regiments in single battalions.

Even before the Enlistment Act of 1870, the operation of the Limited Service Act of 1847 was beginning to make itself felt, and the depôts of regiments abroad had swelled to an inconvenient size, being filled with men unfit for India from various causes, yet having no place in any regiment serving at home. The expense and the waste of the existing system was becoming prohibitive. Although the double battalion regiments had not been worked on any regular system, in some cases both battalions of a regiment being abroad, in others both at home, yet it was observed that when one battalion was abroad and one at home, the waste of the foreign battalion was mitigated, as the men who were too old or too young for India could join the ranks of the home battalion. The adoption of an universal system of double battalion regiments was therefore an inevitable conclusion, and the necessity became stronger when it was decided in 1881 that no soldier under twenty years of age should be sent to India. The adoption of that rule resulted in an increase of establishment for the home battalions and the inclusion in their ranks of a preponderance of young soldiers under training for foreign service.

The system by which every regiment has always one battalion at home and one abroad, has also been of great advantage to the officers, who are now able to exchange

between home and foreign service without going to a fresh regiment which entails expense and loss of rank. The result is that regimental exchanges, which were so much deprecated by the advocates of the purchase system, and which were, in fact, a great feature of that system, now rarely take place.[1]

As regards the rank and file of the army, Lord Cardwell was the first Minister who insisted on the discharge of men of bad character, and he enabled that to be done without inflicting a heavy pecuniary loss on the public. This measure alone has been of immense benefit to the army.

There remains to be considered the departmental reorganization which he effected, and to a departure from which, may be attributed some of the difficulties that have since arisen.

The creation of a separate Secretary of State for War in 1854, and the placing under his direct control all the military departments except that of the Commander-in-Chief, was bound to pave the way for still further unification. But this would necessarily bring forward the old contest between Parliament and the Crown. Whatever desire Lord Cardwell might have had to refrain from raising such a contest, it was impossible to avoid it with the newly reformed Parliament of 1868. Those of the present generation who are not old enough to remember that period, but who remember the halo that surrounded the last fifteen years of the reign of Queen Victoria, cannot easily picture to themselves the antagonistic spirit that animated some prominent members of the Parliament of 1868.

On the one side, objection was made to anything that would imply that the Commander-in-Chief was subordi-

[1] There were only eight exchanges between officers of different regiments during the two years, 1902 and 1903. In the year 1870, the number of exchanges was 57.

nate to the Secretary of State for War; not indeed in the general sense in which the pleasure of the Crown is conveyed to every public department, and which must be signified by a Secretary of State; but in the sense of departmental subordination. On the other side, it was contended that the authority of the Crown could only be exercised through a minister responsible to Parliament.

The objection to placing the patronage of the army at the disposal of a member of Parliament had been recognized in 1854, and no change was made in the existing practice whereby the discipline of the army, that is to say, the reward and punishment of all military employés, remained with the Commander-in-Chief.

It was in accordance with this decision that a supplementary patent was issued to Lord Panmure in May 1855, charging him with the administration and government of the army and land forces of every kind, "excepting so far as related to and concerned the military command and discipline of those forces, as likewise the appointments to and promotions in the same."

This matter came under the consideration of a select committee of the House of Commons on Military Organization in 1860, who stated in their report, that previous to this there had been no limitation in the patent to the powers of a Secretary of State; he is removable at pleasure, but while he holds the Seal of his office, he is responsible for the acts of the Sovereign, and administers the Royal authority and prerogative, which are delegated to him without reserve; and that the tenure of his office is by seals rather than by patent.

The patents issued to Secretaries of State had uniformly been couched in general terms, simply nominating them to the office, without limitation of powers. On the abolition of the Board of Ordnance in 1855, when a separate and supplementary patent was issued to the

Secretary of State for War, that patent contained for the first time the special reservations which have been specified above. The Committee considered that the supplementary patent was not needed. It did not absolve the Secretary of State from his constitutional responsibility in regard to all matters where he is the Minister by whom and through whom the commands of the Sovereign are received and given.

The Committee then considered the question with regard to the relative position and power of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Secretary of State for War, on which point they took the evidence of the Duke of Cambridge, of Lord Panmure, of General Peel, and of Mr Sidney Herbert.[1] They reported that notwithstanding the reservations in the patent, H.R.H. admitted that, with respect to commands in chief whether at home or abroad, with respect to the giving away of regiments, and with respect to promotions, the consent of the Secretary of State for War was invariably obtained before appointments of this description were submitted to Her Majesty. If a difference of opinion should arise, the decision must rest with the Secretary of State, who is the responsible Minister. The reservations in the patent therefore seemed to be inoperative, and had not introduced any change in the practical working of the system. Before the union of the various powers in the hand of the Secretary of State for War, they were confided to three different Ministers. The controlling powers were then distributed, now they were united.

The Committee also fully investigated the question of the reservation with regard to discipline, and the usage concerning it before the issue of the supplementary

[1] Lord Panmure, Secretary of State, 1855-8.
General Peel, ,, 1858-9.
Mr Sidney Herbert, ,, 1859-61.

patent. With regard to control in matters of discipline, Lord Panmure stated: "Though the Secretary at War had no power, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies might have done it if he had chosen. The authority of the Secretary of State, I apprehend, is paramount at all times." The Duke of Wellington had previously expressed a similar view. It seemed therefore that the reservation in the supplementary patent had not barred the constitutional control of the Secretary of State with respect even to the discipline of the army.

In 1861 Lord Herbert[1] died, and Sir George Cornewall Lewis was transferred from the Home Office to the War Department. Being already a Principal Secretary of State, no new patent was issued to him,[2] but in view, apparently, of the reservation in his predecessor's supplementary patent, he submitted to the Queen and obtained Her Majesty's signature to a document, by which the military command and discipline of the army, together with all appointments to and promotion in the same, were excepted from the department of the Secretary of State for War, subject, however, to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of the royal prerogative.[3] This document was countersigned by Sir George Lewis, but he took no further step with respect to it, nor was it deposited in the office. It was never seen by his successors, Earl de Grey, the Marquis of Hartington, and General Peel. In 1868 it was casually found among the papers of Sir George Lewis, but Sir John Pakington took no step in reference to it, and he quitted office before the end of that year.

[1] Mr Sidney Herbert had been created Lord Herbert of Lea in 1861.

[2] The issue of a patent was afterwards discontinued to all Secretaries of State, in consequence of a Secretary of State declining to pay the fees for a patent, on the ground that a Secretary of State holds office "by seals rather than by patent."

[3] For this document see Fourth Appendix.

When Lord Cardwell came into office he found this document in existence, and he showed it to the Duke of Cambridge, who had not previously seen it. It was also laid on the table of the House of Commons, and it came under the consideration of the Government, who were advised that the document was not one of continuing obligation, and that the principle of undivided responsibility remained in full force. They held that there was not in principle any dual government of the army; that upon the Secretary of State, the person who, for the time being, has been intrusted by the Sovereign with the Seals of office, and upon him alone, rests the sole responsibility for everything that is done and for everything that is left undone.

But although there was not in principle and in theory any dual government of the army, there was in practice a duality which was adverse to the public interests. The question was how to commit to the Commander-in-Chief the discipline and the promotion of the army, while yet preserving to the Secretary of State that supreme authority which attaches to the holder of the Seals, and that responsibility to Parliament which the Constitution imposes.

It appeared to Lord Cardwell that the best course was to make a statutory distribution of the duties of the War Department. This was effected by the War Office Act of 1870, under which Act and subsequent Orders in Council, Parliament and the Crown concurred in vesting the direct and immediate control of every branch of army administration in the Secretary of State for War. The actual administration was divided between three great officers:

1. The Officer Commanding-in-Chief, in charge of the combatant *personnel* of all regular and irregular forces.

2. The Surveyor-General of Ordnance, under whom were all civil administrative duties except the Pay Department, with the purchase, construction and charge of material.

3. The Financial Secretary, who was responsible to the Secretary of State for the estimates submitted to Parliament, with the appropriation, accounting, and audit of all funds voted thereon, and who also controlled the Army Pay Department.

Thus was the question of the Royal Prerogative with regard to the command of the Army placed on a constitutional basis. "The General Commanding-in-Chief was formally declared to be a subordinate of the Minister of War;"[1] and that Minister was declared to be the channel through whom the Sovereign's commands were to be conveyed to the army.

All military work hitherto done at the War Office was transferred to the Horse Guards, both offices being made one, so that correspondence between the two offices should cease; it being clearly understood that no question should arise to prevent the Secretary of State from sending for any officer or any clerk in any military office, if he wished to examine him on any question of doubt.

Under the former duality of arrangement the officers of the military department were, under their immediate chiefs, responsible only to the Commander-in-Chief; and the Secretary of State was precluded from seeking their individual opinion on any matter. The continuance of such a system, after the transfer of all the military work to the Commander-in-Chief, would have made him the sole arbiter of questions for which the Secretary of State was held responsible.

Under the British Constitution, the Secretary of State

[1] *Annual Register* for 1870.

is necessarily a Member of Parliament, and must usually be a civilian and therefore without that sort of knowledge that pertains to a life spent in the military service. This is an unavoidable result of our Parliamentary system, and as it could not be changed, it was necessary to make the best arrangement for working it. To this end, it appeared to Lord Cardwell that the Secretary of State should surround himself with the best officers in the army as the heads of the various departments, so that after freely consulting them, he could form a sound judgment and come to a clear conclusion upon the great questions submitted for his decision.

While unity of direction and control is essential for practical efficiency, it must be combined with division of labour, and it was Lord Cardwell's aim to distribute the work under the three great administrative officers, in branches, each of which should have at its head an officer who should be acquainted with all the details of the department which he administered. By this means, responsibility could be brought home. In pursuance of this policy, he established a Director-General of Military Education, thus placing the questions relating to the qualifications of officers for first appointment and for subsequent promotion up to the rank of field officer, in the hands of a general officer whose rank would be sufficient to give authority to his office. The Auxiliary and Reserve forces were similarly placed under a general officer, in a separate branch which looked after the welfare of all the disembodied troops in the United Kingdom. By the formation of the Intelligence Branch he established a department by which the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State might be kept constantly informed on those matters that were necessary to enable them to form a judgment with regard to all questions whether of offence or defence. These three

branches were added to the Military Departments, and were placed under the Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

Under the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance were separate branches, each under a responsible head.

1. The Commissariat Department, under a Director of Supplies and Transport.

2. Stores and Munitions of War, under a Director of Artillery and Stores, with competent assistants for each subdivision.

3. Clothing Department, under a Director.

4. The Department of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, containing the two separate divisions of Barracks and Fortifications, each under a responsible head.

5. Contract Department, under a Director.

In this way was created a chain of responsibility which enabled the Secretary of State to obtain any detailed information which he required, and at the same time to bring home the responsibility for any shortcomings.

In abolishing the dual government of the army, a favourable opportunity was offered for effecting a reconstruction of the War Department upon a sound principle. Lord Cardwell had stated his intention of taking the Board of Admiralty as the model for the future government of the army; and he carried this out by distributing the administrative duties under separate officers, each of whom had a definite responsibility for the department over which he presided. For the consideration of great questions, these heads of departments met in council, but they had not the same position which the Lords of the Admiralty have under their patent. Hence we see that while a new First Lord has to follow, to a great extent, the general policy of the former Board, a new Secretary of State for War is expected by the public, and therefore thinks it necessary, to have a policy

of his own; and the administration of the War Department lacks that continuity of policy which is seen at the Admiralty, and which it was Lord Cardwell's aim to establish for the army. Had he remained in office as long as Lord Bathurst did,[1] he might have established the War Office on a basis so firm that it would not have been easy for a successor to have overturned it.

But although the army and the navy might thus both be administered on the same principles, Lord Cardwell was of opinion that something more was wanted to ensure a perfect co-operation between the two services. As he expressed it in his memorandum of 3rd December 1868, the safety of the country, in case of war, would depend not on the efficiency of either branch separately, but on the combined efficiency and united action of them both. With this end in view, Lord Cardwell held the opinion that while the War Office and the Admiralty should each continue their separate administration of the land and sea forces respectively, each under a Cabinet Minister, they should both be subject to one Secretary of State, a Minister of Defence, whose duty it would be to co-ordinate all the forces of the kingdom. He found that when any question arose between the two services, or when any matter was in question in which both were concerned, there was no one to decide between them, except the Prime Minister, who was not really in a position to give a scientific decision based on a proper knowledge of the merits of the case. This defect has since led to the constitution of a Council of Defence composed of Cabinet Ministers whose function it is, presumably, to deal with such matters. But this is obviously an imperfect arrangement, and does not secure co-operation between

[1] Earl Bathurst was Secretary of State for War and the Colonies from 1812 to 1827.

the two services. This question is so important that it cannot be treated in a cursory manner. It is sufficient to say here that it had not escaped the attention of a statesman so pre-eminently practical as Lord Cardwell.[1]

In his administration, Lord Cardwell always preached the "gospel of efficiency." He was ever ready to avail himself of the advice or opinions of experts not connected with the War Office, but he never parted with the control to irresponsible persons. Nothing can be more fatal to the efficiency, the discipline, and the *morale* of a public department than to confide to those who are not subject to the head of that department, the power of practically controlling the management. Such action may obtain the temporary applause of ill-informed critics, but it leads to extravagance and to weakness, where economy, stability, and strength are essential for the public good. He wished to fill the War Office with the best men he could find, whether soldiers or civilians, but he expected them to work with him and in subordination to his policy. It was not that he was not attentive to outside criticism; on the contrary, his old friend and school-fellow, Lord Selborne, said that "he sometimes watched too closely the currents of public opinion"; but he certainly did not yield the reins to every passenger who had a fancy to drive. The testimony of an experienced Under Secretary was that, of all the Secretaries of State under whom he had served, "Cardwell alone both did his own work thoroughly and saw that every one else in the office did the same."[2] He endured with calmness and courage the attacks made upon him by many who knew little of his policy, including some

[1] The laxity that has crept in of late years is shown from the fact that when the late war broke out, no instructions were given to the Commanders either of the army or the navy. Such a circumstance could hardly have occurred in former times.

[2] "Memorials, Personal and Political," Earl of Selborne.

belonging to the service whose welfare and efficiency was his sole aim.

Lord Cardwell's constant aim was to have a thoroughly efficient army, fitted for the objects for which the army is maintained. Those objects were to keep efficient and at full strength the garrisons of India, and of those colonies in which troops are maintained for Imperial purposes; to be able to send abroad, in case of necessity, two army corps each consisting of 30,000 men with ninety guns;[1] while in case of an invasion, such as was threatened by Napoleon in 1803, 400,000 men would have been under arms to repel the invader.

The war of 1870 brought into the foreground the weak points of the military machine, and the contest with regard to the abolition of purchase put the courage and endurance of the Secretary of State to a test to which a Minister is rarely exposed. He was the butt of every attack, but when he had withstood these, and the building, whose foundation he had laboriously laid during the first three years of his tenure of office, was beginning to show itself to public gaze, the voice of criticism died away, and the administration of the War Department became a source of strength to the Ministry during their declining days.

It was Lord Cardwell's earnest desire to see this country properly defended. Efficiency and economy should march hand in hand, and neither should take precedence of the other. Mr Gladstone has recorded in his private journal in 1861, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer and a reduction of the navy was urged by him, how

"Palmerston [Prime Minister] criticized, Lord John [Foreign Secretary] protested, and Cardwell! I think, went further than either. Never on any single occasion since this

[1] With the growth of the Army Reserve, it would become possible to put on foot a 3rd Army Corps of the same strength.

Government was formed has his voice been raised in the Cabinet for economy."[1]

If by economy is meant reduction at any price, then the observation may have been correct; but Mr Gladstone made a more just remark when Lord Cardwell opposed the reductions demanded of him in 1874, that he was "not an extravagant Minister."

It would indeed have been ungrateful not to have owned this. Lord Cardwell left the army estimates in 1874 at a lower figure than when he assumed office in 1868, and yet he had increased the strength of the army in the United Kingdom by twenty-five battalions and 156 field guns, while the army reserve available for foreign service had been raised from 3545 to 35,905 men; so that a far larger force was available for field service, though the cost was not greater. Nor was the saving due to an improper economy in the vote for stores, as had been suggested by a prominent critic; for his successor, Mr Gathorne-Hardy, when moving the army estimates on 30th March 1874, said, "we find that the supply of stores is so full and efficient that we can dispense with the payment of £100,000 under this head."

The question of stores is always a difficult one on account of deterioration and change of pattern. Lord Cardwell's views were that where time entered into the element of supply, those risks must be endured; but where it was only a question of money, and the articles needed could be obtained immediately on outbreak of war, though perhaps at an enhanced cost, it was better to suffer the extra expense when the necessity arose. Where time and money both entered into the question then the articles must be kept in store so that the risk may not be run of their not being ready when wanted.

1 "Life of Gladstone," ii. 24.

Every reduction in the estimates was carefully considered on its own merits and with regard to the general efficiency of the service. When greatly pressed at the end of 1873 to make further reductions, Lord Cardwell could not look at it from the point of view of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As well ask an engineer who has calculated the strain to which his building might be exposed, to diminish its strength as there appeared no prospect of a storm. He felt that the army stood at the lowest point compatible with efficiency, and he declined by further reductions to incur the risk to which the country might be exposed on some national emergency. In his "Life of Gladstone," Mr Morley has done justice to Lord Cardwell's memory when he says:

"The most marked adminstrative performance of Mr Gladstone's great Government was the reform and reorganization of the army. In Mr Cardwell he was fortunate enough to have a public servant of the first order, not a political leader nor a popular orator, but one of the best disciples of Peel's school; sound, careful, active, firm, and with an enlightened and independent mind admirably fitted for the effective despatch of business."

Another public writer described him as "an excellent specimen of the old-fashioned type of English statesman and administrator, industrious, clear-headed, and extremely sagacious."[1]

The work which he performed was described by Mr Gladstone in a speech at Greenwich in the following words:

"No man who ever held the seals of office since the Secretary for War was established, has done so much for the reform and efficiency of the army. He will leave behind him a name entitled to the approval and gratitude of the country."

[1] *The Times*, 16th February 1886.

The efficiency of his departmental re-organization was put to the test in 1882, when an expeditionary force was despatched to Egypt, at short notice, under the same distinguished soldier who had led the British forces to Kumassi. The successful result of the Egyptian campaign of 1882 not only enhanced Lord Wolseley's reputation in the eyes of Europe, but also greatly raised the prestige of the War Department in the opinion of the public. Mr Gladstone was again Prime Minister, but Lord Cardwell's health in 1880 had not admitted of his resuming office. He was not, however, forgotten in the hour of victory, when Mr Gladstone wrote to him the following letter:

"10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL,
15th September 1882.

"MY DEAR CARDWELL,—I write a hasty line to congratulate *you* on the spirit-stirring intelligence from Egypt which has overflowed us like the waves of a rising tide for three successive days, and which amounts, according to every appearance, to a termination alike rapid and successful of the War in Egypt.

"In his noble song on the 'Battle of the Baltic,' Campbell, our Tyrtæus, says:

"'Let us think of those who sleep,
Full many a fathom deep,
By thy wild and stormy steep,
Elsinore.'

"Happily, there are but few of our countrymen contributors in the field to this great work of whom we have to think with these mournful associations.

"But we must and do think of one who, far at this moment from the tumult of our labours and our joys, laid in other years the foundations of this great success, by his enlightened, courageous, and indefatigable work in the re-organization of the British army.

"I rejoice at this important juncture to render to you the testimony at once, I hope, of an old friend and of an impartial witness.—Believe me always, most sincerely yours, W. E. GLADSTONE.

The Viscount CARDWELL.

Thirty years have passed since Lord Cardwell left the War Office. Nine Secretaries of State[1] have since been responsible in turn for that efficient administration on which, after all, the success of any system, however excellent, must depend, and for adapting it to the new requirements of a later generation. It is no part of the present undertaking to discuss, or even to record, any changes made.

But now there is again, as there has been before, much talk of revolutionary reforms. These will, no doubt, be discussed upon their merits. With the aid of the evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the late war in South Africa and of their Report, the public will have means of judging how far our failures were due to faults of system, and how far to maladministration. May it not be added, how far to the public themselves, and to our parliamentary system of party politics?

The purpose of the foregoing pages has been to set in the clearest light—to a great extent in the light of Lord Cardwell's own papers and speeches—the fundamental principles of the present organization, in contrast to what he found existing, and to whatever may now be proposed to take the place of the system which he, after much consideration, thought best.

[1] Gathorne-Hardy, Stanley, Childers, Hartington, W. H. Smith (twice), Campbell-Bannerman (twice), Stanhope, Lansdowne, Brodrick.

[NOTE.—These pages had gone to press before the publication of the new War Office Scheme on 1st February, 1904.]

FIRST APPENDIX

See page 19

THE ARMY

I

IT will, I suppose, be acknowledged that the most important administrative question for the new Government will be a review of the two great spending Departments, the Army and the Navy; with a view at once to increased efficiency and to diminished expenditure. Not even the great political question of the day will cast this administrative question so far into the shade, as to prevent its being a question of cardinal importance for the Government.

I propose to deal at present with the Army only.

Fourteen years ago, the old system broke down: and in the middle of the disasters so occasioned, the new one was hastily established in its room. That new system was examined in 1860 by a very strong Committee, of which Sir James Graham was chairman. When he had concluded his labours, speaking to me of the War Department, he said: "I assure you the only word which will describe it properly is '*Chaos*.'"

It is not surprising that he should have said so; for no principle has ever been clearly laid down for the guidance of the Department. The Patent of the Secretary of State contains an exception, which, according to Lord Panmure,[1] is unnecessary; the effect of which is differently interpreted by Lord Herbert[2] and General Peel;[3] which, according to the Duke of Cambridge, is inoperative; and of which the Committee, in a paragraph suggested by Lord Herbert, has said: "that in whatever

[1] Report, 1860, Q. 46. [2] *Ibid.*, Q. 6425. [3] *Ibid.*, Q. 3599.

document the reservations now in these patents be recorded, the wording of them should be reconsidered and the limitation be more accurately defined, in consonance with existing usage, so as to avoid the anomaly of usage and the exigencies of the Service, necessitating the exercise by the Secretary of State of a direct authority beyond that which the reservations in his supplementary patent by its letter imply."

The idea embodied in the Patent is that of separating the civil from the military administration, that part which concerns Finance from that part which concerns Discipline, and placing the latter in the hands of the General-Commanding-in-Chief, the former in the hands of the Secretary of State for War.

Eight years have elapsed since Sir James Graham's Committee made its Report. It seems to me that dissatisfaction has been steadily on the increase, that the ministerial contradiction has culminated at last in the discrepancy which exists between the Treasury Minute on the appointment of Sir H. Storks, which was laid on the Table just before Parliament rose, on the one hand, and the Royal Speech proroguing Parliament on the other, and that the new House of Commons will require from the new Government that plain and intelligible statement of the principles on which the War Department is founded, which has been so often asked for, but has never yet been given.

I contend for the principle of plenary responsibility to Parliament on the part of the Parliamentary head of that Department; and, consequently, for the absence of all reservations express or implied from the authority of that officer.

I think it is impossible to contrast the evidence given in 1860 by Lord Panmure, General Peel, and Lord Herbert on the one side, with that given by Earl Grey upon the other, without feeling that compromise was the animating spirit of the former, clear constitutional principle of the latter. It is, I think, equally impossible not to feel that the public sentiment of 1868 is entirely different from that of 1860; that palliatives will no longer be permitted, and that the Reformed Parliament, resolved to obtain the greatest amount of efficiency at the smallest cost, will require a complete reformation of a system now universally pronounced to be unsatisfactory.

From the beginning to the end of his evidence Earl Grey lays down that it is "radically impossible to divide the administration of the Army into two parts,"[1] and that the attempt to do so creates in the Army "that state of confusion which has for many years existed in carrying on our service, and distrust of the civil authority which has necessarily the supreme control."

All the evidence which is printed in the Blue Book, and all the experience of the intervening years, as well as the reason of the thing, tend, in my opinion, to confirm this view; and this notwithstanding that the exalted rank, combined with the personal qualities of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief is calculated to reduce to a minimum the difficulties of an impossible position.

For this principle, then, I contend, viz. that an intelligible foundation shall be laid for the government of the Army; and that the superstructure shall be built up in conformity with it.

II

Earl Grey proceeds to apply his principle; and I think his application is practical, and might with advantage be adopted. Without saying that the present constitution of the Board of Admiralty is not susceptible of improvement, he maintains that the principle of it is right. He regards it as a great executive department, of which not policy of any kind, but simply administrative excellence, is the aim and object. The employment of the Army or the Navy is a proper question for the Cabinet; in case of war, primarily among the members of the Cabinet, for the head of the Government. The proper task for the head of the naval or military Department is simply that of raising the Navy or the Army to the highest possible state of efficiency, of which the means placed at his disposal by Parliament, on the requisition of the collective Government, will admit. Considering the vast importance of each of these two services, he thinks the head of each should be a member of the Cabinet; but he sees no reason why either should be a Secretary of State, or why the

[1] Committee, 1860, Qs. 5346, 5361, 5362.

decisions of the Cabinet, approved by the Sovereign, should not be conveyed to each of these heads of Departments by the Secretary of State for Foreign, or for Domestic, or for Colonial, or (I presume, if the case arise) for Indian affairs, as the case may be.

It is scarcely necessary to pursue the subject into detail, since in the main the constitution of the Board of Admiralty, though with some practical improvements, would be preserved, and would be the model adopted for the future government of the army.

I do not observe that Earl Grey was asked, or offered, his opinion on one point which seems to me to be of first importance, viz. this, that in case of war, safety must depend not on the efficiency of either branch of the service separately, but on the combined efficiency and united action of them both.

The orders which the Sovereign would give through a Secretary of State ought, as it appears to me, to come from one single authority, *i.e.* from the Cabinet, and above all from the head of the Cabinet, to the head of the Navy and to the head of the Army; and neither of these officers ought to be the Minister of War, in a higher sense than his colleague, who should preside over the sister service. I hope Mr Kinglake is mistaken in the extraordinary passage in which he asserts that the Duke of Newcastle privately, and without the knowledge of Sir James Graham, encouraged Lord Lyons to disobey the orders of Sir Deans Dundas; but such a statement is sufficient to suggest the possible mischief of an ill-assigned relation in time of war between the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty.

I am fully conscious of the great difficulties which surround the question of which I have thus treated; but I believe the time for parleying is past, and that the only safety lies in dealing with them without fear. I do not believe that the new Parliament will accept from the new Administration an ambiguous utterance on the subject.

III

There is probably no part of the whole system of the Army which will not be drawn into debate as soon as the estimates are discussed.

It has been the custom to say that practical efficiency must be preferred to theoretical excellence, and that any changes which are introduced must be gradual. But I doubt very much whether the plea of practical efficiency can be sustained; and whether the time has not arrived when wide and extensive changes will be imperatively demanded, and will meet with less real opposition than measures of a temporising and palliative character.

It is now seven or eight years since Lord Palmerston's Cabinet, following the advice of the Duke of Somerset's Commission, resolved that the principle of selection should be applied to the Lieutenant-Colonelcy of a regiment, in lieu of the principle of purchase. That step, however, has never yet been taken; and it may, I think, be doubted, whether Lord Grey was not right when he said:[1] "*If you touch the system of purchase at all, it would be wiser to abolish it altogether.*"

It may very well be that the House of Commons will be indulgent to a new Ministry proposing the army estimates of the now coming year; and will wait till 1870 for a complete exposition of its policy with respect to the Army. But even if this prove to be the case, I still expect that the following subjects, among others, will be brought into debate, and that something more than a merely passive attitude will be required concerning them from the ministers of the Crown.

1. Appointment and promotion of officers, involving purchase, seniority, selection, military colleges and examinations, and the relation of highly-educated officers to those who may be promoted from the ranks.

2. Recruiting; and this will raise the question whether service is to be for a long or short period; whether there shall not be a very considerable change in the proportionate numbers of men serving in the Colonies and of those serving at home—with a special provision for India—whether after a short service in the first army, the soldier

[1] Purchase Commission, 1857, Q. 4061.

shall not pass into a second army, with gradations to the mere militia, etc., etc., and interconnection of all services.

3. What inducements shall be held out in the way of
   (1) Civil Employment
   (2) Retirement, etc., etc., for officers and men: and herewith the great question whether the distinction between the Guards and the Line is to be preserved; and if so, whether the Corps d'élite shall not be a means of stimulating energetic service throughout the whole army, and of retaining for a longer period of service the men thought worthy of being selected for that corps.

This is a very formidable array of questions. It is wholly beside and independent of such questions as that of the position of Sir H. Storks which Mr Disraeli thought worthy of a place in the Queen's Speech, but which, in view of such questions as these, becomes a mere detail. I do not raise such questions as these, *proprio motu*, and from any fancy of my own. I believe they will raise themselves as surely as the estimates are proposed: and that it is absolutely impossible for any Liberal Government to decline the thorough investigation of them.

E. C.

3rd December 1868.

SECOND APPENDIX

See page 87

Lord Barrington to the Judge-Advocate-General.

WAR OFFICE,
8th February 1766.

SIR.—I have laid before the King your letter of 31st day of January, containing a report of the Board of General Officers on a matter referred to them by His Majesty in my letter of 3rd day of October last, touching the different prices to be given for commissions in the army in cases where he shall please to allow them to be sold. The King entirely approves the said Report, and every particular therein contained. His Majesty commands me to express his perfect satisfaction to the officers who have signed it, and to acquaint them that he will order what they recommend to be invariably observed for the future, under pain of his highest displeasure.

Having now finished what I am commanded by the King to communicate to the Board, I take this opportunity of conveying, through you, Sir, to the generals who compose it, some thoughts on a matter of great importance to the regiments they command, and indeed, to the whole army.

Colonels frequently recommend that officers in their respective corps should sell commissions which they did not buy. Long and faithful service has worn them out; they have families, the eldest in each rank are able and willing to purchase. They all deserve preferment, which, in time of peace can scarcely be obtained any other way. In short, the good of the corps, merit, and humanity all strongly plead for the indulgence which is recommended. It is no wonder that these arguments have so frequently succeeded when any one of them would be sufficient inducement, if there were not another side of the question.

Officers who buy are permitted to sell; men who find themselves growing old or infirm, dispose of their commissions, which are purchased by the young and the healthy; and thus what has been once bought continues for ever at sale, especially in time of peace, except now and then in a case of sudden or unexpected death. The consequence often is, that men who come into the army with the warmest dispositions to the service, whose business becomes their pleasure, who distinguish themselves on every occasion that offers, are kept all their lives in the lowest ranks because they are poor. These meritorious officers have often the cruel mortification of seeing themselves commanded by young men of opulent families, who came much later into the service, and whose fortunes have enabled them to amuse themselves frequently elsewhere; while the others, continually at quarters, have done the duty of those gentlemen, and have learnt their own.

Flagrant abuses seldom grow up at once, but arise from circumstances whose consequences were not foreseen. The first time a commission is sold, it is almost always bought by a good officer, the next in succession. He afterwards asks to sell. The corps is changed; the senior officers have merit and long service, but they have no money; this circumstance does not prevent the transaction, and the commission is purchased, perhaps by the youngest, least steady, and least experienced of that corps or of some other, to the infinite distress of many deserving men, and to the great scandal and detriment of the service. Like circumstances happen more or less every change, and bring with them the same distress and mischief. Each fresh commission brought to market multiplies both, and, therefore, instead of increasing purchases, they cannot be too much lessened, so far as is consistent with the invariable practice of the army.

That colonels of regiments should not attend to these consequences is not matter either of wonder or blame. Their care is extended no farther than to their own corps, and while they command it; but the officer of the Crown, who is intrusted with the important charge of the whole army—a body whose probable duration infinitely exceeds the short space allotted to individuals—cannot be too vigilant, lest confined temporary convenience or compassion should produce general permanent mischief or distress. To be firm in preventing future evil by immediate

refusal, is not the least difficult part of his duty. He must withstand the feelings of humanity, and the desire to please; he must expect the uncandid interpretation of the prejudiced, the hasty judgment of the ignorant, and the malignant conclusion of the disappointed; arrows shot in the dark, against which a good conscience is an indifferent defence. He must often contradict the passions and interests of the powerful, and even disappoint the wishes and expectations of the deserving. He must acquire a great many enemies, and lose a great many friends; and yet he had better suffer all this than do wrong.

It is of consequence that the army should know the rules of the service, and see the reason of them. That officers should sell what they bought, and no more, has long been a rule, and perhaps this letter will tend to explain the grounds on which it was established. If that rule be good, can it be too invariably observed? Specious distinctions will be made; they should never be admitted, for every deviation tends to disuse. Nothing can be more fatal for the army in general than occasional exceptions from good regulations; or give more advantage to the unjust attempts of the importunate and of the great. It is frequently asked, what can be done with an officer who is become useless to his corps through age, wounds, or infirmities?

It must be owned that there are too few comfortable retreats from active service in this country; however, our establishment affords some. The commission in the invalids, small governments, and other garrison employments always properly bestowed, would go a great way; till there can be a more ample provision, the young and healthy must do the duty of the old and infirm; and they can sufficiently do it in time of peace. Hereafter in their turn they may receive the like benefit themselves, and in the same time escape a thousand mortifications to which indigent merit is too often exposed. It frequently happens, in the army as elsewhere, that want of money is also accompanied by a want of assisting friends; but the poor though deserving officer should always find at the War Office a constant assertor of his rights, and faithful guardian of his interests. I am, etc.,

BARRINGTON.

CHARLES GOULD, ESQ.

THIRD APPENDIX

See page 141.

16th August 1871.

MY DEAR PALMER.—It was my impression that you had clearly expressed to me your opinion that the course which we took about the Royal Warrant was the least objectionable course that was open to us under the circumstances in which we were placed by the vote of the House of Lords.

I was, however, not present at the moment when Mr Torrens spoke, and besides he used, I understand, the strange expression that he would not believe you approved our course unless he heard it from your own lips.

May I say, if the occasion offers, that his reference to you was unfounded, and that you did consider our course the least objectionable course that was open to us after the vote of the House of Lords? Ever yours,

EDWARD CARDWELL.

TANTALLON HOUSE, NORTH BERWICK,
18th August 1871.

MY DEAR CARDWELL,—I am afraid my answer to your letter will hardly arrive in time to be of use. I was surprised to see the reference made to me in Mr Torrens's speech on Tuesday, and I need hardly assure you that as, on the one hand, my absence from London was due to no other cause whatever than my own private convenience (coupled with the belief that I should not be omitting any public duty which would require my continued presence in the House of Commons till the end of the session), so, on the other, I have never expressed myself to any one in private on the subject of the Army Bill or the Royal Warrant in a manner different from that in which I have spoken to

yourself, or so as in any way to account for the introduction of my name into Tuesday's debate. I have always thought and said that the issuing of such a warrant was within the undoubted power of the Crown, though to do so without having a sufficient assurance that Parliament would provide the necessary compensation for the officers who would otherwise suffer from such an exercise of royal power would not be just, and, therefore, would not be consistent with the spirit of the constitution, which vests all such powers in the Crown, in the confidence and for the purpose that right, not wrong, shall be done. I should have been glad if it had been generally and clearly understood from the beginning that, subject to the sense of Parliament being ascertained with reference to the point of compensation, the form of procedure would be that which was eventually adopted; because it is certainly an evil that the adoption of one constitutional mode of procedure rather than another should appear to arise from an adverse vote of the House of Lords. But I consider that the votes of the House of Commons had practically settled the question of compensation, as it was impossible that the Lords should exercise their power merely to prevent justice being done to the officers of the army, and this being so, as the permanent continuance of the purchase system had evidently become impossible, and as any unnecessary delay in putting an end to it must have been most injurious to the organization of the army, and most unjust to those officers who might want to sell out during the period of transition, it did and does still appear that the course which the Government took (after what I must always consider the ill-advised resolution of the House of Lords) was, as you express it, the least objectionable course which could be taken under the whole circumstances of the case. Yours, etc.,

ROUNDELL PALMER.

30th August 1871.

MY DEAR PALMER,—You will have seen the use I made of your letter. It was not my doing that Black Rod was arrested for a moment in his beneficent course; for I should have been satisfied, having begun your letter on the proper stage, to send it up to the reporters, if the hand of Fate had cut the thread of my recitation.

My present purpose is to raise an inquiry on that part of it, which suggests that we might as well have issued the Warrant *at first*, and only have asked for the money. Have you not overlooked the consideration which we regarded as cardinal, that we could not ask the House of Commons for money to pay the prohibited prices, in any other form than by a Bill, to which the House of Lords should be a party?

The course we actually took was, I submit, consistent throughout. We invited the House of Lords to concur in such a Bill; and we little doubted that they would. Had it not been for the Ulysses of Pembroke Lodge,[1] they would have so consented.

When they passed the suspensory resolution, we used the power of the Crown, backed by the pecuniary support of the House of Commons, and threw it upon the Lords to determine how far that support should be drawn upon. If the Lords had continued obstinate, we could only have asked the House of Commons for the regulation prices, until such time as reason should dawn again upon the horizon of the House of Lords. Ever yours,

EDWARD CARDWELL.

NORTH BERWICK,
1st September 1871.

MY DEAR CARDWELL,—I think you have not quite understood my meaning about the course, which (aided by the light, no doubt, of subsequent events) I think it would have been better to have taken as to the abolition of purchase. If there was any error on the part of the Government in reckoning too much upon the concurrence of the House of Lords in their Bill, I fully admit that it was a *most excusable* instance of want of foresight; for certainly, at the beginning of the session, I was as far as any man from anticipating (and I think nobody did anticipate) what afterwards happened. But there is this difference between the responsibility of the Government and that of other people: that the Government may be expected to shape their measures, so as to accomplish the ends which they deem necessary, with the greatest

[1] Earl Russell.

certainty, and the least degree of public hazard and inconvenience, in any contingency which may possibly happen: and when any one not sharing their responsibility has to judge, after the event, what course would have been best and wisest, he naturally judges that a state of things, of which the *possibility* was known, and which has actually occurred, ought to have been provided against as far as might be.

So judging, I think that the Army Bill (as far as it related to purchase) should have been originally framed upon the view that the existing Royal Warrant for purchase would be revoked by the authority which issued it, as soon as it should be ascertained that the necessary provision for the compensation to the officers would be made by Parliament: and should have been accompanied, at the time of its introduction, by a message from the Crown, recommending the question of compensation (in the event of such a Warrant being issued) to the consideration of Parliament. I suppose, if this had been done, it would have been quite practicable to provide for the compensation by Act of Parliament (as has been actually done) on a fixed and permanent footing, just as it proved to be at a later stage: and I suppose, also, that it would have been quite constitutional for the Crown, either on receiving an address from the House of Commons in reply to the message, or after the sense of the House of Commons had been sufficiently taken on the Bill itself, to have issued the Warrant (just as was actually done, naming a day sufficiently distant to enable the Bill to pass before the Warrant took effect), without waiting for the actual passing of the Bill, even through the House of Commons itself. In this way (everything else being the same as at present), the appearance of an intervention of the Crown, to counteract a vote of one branch of the Legislature, would have been avoided. Ever yours truly,

R. PALMER.

FOURTH APPENDIX

See page 237.

VICTORIA R.

WHEREAS, We deem it expedient, in order to prevent any doubts as to the powers and duties of the Commander-in-Chief with respect to the Government of Our Army and the Administration of Military Affairs, to express Our Will and Pleasure thereon. Now Our Will and Pleasure is, that the Military Command and Discipline of Our Army and Land Forces, as likewise the Appointments to and Promotions in the same, together with all powers relating to the Military Command and Discipline of Our Army, which, under and by any Patent or Commission from us, shall have been, or shall from time to time be, committed to, vested in, or regulated by the Commander-in-Chief of Our Forces, or the General Commanding Our Forces in Chief for the time being, shall be excepted from the Department of the Secretary of State for War.

And We are further pleased to declare Our Will and Pleasure to be, that all powers relating to the matters above enumerated shall be exercised, and all business relating thereto shall be transacted, by the Commander-in Chief of Our Forces for the time being, and shall be deemed to belong to his Office, subject always to Our General Control over the Government of the Army, and to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of Our Royal Prerogative in that behalf, and subject to any powers formerly exercised by the Secretary at War.

Given at Our Court at Balmoral, this 11th day of October 1861, in the 25th Year of Our Reign.

By Her Majesty's Command,

G. C. LEWIS.

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